Time and Determinism

[wayfriend]

Being constrained to a single choice is not free will.

As long as there is an alternative, you're not constrained to one option alone.

And if a series of cause and effect, including those that occur in the mind, dictate what you will choose, is there any alternative?

This is not the same as asking if there are multiple possible outcomes.

This is asking if determinism cannot completely dictate the outcome, and thus leave the final outcome up to a free will to choose.

[Fist and Faith]

And anyway, free will v. determinism only matters if you accept as a given that there's an all-powerful, all-knowing God out there somewhere who may or may not have already pulled your strings. As a Pagan who does *not* believe in the existence of such a God, well, to me, the whole argument is nonsensical.

It's possible that the universe is not the product of any cause at all, much less an all-powerful, all-knowing God who pulls our strings; yet its nature is such that it is not possible for anything to happen that is not the result of, basically, the laws of physics. All interactions of every bit of matter/energy, including those within our brains, are nothing but the result of collisions and interactions of everything that began at the first instant of the Big Bang. More interactions of more things than is possible for our minds to even imagine, much less calculate into the future. But it could be the way things actually are. I don't believe it, myself. I feel my own free will every moment I'm conscious. I'm just saying, entirely cause & effect, and no God.

I am using free will to mean the ability to choose, and act based on that choice.

I would put it to you that this is a poorly formed premise.

A die can choose a number when thrown. That does not warrant the claim that it has free will.

Free will is the ability to choose by will alone. Therefore, it must be choice without constraint. Any constraint.

If you can only choose what a decision tree of cause and effect determine you must choose, then you are constrained to a single choice. This is true even if that decision tree is one that includes judgements and emotions in the sequences of causes and effects.

Being constrained to a single choice is not free will.

And when it comes to certain matters - for example, divine judgement - it matters utterly and completely whether you have actual free will vs the illusion of free will.

I think you're insisting on to much. Or too little. Whichever. I cannot choose to live on arsenic. I can choose to eat it, but... That constraint, however, does not prevent me from freely choosing between ice cream and pie for desert. I imagine we can find many other constraints, possibly even severe ones, that do not prevent free will.

[hierachy]

I am using free will to mean the ability to choose, and act based on that choice.

I would put it to you that this is a poorly formed premise.

A die can choose a number when thrown. That does not warrant the claim that it has free will.

Choose meaning a conscious decision.

Free will is the ability to choose by will alone. Therefore, it must be choice without constraint. Any constraint.

If you can only choose what a decision tree of cause and effect determine you must choose, then you are constrained to a single choice. This is true even if that decision tree is one that includes judgements and emotions in the sequences of causes and effects.

Causality is not a constraint on our volitional functions, but a fundamental aspect of them.

Choice (as a conscious process) combined with sapience (otherwise who's will is it?), is sufficient to meet the criteria of free will as defined in my previous post.

If you have any problems with my definition of free will (other than the one I just addressed), I would be more than happy to discuss them.

Edit: in fact I would like to amend my previous definition to include sapience (as without self-identity, action can hardly be considered will).

And when it comes to certain matters - for example, divine judgement - it matters utterly and completely whether you have actual free will vs the illusion of free will.

If there were an omniscient creator then I agree it would be very important to differentiate between determined sapient will and non determined sapient will. However, as an atheist I do not consider it to be an issue and will keep out of this branch of the discussion.

[aliantha]

And anyway, free will v. determinism only matters if you accept as a given that there's an all-powerful, all-knowing God out there somewhere who may or may not have already pulled your strings. As a Pagan who does *not* believe in the existence of such a God, well, to me, the whole argument is nonsensical.

It's possible that the universe is not the product of any cause at all, much less an all-powerful, all-knowing God who pulls our strings; yet its nature is such that it is not possible for anything to happen that is not the result of, basically, the laws of physics. All interactions of every bit of matter/energy, including those within our brains, are nothing but the result of collisions and interactions of everything that began at the first instant of the Big Bang. More interactions of more things than is possible for our minds to even imagine, much less calculate into the future. But it could be the way things actually are. I don't believe it, myself. I feel my own free will every moment I'm conscious. I'm just saying, entirely cause & effect, and no God.

Oh fine. I grant you that it's *possible* that everything since (and perhaps including?) the Big Bang could be the result of the laws of physics, and so predetermined, without a Divine Hand of Providence being part of it.

[Avatar]

Wait, wait, we didn't sort out the issue of the die "choosing" yet.

This is asking if determinism cannot completely dictate the outcome, and thus leave the final outcome up to a free will to choose.

Now I wonder if we were agreeing all along.

I believe in a cause and effect universe. But I don't believe that effects are necessarily invetiable, given a specific cause. I think cause determines a lot of things...most things. But I think that it is possible for the will to overcome cause, and determine effect.

--A

[wayfriend]

As to the die choosing ...

If all our choices are the sum of cause and effect, including causes and effects which might be in our mental state, then we are nothing more than engines which produce a result nased on the state of the universe.

That's what a die does - when cast, it reacts to how you threw it and what it bumps into and produces a result. It's an engine which makes a choice based on the state of the universe.

By "choice" here, I mean one result is chosen out of several possible outcomes. A "collapse' in quantum physics, if you like.

All that's different between us and a die, if you accept the premise that all our choices are the sum of cause and effect, is that the die is not conscious of choosing, and does not include a mental state in its choice. We are, and we do. Other things lie along a graduation between us and that die ... chimps, dogs, mice, insects, jellyfish, viruses ... (Cats are between lichens and ferns somewhere.)

Being conscious of making a choice, but a choice based on the sum of cause and effect, creates an illusion of free will. It's an illusion because we see how our mental state, even our whim, controls the outcome ... but our mental states and our whims are only the sum of other causes and other effects. Everything you can point to and call "will" is actually, by a chain of cause and effect, predetermined by the state of the universe.

So if you want to believe in free will, that more than the state of the universe goes into the choices we make, that there is something more than the sum of cause and effect which produces them, then you need to believe that there are effects that are not caused. Effects that come into being by an act of will alone, and which is not calculated from the state of the universe. Which comes from some ultimate, utter source that you call "me".

[Avatar]

Aha, gotcha. But if you throw a die exactly the same way (or build a machine to do it) 100 times, (giving it the same cause as it were), does it always show the same face?

And don't you think it's possible to over-ride the cause? To do the thing that every part of you says not to do? (Or vice versa of course.)

I like that bit about the "me" producing a causeless effect...I might be able to go with that. But then, might the "me" not be the cause itself?

--A

[wayfriend]

Coninuing with my personal opinion .... The whole point behind determinism is that it's deterministic - the same cause always has the same effect, the same state always produces the same result. No freedom.

So if human will is deterministic, then you must always make the same decision given the same exact circumstances. (BTW, the exact same circumstances are only theorhetically possible if we include cognition. The second time you do something, you remember the first time you did something, and that changes the circumstances.)

On the other hand, if you believe that there's randomness anywhere in cause and effect, then you have ruled out determinism. Because you can't guarantee the same results from the same initial state. By definition, nothing is deterministic. Not even human will.

On the other other hand, randomness alone cannot be sufficient for "free will". A will that makes choices randomly is no more free than an engine that computes choices. Instead of being constrained, it is at the mercy of randomness, and no one has any power or control over randomness, by definition.

Therefore, free will necessitates two things: (a) that we are not deterministic - that the same circumstances will not always produce the same choices, and (b) this "something" is not randomness, but something that we (all us me's) can influence.

Hence, the idea that there can be an effect without a cause. (Bad word choice there, upon reflection.)

For if we can effect things in the universe by our will, and our will is not just the effect of some other cause, then our will is a "primary cause". (If our will is only the effect of some other causes, then it's an illusory will, because we have no control over it.)

("Primary cause" is a better word choice.)

Which gives us something that seems reserved for the Gods. In that way, we would be gods.

[hierachy]

A die "chooses" based on the external forces acting upon it.

An animal of somewhat developed brain functions "chooses" based on an interaction of its percepts and instincts.

A human chooses based on an interaction of perceptual data with concepts, or purely conceptually.

Crate a continuum if you will, but it is essential to note critical points of development at which consciousness fundamentally changes the nature of decision-making.

[wayfriend]

Crate a continuum if you will, but it is essential to note critical points of development at which consciousness fundamentally changes the nature of decision-making.

Agreed.

A die exists in a matrix of state. It's state, and the state of its environment.

If you believe in determinism, then what changes is this: the more human you are, the more cognitive state factors into making a choice. And the more human you are, the more you are aware you are making a choice. (Which becomes cognitive state, which factors into making a choice.)

However, if your will is based on deterministic effects, then what doesn't change is that the choice you make is merely, only, and solely a calculation based on a matrix of state. Inputs go in, a single choice comes out. Same inputs, same outputs.

So both you and a die are choice engines. Merely choice engines.

Free will demands that the same inputs can cause different outputs. Otherwise, we are a slave to the matrix of state, and aren't free.

And that the difference is under the control of our will.

[hierachy]

If you believe in determinism, then what changes is this: the more human you are, the more cognitive state factors into making a choice. And the more human you are, the more you are aware you are making a choice. (Which becomes cognitive state, which factors into making a choice.)

However, if your will is based on deterministic effects, then what doesn't change is that the choice you make is merely, only, and solely a calculation based on a matrix of state. Inputs go in, a single choice comes out. Same inputs, same outputs.

So both you and a die are choice engines. Merely choice engines.

Free will demands that the same inputs can cause different outputs. Otherwise, we are a slave to the matrix of state, and aren't free.

Your criteria for free will differs from mine. I have never supported the idea that consciousness somehow exists beyond the determined nature of causality (assuming determinism is true). I simply see the functions themselves as sufficient in every way that actually matters (self identity, values, etc).

I believe the classical view of free will that requires the human mind to create an effect without cause is unreasonable, and almost certainly false (regardless of whether the universe is determined or undetermined--as you said, randomness does not account for free will).

The 'free' in free will: in my view it is the ability to decide upon a course of action based on conscious value-judgements, as opposed to a percept-instinct-action level of existence.

[Avatar]

A die "chooses" based on the external forces acting upon it.

I still think "choice" is the wrong word. The die may display a certain face based on those external forces, but choice is a conscious action.

--A

[hierachy]

A die "chooses" based on the external forces acting upon it.

I still think "choice" is the wrong word. The die may display a certain face based on those external forces, but choice is a conscious action.

--A

I agree. The terminology was borrowed, not my own.

[Cagliostro]

I've never understood those that hold the view of determinism (my apologies to those that might here). If everything has been determined, then whatever you say and do makes no difference, as you are essentially just doing what you were going to do anyway. But with free will, you take responsibility for your actions, and the consequences of those actions. It is all you, as you were the one that chose to take that action. I've felt determinism is just a way to dismiss responsibility when you screw up. But maybe I'm missing the boat on the argument.

But my argument runs a bit like the opposite of Pascal's Wager, which essentially is "if God exists, then believing in him/her/it/them makes sense, as there are no repercussions if God doesn't exist. You've got both bases covered in believing in God." Of course, the question remains in which God or Gods to follow to avoid being cast into the lake of fire/anally raped by demons for the rest of eternity or at least until your next rebirth/or other really bad things. Unfortunately, I'm still not logical enough to throw my lot in with one yet. But I try to be a moral person, and hope that in the ultimate pass/fail, I will just squeak by. If it comes to that, that is.

I like the choice engine discussion though. It makes some sense, but I can't help but be uncomfortable. And yes, there is still room for paradoxes in all of it. For example, my life course is predermined - I'll always be some schlub that never got off his ass to take the chance at the longshot of a career, and will essentially be another cog in the wheel, but I have the free will to say, for instance, a nonsense word like "splanoogi" that God or the Great Geometric never saw coming. Kinda like wizards in a lot of books, where they see what is coming up, but don't know all the factors leading up to it.

[lucimay]

Unfortunately, I'm still not logical enough to throw my lot in with one yet.

i think that's a good thing, Cag, not an unfortunate one.
there's no doubt in my mind (as i believe i have stated elsewhere in
another thread) that "gods" (for lack of a better thing to call them)
exist. i further assert it is NOT necessarily a "good" thing to throw
your lot in with with them nor trust your immortal soul to their care-taking.
i just don't buy that they give a flying shit about your immortal soul
except insofar as it can serve their undoubtedly obscured purposes.

The roots of the notion of determinism surely lie in a very common philosophical idea: the idea that everything can, in principle, be explained, or that everything that is, has a sufficient reason for being and being as it is, and not otherwise.

now, if you don't buy that everything can be explained or that everything that is has sufficient reason for being or being as it is, then determinism is not for you.

[Zarathustra]

If all our choices are the sum of cause and effect, including causes and effects which might be in our mental state, then we are nothing more than engines which produce a result based on the state of the universe.

To jump back into the discussion, this is a good place to start. There’s nothing inherently problematic here until we get to the “mental state” part. If a mental state can be a cause—not merely an effect—then all bets are off. The “nothing more” part is no longer sustainable, because a sufficiently complex mental state (i.e. one that includes self-awareness) introduces a feedback loop into this system that is not itself a cause/effect of merely physical processes. Sure, the body produces consciousness. But when consciousness acts back upon the body (i.e. becomes a “cause”), this is distinct from the body acting on the body. It’s different from two billiard balls colliding. It introduces information, meaning, and understanding into the causal chain. Understanding and meaning are not physical entities. They are not electrons moving along synapses. They are holistic processes which are greater than the sum of their parts. They transcend the mere materiality of their causes. And when a “trans-material” entity can act as a cause back upon the material, you most certainly do have something which is more than mere "engines which produce a result based on the state of the universe." The state of the universe doesn’t include awareness of the state of the universe. Mental states aren’t physical states. Conscious knowledge isn’t a physical state (though it’s produced by physical states). For instance, you wouldn’t say that me knowing how to do calculus is the same as the universe knowing how to do calculus (though I might!). If the universe itself knows how to do calculus, and the universe itself is conscious, then what’s the problem with thinking of us as self-caused gods? If that’s the case, then we’re already talking about something much more profound than the idea of human freewill. (Which, again, I believe is the case.)

Otherwise, if there is nothing transcendental about self-consciousness, then there is no distinction between our conscious decisions and the actions of a zombie—or a body which possesses no self-consciousness.

Being conscious of making a choice, but a choice based on the sum of cause and effect, creates an illusion of free will.

Not unless consciousness is itself an illusion (some modern philosophers actually think this, like Daniel C. Dennett). In other words, for this to be true, the possibility of consciousness being a cause would have to be an illusion, too. And the qualitative nature of consciousness would have to be an illusion (such as the distinctive conscious recognition of the color of red, as opposed to the physical electromagnetic frequency which elicits this particular mental state). Thus, mental states couldn’t affect physical states. They would be mere shadows on the wall, epiphenomenons that have no cross-causation between mental states, only a chain of physical causation beneath them . . . like shadow puppets that don't ever really touch each other (much less the hands that produce them).

Obviously, I disagree. I think that mind does influence body. I think mind influences mind. When Donaldson shares a story with us, this is more than the chemical reactions in his brain producing chemical reactions in our brains. To describe the interaction as such would be to ignore the way human experience and meaning is transferred through symbols. This happens on a level that transcends chemical reactions in the brain. Symbolic information affects us. And yet symbols are abstract, and immaterial. If symbolic information is not more than merely the current state of the physical universe, then there is no essential difference between a Donaldson book and a book of jumbled letters. In both cases, the state of the physical universe contains atoms of ink arranged on wood pulp, but in the former case, there is *more.*

It's an illusion because we see how our mental state, even our whim, controls the outcome ... but our mental states and our whims are only the sum of other causes and other effects. Everything you can point to and call "will" is actually, by a chain of cause and effect, predetermined by the state of the universe.

But if mental states are inserted into that chain, then this is exactly the self-caused effect you claim is an illusion. It is conscious will (though I wouldn’t call entirely free).

So if you want to believe in free will, that more than the state of the universe goes into the choices we make, that there is something more than the sum of cause and effect which produces them, then you need to believe that there are effects that are not caused. Effects that come into being by an act of will alone, and which is not calculated from the state of the universe. Which comes from some ultimate, utter source that you call "me".

Yes, exactly. That’s what I believe. I agree with everything in that paragraph except for the conclusion that the effects in question must be causeless. Instead, I’d say they are (sometimes) caused (or affected) by something more than the state of the universe—i.e. mental states themselves. With your wording, without this distinction, you seem to assume that if something is caused by more than the state of the universe, then it is essentially a causeless effect (in other words, you must assume that no cause can arise from "more than the state of the universe"). But that’s a position that can only arise by assuming that mental states, as distinct from physical states, don’t exist (because if you admit they do exist, then this is an existing entity that's more than the physical state of the universe, and thus there is no need to conclude that we must ascribe to "effects that are not caused," becuase that real existent entity can be the cause).

And if that's the case, mental states are illusions—effects which can’t in turn be causes. That’s an even stranger entity than the entity you’re criticizing—an effect which has no cause. An effect which can’t cause anything isn’t even a state of the universe (because all states of the universe—all physical effects—can in turn exert causal force). A mental state characterized as an effect which can’t exert causal force is a nonsensical entity. An illusion. (In other words, you'd have to claim that mental states are identical to and nothing more than mere physical states.)

And yet if mental states can exert causal force, then the criteria set out by your paragraph above are met: more than the state of the universe goes into the choices we make. It doesn’t have to be a Primary Cause, as you say later. There is a third alternative between your dichotomy of determinism and uncaused effects: holistic causation. Consciousness being more than the sum of its parts (i.e. the chain of physical causes which produces it), and producing a feedback loop of symbolic, reflective, meaningful awareness into the physical system, avoids the conceptual paradox you’ve delineated.

("Primary cause" is a better word choice.)

Which gives us something that seems reserved for the Gods. In that way, we would be gods.

Yes, I agree. It’s time we wake up to our godhood. The universe is alive, fellow pieces of the universe!

[wayfriend]

Malik,

First of all, I don't have a position on whether the universe is predeterministic or not. But it if is, some things follow some things. And what follows is that free will is not possible.

Predeterminism means that all mental state, in its entirety, eventually leads back to external, physical causes. Yes, the mind has a feedback loop, and it may be that the some is greater than it's parts, on these I can agree. But even so, each bit of your mental state is caused either by physical stimulus or another bit of mental state. And that, in turn, is caused by either a physical stimulus or another bit of mental state. On and on and on. Eventually, all paths lead to a physical stimulus on the end.

To prove that's true, just consider that you came into existance, and so at one point there was no mental state. One's mental state comes into being from physical stimulus (including the physical stimulus of ontogeny).

The only way that this hypothesis - that all mental state ultimately derives from physical stimulus - could be false is to introduce an idea that we have something in us that can be a primary cause.

And if you propose that, you are proposing something that is contrary to predeterminism. A primary cause, by definition, cannot be predected.

If a mental state can be a cause—not merely an effect—then all bets are off.

On that I agree. I have only tried to say that predeterminsm denies that this is possible. So you either have to relinquish the idea of mind being a cause, or that the universe is predetermined.

In other words, for this to be true, the possibility of consciousness being a cause would have to be an illusion, too.

On that I agree. And I can see easily how it could be so. Chains of cause and effect leading through a complex mental processes before ultimately being sourced in the physical world would be so fundamental to the way our mind works that we would not notice it. We would only be conscious of decisions that come out of that mental state.

But, again, this is a consequence of predeterminism. You either need to relinquish the idea that conscciousness is a cause, or that the universe is predetermined.

I agree with everything in that paragraph except for the conclusion that the effects in question must be causeless. Instead, I’d say they are (sometimes) caused (or affected) by something more than the state of the universe—i.e. mental states themselves. With your wording, without this distinction, you seem to assume that if something is caused by more than the state of the universe, then it is essentially a causeless effect (in other words, you must assume that no cause can arise from "more than the state of the universe").

As I said above, perhaps "primary cause" is a better way to say what I mean. If I had said it that way, I think we'd be on the same page.

If something is not caused by the state of the universe, then it is caused by something else. What is something else? Whatever it is, by definition it is not something which produces effects based on things acting upon it. If it produced effects based on things acting upon it, it is not a primary cause, just a link in a chain of cause and effect. So something that produces an effect with nothing that causes it is a "primary cause".

(If you think about it, such a primary cause would be invisible, impenetrable, and undetectable, by definition. EXCEPT you could deduce it's presence by the effects it produces. Effects would seem to be produced "out of thin air". An apparently causeless effect. Hence, the reason I sometimes (mistakenly) use the term "causeless". I should fix that.)

"Primary cause" alone is not "free will". For the will is partially, even almost totally at times, something which is modified by the state of the universe. But there must be some aspect of it, contributing some piece, sometimes tiny, sometimes large, which is not. Or else it isn't free.

[Zarathustra]

First of all, I don't have a position on whether the universe is predeterministic or not. But it if is, some things follow some things. And what follows is that free will is not possible.

I suspected that, which is why I said at the beginning of my post that I was "jumping back in," meaning that I hadn't read everything between this page and my last post months ago. Going back and reading it now, I do think we're very close to being on the same page. Like you, I was arguing against a chain of reasoning (which you presented), and not so much against you. [It's nice to have a pure "formal" debate without any partisan entrenchment dividing us. ]

I think I can agree with everything in your last post. So this is just an expansion on my own views.

I don't think existence is entirely physical. While I don't believe in Heaven or a world beyond this universe or souls, I'm not a materialist. I don't subscribe to materialistic reductionism--i.e. the belief that mental states can be reduced to the physical states which produce them. That's where "more than the sum of the parts" idea comes in. There is the physical brain state which produces consciousness, and then once it's produced, that consciousness "rides on top of" the physical state as an additional set of properties that aren't themselves physical, like qualia, intentionality, and self-consciousness. Qualia are the qualitative "seemings" of mental states and mental objects. There is nothing about any atom or molecule or physical state that "seems like" red. No equation can capture how this mental state seems to me. Intentionality is the "aboutness" of mental states. There is no property of atoms or molecules or physical states that is about another atom or physical state. Yet, consciousness can be about atoms, or Donaldson characters. Consciousness can be directed to objects (in fact, it always is directed to some object, either mental or physical). No physical theory can capture this aboutness, this intentionality, this "directed-to" and "holding-of."

Another way that existence isn't solely physical is when you consider the Ideal. Formal relations. Logic. Numbers. Math. The relations between these immaterial entities are distinct, objective, and timeless. Those relations are true even when we don't "hold them in our head" while we ponder them. They are the same no matter which subjective person ponders them. There is no subjective component to the relation between the numbers 2 and 4 (except the intentionality of the consciousness directed toward these ideal objects when they are thought--but that doesn't alter or color the objective, ideal relation itself). Unlike physical objects, there is no disturbing the system when we ponder formal systems. For instance, when we look at an object, we are absorbing photons which bounce off of it, and thus becoming part of the physical system itself, collapsing the quantum waves of the photons, and introducing the act of our observation into the system. But this isn't case for ideal objects. There is no Heisenberg Uncertainty problems from "observing" formal systems. We can apprehend them without altering them.

So there is a sense in which these formal structures exist on a level beyond us, beyond the physical. They were "there" before we discovered them. We don't invent these relations. We track them down. We merely explore them. Sure, we invent conceptual tools to explore them, and symbols to relate them to ourselves, but the numerical difference between 2 and 4 was something that always held even before humans existed to know it.

So they are separate from the physical, distinct from us (i.e. "objective"), And yet we can still reach them. Consciousness bridges the "divide" between the actual and the ideal, between the contingent (i.e. depending upon causal chains) and the necessary (i.e. true regardless of context or conditions). Formal relations aren't effects (nothing causes 2 + 2 to equal 4) and they aren't causes. But consciousness can take those relations and produce effects upon the world. Like architecture. Or science. Or art. We can take our awareness of formal relations and build order in the physical world.

And, in fact, the physical world itself "blindly" follows patterns of the ideal. Matter travels along paths that can be traced with numbers (though not necessarily deterministically--got to remember quantum randomness at the root of everything). So there is a deep, mysterious connection between the actual and the ideal even before we come along to make use of that connection--and embody that connection--with our mind/body connection.

This is what I mean about existence being more than merely physical. It is also ideal or formal. And that ideal/formal isn't merely something we invent, because matter was already following these paths long before we existed. But even if no matter existed at all, even if there was no universe, 2 + 2 would still equal 4. That relation doesn't need a universe, or conscious beings, to be true. Its reality transcends physical existence.

So, back to determinism and freewill . . . since there is a part of the universe (us) which can access the ideal with consciousness, and intentionally make use of these formal structures (meaning, information, etc.), then we are doing something completely different from unconscious matter. Matter can't manipulate and make use of formal structures, information, and meaning. It merely "blindly" follows formal patterns. But we can make use of the ideal. And thus we can access a level that is beyond the physical state of the universe, and step out of the chain of cause/effect, and bring the ideal back into the universe in a new way that wouldn't have happened without conscious understanding of abstract, immaterial, ideal objects. Thus, there is no way that could have been programmed into the universe from the beginning.

[Avatar]

Yes, I agree. It’s time we wake up to our godhood. The universe is alive, fellow pieces of the universe!

We are gods. As much as, or more than, anything else can be. Of course, what we mean by it might not be quite as traditional as religions would have us believe.

Jesus answered them, "Is it not written in your Law, 'I have said you are gods'

--A

[Fist and Faith]

And from Conversations With God:

Look, he [Jesus] said, at what I can do, and know that these things, and more, shall you also do. For have I not said, ye are gods? If you cannot, then, believe in yourself, believe in me.

And what about that other quote you and I love, Av? Should you say it, or should I?