Well, to be fair to Donaldson, he does admit that it has wider applicability and meaning. He just insists that this isn't his intention. While it might be unavoidable for a rich story to have wider applicability, seeing that applicability is something done by the reader, not inserted by the writer (he'd claim).TheFallen wrote:He can't possibly expect us to accept that the resolutions of all three sets of chrons - and especially the culmination of the LCs - is only significant to the main protagonist and has no wider applicability or meaning.
I think his point is more subtle than you're giving him credit, because he doesn't deny that his own philosophy informs his story. He would merely claim that this is a subconscious effect of being the kind of person he is, the kind of writer he is.TheFallen wrote:To claim that he created such, but that none of it was informed or coloured by his own philosophy is frankly ridiculous.
I just don't accept that it's subconscious or unintentional.
But observations can be inaccurate, whereas experiences are what they are, in themselves--which is why Donaldson makes the distinction, and claims that the observation can't be his intention, because it's yours ... it's something added to the experience by the reader, who might be wrong. His goal was only to create a certain experience.TheFallen wrote:... the most skilfully constructed of allegories work simultaneously on both the levels of narrative and meaning: the reader is emotionally caught up in the narrative (the "experience", if you like), while the subliminal level of meaning (the "observation, if you like) percolates through at the same time.
Again, there is a parallel in Heidegger here, because in order to realize the general ontological nature of your specific ontic life, you must "step back" from your average-everyday attitude/orientation ... indeed, step back from the very level at which your life is lived (i.e. the "experience"), in order to consider it thematically (the "observation"). And such a reflective attitude, a thematization of one's life, is in some sense inauthentic because it's not really our "normal" way of living. Indeed, just like interpretting the meaning of a book, we can get the thematization of our own Being wrong ... as Heidegger thinks most philosophers have done prior to him. We can apply the wrong model or categories for viewing our own Being, just as we can for a book. For instance, maybe it's not Jungian after all (though I agree you analysis seems justified).
But Heidegger also points out that similar errors can occur by not examining your life at all, not being reflective at all (or for our purposes here: by not making "observations" of stories at all). And this is because it's impossible for us to not have *some* theoretical understanding of our Being, because we are creatures for whom our Being is an issue; e.g. we necessarily choose our ontic state. So if this pre-ontological (or pre-observational) understanding is all we ever have, and it's the inchoate product of never examining our lives explicitly, rigorously, then it's likely to be full of misconceptions or inauthenticity.
And this brings us back to your complaint, because I think a story can't be devoid of *some* symbolic understanding. It's simply the nature of fiction to stand in a symbolic relation to reality. So to deny that it exists at all--or that it could be ignored while reading--would be inauthentic. And if it exists, and only exists because the author created the story, then it must be in some sense intentional.
As for your 4th wall points, I think this wall is broken more by the obvious hand of the author in his plot contrivances, the choices that are made to preserve reader (or even character) ignorance, so that the payoff of the "big reveal" is bigger, or so that the plot can happen at all. The symbolism doesn't break it for me.
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