Kevin's Watch

Sorry, Z. I've been pretty busy the last few days. I have not read your last post yet. But I still have the same problem. I don't know where to go with this conversation. Is there evidence that any of us could have chosen other than we did in any situation? I ask sincerely, because I know that I don't know much about this. And I know there is some bizarre stuff out there. For example, in the quantum world, I'm told that, in certain circumstances, the state of a particle is not determined until it's counterpart's state is observed; that, in fact, the observation of the counterpart is what determines the particles state. Utter insanity, but verifiable fact. So I couldn't guess what evidence there might be for the non-materialistic reductionism argument.

Fist and Faith wrote: So I couldn't guess what evidence there might be for the non-materialistic reductionism argument.

Not non-materialistic reductionism. Material expansionism. Emergence due to scale, relationships, complexity. Everything DOES depend on the material---must be consistent and coherent with it. An ocean DEPENDS on molecular H20---but what it is/does is not and cannot be or be done by a molecule of H20. [[don't take that analogy TOO literally.]] [[I think that's bearing a few distinct resemblances to a fair amount of what Z has said, if I'm reading him correctly]].

Speaking of you, Z.
---Yea, definitely "as currently construed" is a big deal

---I think you missed something in the 'qualia/intentionality aren't necessary' section. They may in fact not be necessary---but the brain/creature that has them has an enormous advantage over the identical brain/creature without them. [[maybe you were on to that and I missed it in my quick skim through---there were a lot of words. ]]
But I think they ARE necessary for actual intelligence/consciousness. It's imaginable that some brain could create the word "iron" and the same brain could see the element "iron" in the rock. But without something that functions like qualia, and something that functions like intention, they could not, ironically, forge the connection between the two things.


---"Why can't effects be causes," or however you said it, similar to that...uh huh. yep. If a magnet can make an electric current, then an electric current can make a magnet. If a chemical reaction can make a thought, then a thought can make a chemical reaction. Not perfectly accurate, I'm sure. Likely way more complicated and a bit stranger...nevertheless, the evidence such as it is, more strongly supports that than the "it's an illusion!" claim---which isn't much more than an assertion.

Just a few random things while I had a minute.

Fist and Faith wrote:Is there evidence that any of us could have chosen other than we did in any situation?

That would be a very simple experiment to conduct. Have a subject with two options available ... say, two different desserts. Let them pick one. On the second trial, ask them to see if they can pick the other. If I can choose either of two desserts, on multiple trials, going back and forth between either one, clearly nothing prevents me from choosing either one. Since the situations aren't any different each time, then we can conclude that we could have chosen otherwise in any of these given situations.

Sure, you could say that my brain somehow forces me to pick a particular one each time, even when I'm picking different ones, but the burden of proof would be on you in that case, because the evidence of the trials suggests otherwise. If I'm "hardwired" to be predisposed to a certain choice in any given moment, then how would this "wiring" change from one moment to the next? How is it even meaningful to talk about my choice being determined by my brain, if I'm always open to another option? Given my willingness to try other options, there's no evidence whatsoever that my choice has been determined by anything other than my will.

You could also say it's random ... but that would violate your own theory that the brain is causing each choice through a physical cause-and-effect chain reducible to the laws of science--which can't be random if they're deterministic, not unless you're saying that each choice is a quantum event.

Fist and Faith wrote:So I couldn't guess what evidence there might be for the non-materialistic reductionism argument.

I've been giving evidence. I've pointed out numerous phenomena (consciousness, qualia, intentionality, purpose, will) that can't be reduced to materialism. The response is always to discount or diminish the evidence, even to claim it's an illusion. As long as that claim isn't proven, the evidence remains irreducible. And I think I've shown that for some of these--especially purposeful, goal-oriented action--we're not talking about illusions.

Mental phenomena are a given. They *are* immaterial, as they appear to us. The fact that you can't view mine is evidence that they utterly different from objective, material things which are observable to everyone. The theory is that they're reducible via materialism, so the burden of providing evidence and proof is on those who propose that theory. As mental phenomena are given to us in our experience, they are already immaterial. That's how they start. For us to conclude that something is other than it appears, it must be proven.

Vraith, check out blindsight. It is proof that we can see without qualia ... without the conscious knowledge that we're seeing. Qualia aren't necessary for a Darwinian account of creatures who can observe and respond to their environments. They could do so with blindsight. However, as you point out, they wouldn't be able to contemplate that which is seen, if they lack conscious knowledge of it. So perhaps qualia are necessary for intelligence. Maybe that's what intelligence is: the ability to consciously reflect upon experience. But it is precisely at this point that we enter the realm of immaterial, since everything up to here was entirely explicable in terms of behaviorism and "external" or objective phenomena. Blindsight is what our experience would "look like" if it really were the case that consciousness is an illusion to be explained away by behaviorism. The fact that we can draw this distinction is itself evidence against reductionism (of which behaviorism is an attempt at achieving).

Regarding burden of proof, in this kind of situation, the burden is on the one trying to change the other's mind. I'm not trying to change your mind. I'm actually wanting you to change mind. If you are not concerned with changing mine, then you do not have any burden.

Zarathustra wrote:

Fist and Faith wrote:Is there evidence that any of us could have chosen other than we did in any situation?

That would be a very simple experiment to conduct. Have a subject with two options available ... say, two different desserts. Let them pick one. On the second trial, ask them to see if they can pick the other. If I can choose either of two desserts, on multiple trials, going back and forth between either one, clearly nothing prevents me from choosing either one. Since the situations aren't any different each time, then we can conclude that we could have chosen otherwise in any of these given situations.

Sure, you could say that my brain somehow forces me to pick a particular one each time, even when I'm picking different ones, but the burden of proof would be on you in that case, because the evidence of the trials suggests otherwise. If I'm "hardwired" to be predisposed to a certain choice in any given moment, then how would this "wiring" change from one moment to the next? How is it even meaningful to talk about my choice being determined by my brain, if I'm always open to another option? Given my willingness to try other options, there's no evidence whatsoever that my choice has been determined by anything other than my will.

It's not only wiring. There are many variables involved in even a simple decision. The wiring may not change from one moment to the next, but other variables do. You cannot ask someone to choose between desserts for the first time more than once. The second time you ask, they are also working with the fact that they already chose once. They may think, "I'll just mess with him this time." They may think, "I chose X, but did not get it. Maybe if I choose Y this time, I'll get it." They may think, "Really? I didn't know this experiment was going to take so long." They may be a little hungrier now. They may have a little more/less serotonin in their synapses now. An air current may have made them smell one choice more than they smelled it before choosing for the first time. How many more variables? All things being equal, maybe the same choice would always be made. But all things are seldom equal, and cannot possibly be in your experiment.

Zarathustra wrote:You could also say it's random ... but that would violate your own theory that the brain is causing each choice through a physical cause-and-effect chain reducible to the laws of science--which can't be random if they're deterministic, not unless you're saying that each choice is a quantum event.

I'm saying it's not random. Even "reason" is programmed into us. Some much more strongly than others. (Do we not know people who are much more reasonable than others? Do we not know some people who make absolutely idiotic decisions every day of their lives?) I'm sure wiring plays a big role in the predisposition. And when reason leads to success, it reinforces the predisposition.

Zarathustra wrote:

Fist and Faith wrote:So I couldn't guess what evidence there might be for the non-materialistic reductionism argument.

I've been giving evidence. I've pointed out numerous phenomena (consciousness, qualia, intentionality, purpose, will) that can't be reduced to materialism. The response is always to discount or diminish the evidence, even to claim it's an illusion. As long as that claim isn't proven, the evidence remains irreducible. And I think I've shown that for some of these--especially purposeful, goal-oriented action--we're not talking about illusions.

Mental phenomena are a given. They *are* immaterial, as they appear to us. The fact that you can't view mine is evidence that they utterly different from objective, material things which are observable to everyone. The theory is that they're reducible via materialism, so the burden of providing evidence and proof is on those who propose that theory. As mental phenomena are given to us in our experience, they are already immaterial. That's how they start. For us to conclude that something is other than it appears, it must be proven.

If there is no free will, then there is no intentionality or purpose. I have not heard that there is an agreed upon definition of consciousness. Is that not a difficult topic itself? The problem with leaving the realm of the scientific process is that there's no way to prove things. The fact that we do not have things like clear definitions, and ways to test, reproduce results, and verify, may not prove that you are wrong. But it surely does not prove that you are right.


I'm not claiming to have anything close to a full understanding of my position. As Emerson Pugh said: "If the human brain were so simple that we could understand it, we would be so simple that we couldn't." The "algorithm" I'm envisioning weighs a very large number of variables, some of which are tiny. We can't expect to see every detail of how every decision is made. But not being able to see it does not mean we are no longer operating under the natural laws that seem to govern everything we have ever been able to examine, and have lead us to massive success in so many ways.

What I think is that we have great awareness.
-Is a plant aware of light? It certainly uses light. But does the way it uses light qualify as detection? Possibly. But I would not say there is awareness of light
-Is the eye aware of light. It certainly detects light. I guess that's the retina's sole function. But I don't think the eye is aware of light.
-Is a dog aware of light? It seems so to me. It acts on the information its eye gets because of light.
-I don't know that the dog is aware that it is aware of light. If you think it is, I'm sure there's an animal that we can agree does not have the intelligence to be aware of its awareness, even though it is obviously aware of light. But we are. We are aware of our awareness of a great many things. Including the fact that our brains are doing incredible things. And that our brain is where our awareness resides. But our brain cannot come close to understanding most of its own workings. How could it? The fact that it cannot trace the electro-chemical flow through itself; see the sodium level of X and Y; feel the group of cortical columns that contain this part of this memory; etc etc etc; does not mean that all that is not exactly what is going on. It's all material. The illusion, the thought that it is immaterial, is the result of the brain, which can take in a ton of sensory input and understand what is going on, being unable to do so when it comes to itself.

Fist, I understand that in any debate we're trying to convince each other, so that's a kind of "burden of proof," however, the point I'm making is that claiming that our will and/or consciousness is nothing more than the movements of particles is actually quite a radical position to adopt. We don't adopt it on the basis of the evidence, but instead upon our faith in materialism and the success science has had in reducing the world to particles. It's an expectation, not a fact. And yet we treat it like a fact that must be disproven.

Fist and Faith wrote:It's not only wiring. There are many variables involved in even a simple decision. The wiring may not change from one moment to the next, but other variables do. You cannot ask someone to choose between desserts for the first time more than once. The second time you ask, they are also working with the fact that they already chose once. They may think, "I'll just mess with him this time." They may think, "I chose X, but did not get it. Maybe if I choose Y this time, I'll get it." They may think, "Really? I didn't know this experiment was going to take so long." They may be a little hungrier now. They may have a little more/less serotonin in their synapses now. An air current may have made them smell one choice more than they smelled it before choosing for the first time. How many more variables? All things being equal, maybe the same choice would always be made. But all things are seldom equal, and cannot possibly be in your experiment.

But you could say this for any experiment. That's why valid experiments usually have 100s of people involved in the trials, to eliminate outliers and average out the results. The claim is that we can't possibly choose otherwise, and I think we can realistically test that and provide convincing evidence to the contrary.

If your position is the one that is "scientific," perhaps you can explain how we'd ever possibly produce results that demonstrate it? Can you conduct an experiment like the one I've outlined that reveals our inability to choose otherwise? I think your position is impossible to test even in principle. It's not a falsifiable claim. That's a big clue that it's not really scientific at all. It's almost superstition.

Fist and Faith wrote:Even "reason" is programmed into us.

See, this is what I'm talking about with burden of proof. You're making positive claims, not only negative ones (e.g. "will is an illusion"). What evidence do you have that reason is programmed into us? It's one thing to say that will must be an illusion because everything reduces to particles, but reason is not an illusion. Reason works. It reaches reality. So you can't just reduce it away to nothing. For reason to have been "programmed" into us, the laws of logic and reason would have to be somehow present in atoms and molecules themselves ... indeed, in the laws of physics. No one has ever come close to showing how physics encapsulates the laws of logic. Physics has its own contingent "laws," but these are just regularities that could have been otherwise (for instance, if any of the fundamental constants had been different). But you can't derive necessary formal truths from contingent laws. So how the heck did nature "program" such reasoning into us??

This is a massive philosophical problem, which materialistic and Darwinian explanations just skip over. It's no better than saying, "... and then a miracle happened." You can't just apply the language of computers and step back as if you've said something that makes sense.

Nagel deals with this issue in chapter 4 of MIND AND COSMOS:

On pages 80-81, Nagel wrote: Relying on one's vision and relying on one's reason are similar in one respect: in both cases, the reliance is immediate. When I see a tree, I do not infer its existence from my experience any more than I infer the correctness of a logical inference from the fact that I can't help believing the conclusion. However, there is a crucial difference: in the perceptual case I can recognize that I might be mistaken, but on reflection, even if I think of myself as the product of Darwinian natural selection, I am nevertheless justified in believing the evidence of my senses for the most part, because this is consistent with the hypothesis that an accurate representation of the world around me results from senses shaped by evolution to serve that function ...

By contrast, in a case of reasoning, if it is basic enough the only thing to think is that I have grasped the truth directly. I cannot pull back from a logical inference and reconfirm it with the reflection that the reliability of my logical thought processes is consistent with they hypothesis that evolution has selected them for accuracy. That would drastically weaken the logical claim. Furthermore, in the formulation of that explanation, as in the parallel explanation of the reliability of the senses, logical judgments of consistency and inconsistency have to occur without these qualifications, as direct apprehensions of truth. It is not possible to think "Reliance on my reason, including my reliance on this very judgment, is reasonable because it is consistent with its having an evolutionary explanation." Therefore any evolutionary account of the place of reason presupposes reason's validity and cannot confirm it without circularity.

In other words, the fact that our perception shows us an accurate representation of the world makes sense according to a Darwinian explanation, because accurate senses enable survival in the world. That's something which natural selection could actually shape, because the physical environment which we perceive would itself hone our senses, indirectly, by weeding out those who can't see it accurately.

But the fact that our reason gives us reliable access into logical truths does not make sense on an evolutionary account. As Nagel says, the creation of such an account presupposes the validity of reason in making the argument itself. You can't ground the validity of reason in an evolutionary explanation when you're using reason to create that explanation. It's a circular argument. Nor can you step back from reason and say that a physical account (like evolution) has honed it, because the validity of reason isn't found in physical, contingent facts. Reason is valid whether the environment backs it up or not. In fact, we use reason in ways that (seem to) contradict our environments, to discover truths that go well beyond our senses. Thus, the validity of reason cannot be established on reference to the world, because it is the validity of reason which we use to discover the "deep truths" of the world, to correct the illusions of our senses which evolution has predisposed us to believe. Reason is the "yardstick" we hold up to the world to correct our impressions of the world. Therefore, you can't establish the standard of that yardstick by holding it up to the world.

Fist and Faith wrote:If there is no free will, then there is no intentionality or purpose.

I agree that without freewill, there is no intentionality or purpose. But there clearly is intentionality and purpose. Humans obviously work toward goals, and act intentionally toward both objects and ideas. We're doing it right now. We're directing our consciousness toward the subject of freewill. Our minds are tending toward an object of debate (demonstrating intentionality), and we're doing so to resolve an issue (demonstration of purpose). We're conducting this debate on computers--devices that cannot arise spontaneously in the world without conscious creatures who can create machines for just this purpose ... which is further demonstration of purpose. The universe doesn't operate on the principle of purpose, which is why computers don't spontaneously arise like planets and stars. But this purposeful creation does exist; we do it all the time. Even if you trace all our actions back to physical laws on one end, you cannot deny that on the other end are goals, intentions, and purposes. We know what we're trying to accomplish beforehand. If that's not purpose, then it's something that violates the laws of physics even more: foreknowledge, prophecy.

We don't see the future when we visualize our goals. We move into the future with a purpose. It's teleology, not magic.

Zarathustra wrote:

Fist and Faith wrote:It's not only wiring. There are many variables involved in even a simple decision. The wiring may not change from one moment to the next, but other variables do. You cannot ask someone to choose between desserts for the first time more than once. The second time you ask, they are also working with the fact that they already chose once. They may think, "I'll just mess with him this time." They may think, "I chose X, but did not get it. Maybe if I choose Y this time, I'll get it." They may think, "Really? I didn't know this experiment was going to take so long." They may be a little hungrier now. They may have a little more/less serotonin in their synapses now. An air current may have made them smell one choice more than they smelled it before choosing for the first time. How many more variables? All things being equal, maybe the same choice would always be made. But all things are seldom equal, and cannot possibly be in your experiment.

But you could say this for any experiment. That's why valid experiments usually have 100s of people involved in the trials, to eliminate outliers and average out the results. The claim is that we can't possibly choose otherwise, and I think we can realistically test that and provide convincing evidence to the contrary.

If your position is the one that is "scientific," perhaps you can explain how we'd ever possibly produce results that demonstrate it? Can you conduct an experiment like the one I've outlined that reveals our inability to choose otherwise? I think your position is impossible to test even in principle. It's not a falsifiable claim. That's a big clue that it's not really scientific at all. It's almost superstition.

No, we cannot test for free will, either for or against. As I said, you cannot ask someone a question for the first time more than once. And having already asked once changes the variables when you ask a second time. And the variables from person to person are beyond calculation.

So where did that leave us? You say we could have chosen other than we did, and I say there is no evidence supporting that position. With no evidence, there's no reason to assume something is going on that runs counter to everything we know about the nature of reality; no reason to assume it is not a massively complex system of causes and effects. I think 86 billion neurons allows for such complexity.

Again, what is awareness?
-Photosynthesis and phototropism are the reactions of plants to light, but I do not think of plants as being aware of light. It's all chemical reactions that are local to where the light strikes.
-There is a chemical reaction when light hits the ocelli of a planaria. I do not think the ocelli, themselves, are aware of light. Again, it's just chemical reactions.
-Planaria move when its ocelli are subjected to a change in light. This goes beyond the site where the photons hit the ocelli. Other parts of the planaria react to what the ocelli detects. But I do not imagine the planaria is aware of why it moves. I'm thinking it's a series of chemical reactions, stemming from the original chemical reaction that takes place when the photons hit. Nothing more than a biological motion-detector.
-The reactions of mice to a change in light are more complicated than the reactions of planaria. But are mice more aware of what light and vision are?
-How about the hawk that casts the shadow that the mouse runs from? The hawk acts in very specific ways to what its eyes detect. Is it more aware of light and vision?
-How about a pig? A dolphin?

Is there anything other than us that is aware of light and vision; that realizes it is reacting to something, and is not merely a biological motion detector? If so, it is obviously a higher level of awareness than planaria and mice have. And that higher level is due to a more complex brain. But how, exactly, does that work?

And we have awareness of a still higher level. We are aware of our awareness. Which should be no surprise, since we have 86,000,000,000 neurons, with trillions of connections. But, again, exactly how does it work?

I don't know. I don't have the foggiest notion of this stuff. But I don't see a reason to claim the increasing complexity of the brain cannot account for the increasing complexity of the awareness, and requires something that seems to fit into the category of the supernatural. I think we will learn more and more as we study with increasingly complex technology.

Zarathustra wrote:

Fist and Faith wrote:Even "reason" is programmed into us.

See, this is what I'm talking about with burden of proof. You're making positive claims, not only negative ones (e.g. "will is an illusion"). What evidence do you have that reason is programmed into us? It's one thing to say that will must be an illusion because everything reduces to particles, but reason is not an illusion. Reason works. It reaches reality. So you can't just reduce it away to nothing. For reason to have been "programmed" into us, the laws of logic and reason would have to be somehow present in atoms and molecules themselves ... indeed, in the laws of physics. No one has ever come close to showing how physics encapsulates the laws of logic. Physics has its own contingent "laws," but these are just regularities that could have been otherwise (for instance, if any of the fundamental constants had been different). But you can't derive necessary formal truths from contingent laws. So how the heck did nature "program" such reasoning into us??

This is a massive philosophical problem, which materialistic and Darwinian explanations just skip over. It's no better than saying, "... and then a miracle happened." You can't just apply the language of computers and step back as if you've said something that makes sense.

I honestly don't know what you're getting at. Are legs programmed into the laws of atoms and molecules, or the laws of physics? Because they're certainly programmed into us. What about walking? It's nothing other than genetically programmed instinct that makes a horse or giraffe stand up and walk minutes after being born. But is it programmed into the laws of atoms and molecules, or the laws of physics?

Certainly, our awareness is something very different from legs or walking. An entirely different category of thing. But walking is an entirely different category of thing from legs.

Fist, I agree that there is a massively complex chain of cause and effect going on in the brain. However, I do not think that the causal chain goes only in one direction: from neurons to brain states to mental states. I think that mental states can also affect neurons. And that's freewill--the feedback loop of mind affecting body. The neurons produce a mental phenomenon which is real, not a mere side-effect. And that phenomenon has causal effectiveness (which is just another way of saying it's not a side-effect).

I'm not saying that awareness and mental phenomena aren't produced by the brain. Of course they are. But they are *new* phenomena, holistic and emergent phenomena, which have properties that can't be reduced to individual neurons. Brains produce an effect which is more than the sum of the parts. (Or perhaps we simply don't know all the parts--maybe there are mental aspects buried in matter.)

I honestly don't know what you're getting at.

Legs and walking are definitely contained in the laws of physics, since legs are a collection of atoms and walking is the movement of atoms. You could described everything about legs and walking in physical equations that describe the movements of matter.

You can't do that with reason. Reason isn't the motions of matter. It's not even the firing of neurons. Reason stands on its own, aside from the rules that govern the movements of matter.

How does it work? Something is not composed of matter/particles/energy/call-it-what-you-will, and is not bound by the laws that govern these things. IOW, everything we know about the universe does not apply. But it acts upon, we might even say controls, parts of the universe via particle and the laws. Again, it's Casper passing through walls and picking up objects.

The connection between math and the universe is a deep mystery. Call it a paradox if you want, but it doesn't make it unreal. Math and reason do "pass through the walls" of the universe, and yet they describe how we pick things up.

Either the truth of reality is dualism (i.e. both physical and nonphysical things), or reality is more complex than we realize, having characteristics which are somehow between mind and matter. Or maybe reality *is* numbers, logic, reason, knowledge. Maybe it's matter that's the illusion, consisting in nothing more than relations that are entirely explicable in terms of math/reason. Instead of reducing mind and reason to matter, maybe we can reduce matter to reason.

There are some good reasons--backed up by observations--to think that mind is more fundamental than we typically give it credit. Consider the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. If all of reality follows cause and effect chains of matter, then how is it possible that matter itself isn't determinate until it is observed or measured? How does consciousness affect the collapse of the quantum wave function, if consciousness is nothing more than matter doing its thing in our brain? Why would bits of matter in our brain interact with reality so deeply that they can affect the measurements in experiments? That's one powerful illusion!

Zarathustra wrote:Math and reason do "pass through the walls" of the universe, and yet they describe how we pick things up.

Either the truth of reality is dualism (i.e. both physical and nonphysical things), or reality is more complex than we realize, having characteristics which are somehow between mind and matter.

That's one powerful illusion!

The first, I like the clarity of that statement.

On the second, I suspect "between." An emulsion [analogically] of phase transitions, continua, emergence, mind being more material than we understand [so far], and material being more mental than we can explain [so far]. But/And we will fail to comprehend mind till we know a lot more about matter/energy.
[[Aside...that doesn't mean we won't create a real AI till we get it all. We have a long history or making things that work long before we know all about the hows of the function...]]
Take the field of an electron. We have vast amounts of knowledge about it. We can do the math, chart the vectors, use it for unbelievable feats---but in fundamental ways, we don't know what a field IS.
I don't believe in dualism. Dualism is just ignorance and/or magic by another name.

On the last---I've probably said before and I suspect we agree---on these kinds of issues, everyone who invokes "illusion" as an explanation is either [or both]
Dodging the question, not answering it.
Creating MORE problems/complexity/mystery, not fewer/less.
It's hard to explain the perception of red.
It's far harder to explain that the perception and attendant issues are illusory. Just like the origins of reality are hard---but such and such godhead or whatever created it is isn't an answer, it's a ludicrous escalation of number and difficulty of questions.

Nice to see you around Vraith.

--A

OK, let me try this approach...

We have to choose between two things. Some choices are easy. But what about things that weigh fairly equally in us? We consider the pros and cons of each.

Part of this is whatever preferences are wired into us. Mozart had an extraordinary mind for music, while Michaelangelo and George Carlin were naturally strong in other areas. But our inborn preferences are also on a much less obvious scale. Some people taste particular things (bitter, for example) more strongly than others. Some people are born with absolute pitch, while others are tone deaf. (Just found this test for tone deafness: tonedeaftest.com/ Only a couple minutes if anyone's interested.

Another part is past experiences. Were we forced to do/eat something as a child, and now hate it? On a smaller scale, if we like two things equally, when was the last time we had either?

So we debate the two. And we come to a conclusion. How is this not the result of cause & effect? How are the preferences we were born with and the experiences we had not responsible for the decision? Tell me where we break away from those things in our debate?

And if the decision is not the result of those things, what is it the result of? How do we make the final choice in close decisions without something that tips the scale one way over the other? You say "reason", but I don't see how reason is anything other than an examination of the pros and cons.

You also say the choice is not random; not a metaphorical coin-toss.

If it's not cause & effect, and it's not random, what is it?

Vraith, good points.

Fist, I'm not sure if you've added anything to your previous points. Your main argument seems to be, "How can it not be cause/effect?" The form of this argument is basically an assumption, namely, that everything in reality is bits of matter moving around according to determinist causal rules. Therefore, there can't be freewill since everything is matter, and the only possible ways for matter to interact is causally. You're basically setting up a logical biconditional argument, "p iff q" (if and only if). Here q is your assumption of materialism and p is your conclusion that everything operates by determinist causality (i.e. there is no freewill).

So the response to your question above--how it can be something other than materialist determinism--is "not q." Or, in other words, the claim that there are entities in reality which are other than bits of matter; namely, mind. By the rules of logic, this would then invalidate p, or "not p," meaning that the conclusion that everything operates by determinist causality is false. [A weaker form of your argument would be "if q then p," and in that case "not q" wouldn't necessarily mean "not p," but at the very least you would no longer be able to assert the truth of p with q.]

This counter argument, "not q," rests on the irreducibility of mental phenomena to objective description--a stronger position, in my opinion, because it rests on an observation of particular anomalous phenomena, rather than merely an assumption which is an unwarranted generalization (since you're making a vast claim into all of reality without even the possibility of examining all of reality). In order to defeat this counter argument, you have to show how subjective mental phenomena reduce to bits of matter. That's why I keep saying the burden of proof lies on you. It's much easier to claim "not q" than to claim "q," especially when q is a universal claim. Universal claims can be invalidated by a single counter example.

The mystery here is how the brain can produce phenomena which are not reducible to the brain. Once those phenomena are in existence, it's not so hard to imagine that they can play causal roles themselves--i.e. self-causation or freewill. All of this hinges on the mind/body problem.

We're in a position now analogous to noting that Newton's laws don't perfectly describe the motions of the planets--despite working extraordinarily well--but not yet in possession of a new theory (i.e. relativity) which accounts for those minute aberrations which Newton's laws missed. Most of reality can be accounted for by materialism, except for the extremely rare phenomenon of mind. However, once we have a theory that can explain both mind and matter, it will probably revolutionize our understanding of reality in a way analogous to relativity vs Newtonian mechanics. It will redefine reality, while subsuming the previous world view as an incomplete account.

What phenomena? I'd say the idea there are things the mind does that can't be explained through an extension of current scientific understanding is a bolder claim than the opposite.

Fist and Faith wrote:If it's not cause & effect, and it's not random, what is it?

A phenomenon outside the limitations of cause & effect is supernatural. Based on the definition of supernatural: a force beyond the laws of nature.

Fist and Faith wrote:So we debate the two. And we come to a conclusion. How is this not the result of cause & effect?

Consider this "choice engine" that you propose. It is built upon preferences and experiences and inborn nature - just as you say. And it runs deterministically, of course.

But the sum of your preferences and experiences and inborn nature is you. You are the choice engine. What it chooses is your will.

The problem isn't that determinism excludes free will. The problem is that your free will is deterministic. "Free will exists in a matrix of cause and effect."

But how is this not "free"? Would being subject to random impulses interfering with your choices make you free? Would being influenced by a supernatural phenomenon make you free? In my mind, that makes you a subject to whims beyond your control ... that's slavery.

Think, instead, that your will, as a deterministic choice engine, faithfully (that is, without external influence) renders your choice based on your preferences and experiences and inborn nature. Your will rules. It brooks no other sovereignty. That is "free".

This is why determinism is no excuse for your actions: the choice was made by a choice engine which is your will. Your will is responsible for the choice.

The only thing left to deal with is a vague notion that if your will is deterministic that it is somehow less than wonderful. But that's just vanity in the end.

Murrin, I'm not saying that consciousness can't be explained by current science (although right now, it isn't explained). I think it might take a paradigm revolution in science to explain it, for reasons I've noted in previous discussions, such as our ability to solve Godel's Theorem, whereas no possible computer ever could.

However, even if we explained how consciousness is produced, there would always necessarily be leftover phenomena that aren't captured by an objective description, because it's impossible to objectively describe subjective phenomena. There will always be a perspective "for me" that is distinct from the objective, external, scientific description of how that perspective is produced. Therefore, describing how consciousness is produced isn't the same as reducing consciousness to a brain state. Something seems to be missing not only from our description, but our metaphysics.

A phenomenon outside the limitations of cause & effect is supernatural. Based on the definition of supernatural: a force beyond the laws of nature.

Not necessarily. Quantum fluctuations are entirely random. Particles spontaneously emerge from the void all the time, without cause. Indeed, some speculate that the universe itself came into being this way, without needing a first cause. We already have science based on phenomena that exist outside the limits of cause and effect. It's entirely natural.

But that's random, so it's not what we're looking for here (though some quantum phenomenon might play a role in freewill). The point is that we need not suppose the mind is supernatural to think that it isn't deterministic. It can be a causal agent in itself, self-causation. Mental states seem to cause other mental states, all while "riding on top of" brain states which produce them. I've given the analogy of this before by comparing to a TV image being produced by the TV screen, but its actual content isn't produced in the TV at all, but instead by humans elsewhere (TV stations, recording studios, ect.). Thus, it's possible for a physical device to produce a phenomenon by physical laws (e.g. a TV image), a phenomenon that's necessary for a specific kind of content (e.g. TV shows), with no control over that content whatsoever by the device itself. Brains could very well be responsible for the emergence of consciousness without necessarily determining the content of those mental states. The content of consciousness is determined by things that aren't even physical, like ideas, numbers, logic, reason, etc. When one idea follows another idea in a reasonable fashion, the laws of physics don't determine this flow. It's the ideas themselves that are causing other ideas--causation that happens on an entirely different level than the atoms bumping around in neurons.

Also, we humans produce objects through goal-oriented actions. In other words, teleology, which is not cause producing effect, but instead effects determining their own causes. Human technology isn't supernatural, but it never would appear spontaneously simply through the laws of physics. While it doesn't violate the laws of physics--indeed, it "rides on top of them," so to speak, being dependent upon them--it is nevertheless an example of teleological creation. We build things like computers for a purpose. They only come into being because of an idea in our heads which we try to achieve in the world. A goal.

Physical laws have no goals. Atoms don't have ideas. The human mind is adding something to the universe that isn't containing in the physical laws which produces it. Both the content of consciousness and the products of conscious people are things that can't determined by physical processes, and indeed violate standard cause-and-effect by being teleological and/or ideal in nature.

Zarathustra wrote: Physical laws have no goals. Atoms don't have ideas. The human mind is adding something to the universe that isn't containing in the physical laws which produces it.

Nice.

--A

Zarathustra wrote:Physical laws have no goals. Atoms don't have ideas. The human mind is adding something to the universe that isn't containing in the physical laws which produces it. Both the content of consciousness and the products of conscious people are things that can't determined by physical processes, and indeed violate standard cause-and-effect by being teleological and/or ideal in nature.

Godel already covered this topic. We may substitute "the laws of physics" for "any consistent formal system" and thus conclude that there are things which are true--"statements of the language of the formal system"--but which cannot be proved or disproved from within the formal system itself.

edit: *sigh* the board doesn't like the "o" with the diaeresis over it.

+JMJ+

Hashi Lebwohl wrote:

Zarathustra wrote:Physical laws have no goals. Atoms don't have ideas. The human mind is adding something to the universe that isn't containing in the physical laws which produces it. Both the content of consciousness and the products of conscious people are things that can't determined by physical processes, and indeed violate standard cause-and-effect by being teleological and/or ideal in nature.

Gödel already covered this topic. We may substitute "the laws of physics" for "any consistent formal system" and thus conclude that there are things which are true--"statements of the language of the formal system"--but which cannot be proved or disproved from within the formal system itself.

edit: *sigh* the board doesn't like the "o" with the diaeresis over it.

Fixed it fer ya.