Kevin's Watch

David Deutsch's Book The Beginning of Infinity contains the following couple of parageaphs:-

"Nevertheless, regardless of whether the fine-tuning costitutes an appearence of desighn or not, it does constitute a legitimate and scientific problem, for the following reason. If the truth is that the constants of nature are not fine-tuned to produce life after all, because most slight vatiations in them do still permit life and intelligence to evolve somehow, though in dramatically different types of environment, then this would be an unexplained regularity in nature and hence a problem for scientists to adress.

If the laws of physics are fine-tuned, as they seem to be, then there are two possibilities; either those laws are the only ones to be instantiated in reality [as universes] or there are other regions of reality - parallel universes*- with different laws. In the former case, we must expect there to be an explanation of why the laws are as they are. It would either refer to the existence of life or not. If it did, that would take us back to Paley's problem: it would mean the laws had the 'appearence of design' for creating life, but had not evolved. Or the explanation would not refer to the existence of life, in which case it would leave unexplained why, if the laws are as they are for non-life related reasons, they are fine tuned to create life.

[* These are not the 'Parallel Universes' of the quantum multiverse - those universes all obey the same laws of physics and are in constsant slight interaction with each other. They are also much less speculative]"

Now I think I know what fine-tuning is [the thing about 'the constants' being set at the only values they could be for life as we know it to exist] but Deutsch seems to jump between the use of this phrase and 'the laws of physics' as though they were synonymous. This guy holds the 'Dirac Prize' for physics - he knows hiss stuff, so it aint him being dim, thats for sure. But what is he saying here? I can't get what his point is, though it is clearly a very important one. Can anyone help?

nb I think Paley's problem is something about walking down a path and finding a beautifull pocket watch and then saying that to think the universe is here without 'a Creator' is the same as to think the pocket watch could have randomly assembled itself. I'll check this out and edit if I'm wrong.

Edit: Yes - Paley's argument appears to be in support of a teleological situation where the very appearance of design is logically enough in itself to imply the existence of a designer [..or something ] Still no closer to getting Deutsch's point!

Can I just stick with Deutsch briefly and see if anything can be gleaned from his words. [It did occur to me that to quote a couple of paragraph's fron a thirty page chapter and expect them to be explainable might be a hard ask, but they did seem somewhat 'self-contained' and I'm just interested to see how far can be got with them.]

If I can get anything at all [and I'll surely be quoting the obvious here but at least that might be a reasonable place to start] it is that Deutsch is saying that, no matter whether the laws/physical constants etc of the Universe are fine tuned or not, there is a case for science to answer pertaining to their settings. This I interpret [rightly or wrongly] to imply that it is [in Deutsch's opinion] not good enough for science to just take the approach of "The settings of the costants are what they are, like it or not so ." ie He seems to feel that wh ay the settings are as they are does at least demand investigation, and he goes on to outline why. He say "If the constants are not fine tuned to produced life, because slight variations in them still allow for the evolution of life/intelligence, though in dramatically different types of environment then this would be an unexplained regularity in nature and hence a problem for science to adress. [my italics]. Can we make any sense of this? Why should the evolution of life/intelligence in the dramatically different types of environment that small adjustments to the physical constants might result in be an "unexplained regularity". What do these words mean in this context? What is an unexplained regularity and why should science need to adress it any more than say an 'unexplained irregularity'.

In the blurb on the back of this book Deutsch is compared to Turing and Feynman and it is written "His arguments are so clear that to read him is to experience the thrill of the highest level of discourse on this planet - and to understand it!" I must say for the most part I have found this to be true - the man is 'clearly out in front' [isn't he the inventor of quantum computing] - but this bit on fine-tuning has me foxed - and as fine-tuning has been a place where I have never been entierly comfortable with the answers poular science books/articles have come up with, I was particularly interested in how Deutsch would tackle the 'problem'.

peter wrote: "If the constants are not fine tuned to produced life, because slight variations in them still allow for the evolution of life/intelligence, though in dramatically different types of environment then this would be an unexplained regularity in nature and hence a problem for science to adress. [my italics]. Can we make any sense of this? Why should the evolution of life/intelligence in the dramatically different types of environment that small adjustments to the physical constants might result in be an "unexplained regularity". What do these words mean in this context? What is an unexplained regularity and why should science need to adress it any more than say an 'unexplained irregularity'.

We can make sense of it, I think.
He...it seems...is saying, divided into parts:
First, his starting point before this quote is..."If fine-tuning for life exists, then it must be explained." Everyone would agree on that. "Fine tuned for" means their is an agent/purpose.
So: if it is NOT fine-tuned, do we need to address it?
IF only one set relationship produces life, we don't. We only have to explain the reason they are what they are...which will already have been done. Because you cannot show it isn't fine-tuned for without showing what it is. ***
BUT: if there is MORE than one set that produces life, then there exists some pattern/relationship/commonality between the constants/universes that makes/allows them to produce life. It would imply some kind of "metaconstant," or "metaphysics" [in at least the rigid, limited sense of a material/empiric physics OF material/empiric physics] that needs explaining.

I don't think it would need addressing any more than an unexplained irregularity, though. Regularities and irreg's both need explaining.

***as I said previously, I don't think there is any good reason to believe it is, and tons of evidence that point towards it isn't...but it isn't shown yet.
And I think it highly likely that any universe with constants/laws that will make it last and give it room will also have the conditions for life.

It doesn't seem much different from an elaborated anthropic principle.

peter wrote:He say "If the constants are not fine tuned to produced life, because slight variations in them still allow for the evolution of life/intelligence, though in dramatically different types of environment then this would be an unexplained regularity in nature and hence a problem for science to adress. [my italics]. Can we make any sense of this? Why should the evolution of life/intelligence in the dramatically different types of environment that small adjustments to the physical constants might result in be an "unexplained regularity". What do these words mean in this context? What is an unexplained regularity and why should science need to adress it any more than say an 'unexplained irregularity'.

Vraith seems to be on the right track, and Mong is right that this discussion has *something* to do with the anthropic principle, but this particular point seems more fine-tuned itself.

Here's how I would put it:

I think he means that if life exists in both of these situations (e.g. 1. our universe with our current constants; 2. our universe with slightly different constants), then the "regularity" would be that which stays the same in each case, namely, the presence of life (ignoring for now all the contingent ways that form of life would be different). It's unexplained in the sense that we'd have no explanation for life arising in situation 2, for the simple reason that we're talking about a theoretical situation to which science has never--and never needed--to turn its attention, again for the simple reason that it doesn't currently exist; it's not our situation. But theoretically we could apply sciene to the question, just as we apply it to our own situation with our current constants. So it would be a legitimate scientific question or problematic.

It would seem to imply that there is something about life that is "larger" than the particular situation we now encounter with our current constants; "larger" in the sense of some feature that makes it more likely, because it would have arisen in vastly different circumstances as well as this one. That regularity would present no reason for us to assume a supernatural cause, especially the more likely life is to evolve in different circumstances, because it's precisely the assumed unlikelihood of the universe being "perfectly" arranged to produce life that makes the design concept so appealing and intuitive to some people in the first place.

Therefore it would be just another scientific question to address in natural terms.

But the paragraph in your quote above only deals with the case of the universe not being fine-tuned, which doesn't have much to do with the design "hypothesis" (scare quotes because it's not a legitimate scientific hypothesis), or the Strong Anthropic principle (contrasted to the Weak). He's just eliminating that one first (because it's "obvious " ) before he gets to the one that really matters to his main point, namely, "...regardless of whether the fine-tuning costitutes an appearence of desighn or not, it does constitute a legitimate and scientific problem, ...". He could have just said, "Obviously, if the universe isn't fine tuned to produce life, because life can exist in several different "tunings," then the single compelling reason to even consider a design "hypothesis" ceases to be a reason at all."

The next paragraph is harder. And I'm getting sleepy. Perhaps tomorrow.

Vraith wrote:Life is fine-tuned to the Universe it evolves in.

^ That. ^

--A

Thats a very interesting set of answers guys - and some of the points ring bells as to what Deutsch says late in the chapter. IIRC he is [contrary to Mong's point, and illustrative of the risk's inherent in a partial reading] pretty scathing about the anthropic principles [weak and strong].He also observes that if there is a range of values [of constants etc] that will permit for 'astrophysisists' to exist then the likely hood is that any universes where astrophysisists are found, will likely be places where the laws/constants etc sit toward the edge of the range rather than at the middle, and thus life [--->astrophysisists] will only just exist. Again this looses me in terms of it's significance - I'll do re-read and see if any more can be learned. One thing I can add is that the man is a clear follower of the philosophy of Popper in case that gives a line on the way his thought might function.

Hashi's very pragmatic 'they are what they are and there is little point in wasting too much time in speculating about 'why or what if...' is pretty much the standard position of science and in a sense Av and Vraith seem to concur with this. (pleas correct me if I'm wrong here guy's ). I look forward much to Z's analysis of the paragraph dealing with what pertains if fine-tuning exists. Thanks guys.

peter wrote: Hashi's very pragmatic 'they are what they are and there is little point in wasting too much time in speculating about 'why or what if...' is pretty much the standard position of science and in a sense Av and Vraith seem to concur with this. (pleas correct me if I'm wrong here guy's ). I look forward much to Z's analysis of the paragraph dealing with what pertains if fine-tuning exists. Thanks guys.

Nope, I don't concur with that entirely. Yes, they are what they are...since I think fine-tuning demonstrably false, and mostly demonstrated already...but not quite. But the question of WHY are they what they are? Of course it matters, of course it needs explaining. It's just that the "why" may [in my opinion will] be shown to be purely innate. They are what they are because some fundamental aspect makes it impossible to be anything else. Even if multiples/alternatives exist...which models seem to show they do, not EVERY combo will work/be possible.

This is not "purpose," why...and the fundamental aspect I mentioned above may be simplicity itself to understand [not really a "property" or anything, just a resultant fact]. It may well be as simple as this: Gravity [and all the other constants, and relation between them] exists as it does because all the places it DOESN'T have value [x], or fall within a range between x and y] DESTROY themselves. They are exactly what they are, and work, in OUR universe [and/or various universes] because all the other combinations lead to death.

It's not "fine-tuning"...it is precisely the opposite: an all encompassing, universe-sized, in fact, example of probability.

It SEEMS [to some] fine-tuned...because we LIVED.
I bet it doesn't seem at all fine-tuned to the never-born and the failed corpses. [which could be infinite in number].
But you don't even need infinite failed attempts...if the Stuff that makes up the stuff we're made of is just blobbing about, being formless and voidish, for an eternity...all the values flowing and shifting, until, eventually, they fall into a particular relationship, one of infinite possible relationships that have/could happen, and BANG [a big one]

Vraith wrote:Nope, I don't concur with that entirely. Yes, they are what they are...since I think fine-tuning demonstrably false, and mostly demonstrated already...but not quite. But the question of WHY are they what they are? Of course it matters, of course it needs explaining. It's just that the "why" may [in my opinion will] be shown to be purely innate. They are what they are because some fundamental aspect makes it impossible to be anything else. Even if multiples/alternatives exist...which models seem to show they do, not EVERY combo will work/be possible.

I will again refer back to the membrane theory to which I ascribe. It is theoretically possible that when this universe came into existence that other universes also came into existence; however, unlike the universe with which we a familiar those other universes encountered an instability which led to its collapse. Fortunately for us, that instability did not occur and thus our universe continued forward in its inherent stability. hrm....that makes sense, even if it doesn't accurately describe what really happened. It could have happened that way, though.

When I was 5 years old I remember laying on my back in the grass staring into the cloudless blue void of a spring sky and realizing that existence itself could never be rational.

Mongnihilo wrote:When I was 5 years old I remember laying on my back in the grass staring into the cloudless blue void of a spring sky and realizing that existence itself could never be rational.

Your 5-year-old self is/was correct--existence is not rational. It is built on a foundation of the transcendental and the quantum. It is built on the notion that the Cantor Set, a subset of the closed interval [0,1] is both totally disjoint and yet uncountably infinite and therefore contains infinitely more numbers than the set of all rational numbers as well as the notion that particles may entangle with each other and afterwards communicate at faster-than-light speeds or travel backwards in time (or both at the same time).

It may be pertinant at this point to clarify exactly what we mean by 'fine-tuned'. It seems to me that some confusion may arise as to whether we are refering to i) the setting of the values/laws or ii) the settings of the values/laws - that result in astropysisists.

Vraith [again I think - sorry V. ] is clearly refering to the 'active setting the values' [ie the twidling of a dial somewhere] when he says that fine tuning is demonstrably false - but feels that why the values are as they are is however worth investigating. The second approach may be refering to the actual values themselves as 'fine-tuning' and here, discussion of it's 'truth or falseness' [as a scientifically demonstrable fact] will hinge upon whether life [as we understand it - again definitions are going to kick in here] is or is not possible at different values [of the laws/ constants etc] than we see in our universe. If the latter is the case we may still talk of 'fine-tuning', just not in the sense of a deliberate 'setting' of the values; if the former, then the whole fine-tuning idea is bunkum anyway. (So is this the whole crux of the question - whether intelligent life could or could not have evolved given different values of the universal constants. Deutsch implys it could - yet still says "it seems" that fine tuning is the case!)
[I apologise in advance if I demonstrate by my words that I'm not taking on board what you guys have already said - I'm not going to pretend I understand all that has been posted - but in typing this out I am able to clarify at least the fact that I don't even really know myself what I mean when I use the term fine-tuning'.)

Mong - you appear to have learned more about the world in five yaers than I have in fifty!

Earlier Vraith made the observation about life being fine-tuned to the universe it develops in [which does seem more realistic than the teleological alternative of the universe being set this way so that intelligent life could develop], but it reminded me of the rather strange comment made by Hawking in one of his popular TV shows that 'it is in the nature of matter to organise itself into life' [can't remember the exact words but this was the thrust]. Was this not an odd statement from one of the worlds leading cosmologists (the second such I have raised in these pages if memory serves me correctly).

peter wrote: but in typing this out I am able to clarify at least the fact that I don't even really know myself what I mean when I use the term fine-tuning'.)

Hee hee...that could be a problem, for sure.
OTOH, I think you've got a pretty good handle on what I'm trying to say.

I think at least part of the struggle YOU are having with the word isn't the word...it is that DEUTSCH is using it in a funny way. That it can be fine-tuned without any active/intentional setting of the values. I don't think that makes any sense. Because fine-tuned/fine-tuning REQUIRES some active, intentional act at some point, to TUNE it. It is NOT a state of being, or random process, or something that happens, it is something DONE.

I mean...imagine a sword and a stick. You swing the first, then you swing the second. They both feel good...not too heavy, not too light, weight distributed nicely along the length for your kind of swing.
You can say, they are both "finely balanced." But that's only factually true of the sword...it was made that way, someone did it. The stick may well be in fine balance for your purposes...but it is/was not finely balanced.

[[deleted double...this place is a mess about that, lately. There's a glitch somewhere]]

I really don't see that we can have any useful discussion about this. Would like be produced with different constants? Sheesh, we don't even know how life came about with our constants. Forget about how it actually came about; we can't even create life in the most perfect laboratory conditions, using whatever equipment we want. (Can we? Have I missed some pretty big headlines about something this serious?) So speculating on what other constants might possibly be, and how life might possibly come about in those circumstances...

After rereading the second paragraph in the opening post, I'm not sure there's as much there as I first thought. It certainly seems that his argument is unfinished, and that perhaps the main point would be in a paragraph following that one (not given here). He has basically taken the possibility that the laws of physics are fine-tuned, and said that this can be addressed with an explanation that either refers to life or not. The former leaves open the possibility of design, or takes us back to that problem, and he doesn't explain here why that problem doesn't constitute a legitimate scientific problem.

Personally, I suspect that the universe produces life because it's "alive" itself. Or at least matter is. I think that consciousness is part of our underlying reality, in matter itself, though not really in brains, or limited to brains. I think brains help us to focus consciousness into complex forms, but the consciousness itself exists on a much deeper level than synapses. And I believe that evolution is perhaps a bit more teleological than we suspect, self-guided by consciousness and the organisms themselves. So I don't think the universe itself is fine-tuned to allow life to evolve. I think consciousness would find a way to evolve on its own, in many different kinds of universes ... if it's true that consciousness resides in deeper properties of matter than the ones which are responsible for biology.

Zarathustra wrote: I think consciousness would find a way to evolve on its own, in many different kinds of universes ... if it's true that consciousness resides in deeper properties of matter than the ones which are responsible for biology.

That is good. Related to a thing I was pointing at earlier. In any universe with a set of constants that allows matter to coalesce in stable forms, and exist for enough time, life/consciousness will almost certainly come to be.

I diverge/I don't know that it is present in every "thing" in some way, or a property in any divisible/assignable way. It is, I think, an emergent property tied to complex structures...and in universes that allow complex structures, it will emerge through them.
It's just like atoms and molecules, only at a higher level.
The parts of an atom have no property that an atom, as a whole, has. The atom has new properties that emerge from the interaction of forces.