René Descartes on Existence, God, et al.
Posted: Mon May 30, 2005 7:19 pm
Thought you might find this interesting. Descartes was a great philosopher, among other things. In From Skepticism to Conviction, he writes:
Very insightful.I have been nourished on letters since my childhood, and since I was given to believe that by their means a clear and certain knowledge could be obtained of all that is useful in life, I had an extreme desire to acquire instruction.
But as soon as I had achieved the entire course of study at the close of which one is usually received into the ranks of the learned, I entirely changed my opinion...
As regards all the opinions which, up to that time, I had embraced, I thought I could not do better than try once and for all to sweep them completely away. Later on they might be replaced, either by others which were better, or by the same when I had made them conform to the uniformity of a rational scheme. I firmly believe that by this means I should succeed much better than if I had built on the foundations and principles of which I had allowed myself to be persuaded in youth without having inquired into the truth. My design has never extended beyond trying to reform my own opinions and to build on a foundation which is entirely my own.
I was not seeking to imitate the skeptics, who only doubt for the sake of doubting and pretend always to be uncertain. On the contrary, my design was nly to provide myself with good grounds for assurance, to reject the quicksand and mud in order to find the rock or clay...
I suppose, then, that all the things that I see are false. I persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my fallacious memory represents to me. I consider that I possess no senses. I imagine that my body, figure, extention, motion, and place are but the fictions of my mind. What, then, can be esteemed as true? Perhaps nothing at all, unless there is nothing in the world that is certain.
But immediately I notice that while I wish to think all things false, it is nonetheless absolutely essential that I, who wish to think this, should truly exist. There is a powerful and cunning deceiver who employs his ingenuity in misleading me. Let it be granted. It follows the more that I exist, if he deceives me. If I did not exist, he could not deceive me. This truth, "I think, therefore I am; cogito, ergo sum," is so certain, so assured, that all the most extravagant skepticism is incapable of shaking it. This truth, "I am, I exist," I can receive without scrupple as the first principle of the philosophy for which I am seeking...
I am certain that I am a thing which thinks. But if I am indeed certain of this, I must know what is is requisite to render me certain of anything. I must possess a standard of certainty. In this first knowledge which I have gained, what is there that assures me of its truth? Nothing exept the clear and distinct perception of what I state...
All things which I perceive very clearly and very distinctly are true. If I have heretofore judged that such matters could be doubted, it was because it came into my mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me with such a nature that I might have been deceived ever concerning things which seemed to me most manifest. I see no reason to believe that there is a God who is a deceiver; however, as yet I have not satisfied myself that there is a God at all.
I must inquire whethere there is a God. And, if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver. For, without a knowledge of these truths, I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything...
There is the idea of God. Is this idea something that could have originated in, been caused by, me? By the name God I understand a being that is infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, by which I myself and everything else (if anything else does exist) have been created.
Now, all these qualities are such that the more diligently I attend to them, the less do they appear capable of originating in me alone. Hence, from what was premised above, we must conclude that God necessarily exists as the origin of the idea I have of Him...
The whole strength of the argument which I have here used to prove the existence of God consists in this: It is not possible that my nature should wbat it is, and that I should have in myself the idea of a God, if God did not exist. God, whose idea is in me, possesses all those supreme perfections of which our mind may have some idea but without understanding them all, is liable to no errors or defects, and has none of those marks which denote imperfection. From this it is manifest that He cannot be a deceiver, since fraud and deception proceed form defect.
[Lastly] He has given me a very great inclination to believe that my ideas of sensible objects are sent or conveyed to me by external material objects. I do not see how He could be defended from the accusation of deceit if these ideas were produced in me by any cause other than material objects. Hence we must allow that material objects exist.