Free Will and Determinism

[Fist and Faith]

I don't have even a guess about that. I cannot know what it's like to be any other species, so can't guess if they have free will. Can you guess if they have the illusion of free will?

Nor do I have even a guess about how we could have gotten the ability to truly make even the slightest decision. But it is a thing that even you and Loremaster never would have doubted having before you learned various things about the universe. And you still don't feel any lack of free will, you just intellectually follow another line of thought. No, that feeling, universal though it is, is not proof of its own existence. But I am willing to take it as the starting point, and see if an explanation for the move from absolute slavery of the rules of cause & effect can be found.

You, otoh, can take the universally felt illusion of free will as your starting point. There is no point in any awareness or consciusness, much less a false sense of free will, beyond that of the billiard balls. The lifecycles of stars is much more complicated than a pool game, but I've never heard anything to suggest a star is aware or conscious. Nor an entire solar system, or galaxy, or anything other than us (and possibly some other species?). But they all work perfectly well without any of the things we're discussing. What is the cause & effect explanation of the illusion?

[Prebe]

What is the cause & effect explanation of the illusion?

This is a guess:

Once a species reaches a certain level of consciousness that allows thoughts like this ""determinism vs. free will", there are those who believe in strict determinism (who believe that reacting to stimuli is predetermined, and hence need no action) sit down and wait for the inevitable. They (needles to say) perrish. Those who, otoh, think that what they decide makes a difference, survive to multiply, because they react to stimuli. For the lack of the ability to completely quantify all reactions to any stimulus and to set themselves apart from the rest of nature, they coin the term "free will", and go on to be happily and (re)productive individuals, while those scrawny, anemic philosophers wither away childlessly in their study, in spite the fact that they are right: there is no free will. [/b]

[Zarathustra]

If you don't know - or even attempt to propose - any mechanisms for this free will, what will you have it be?

I've proposed a mechanism for it: holistic, "top-down" causation built up on top of the reductionist, "bottom up" causation.

The type of determinism Lore is talking about implies that every event in the universe is the product of atomic interactions (which is ironic, because it is specifically on the atomic level where we see the very thing he's arguing against: a LACK of strict, deterministic chain of events due to quantum randomness. . . but I digress).

However, this is just an assumption, just like Newton's assumption that time and space were absolute. The idea that the entire universe can be reduced to interactions between atoms, and that every object is nothing more than a collection of atoms, and that the properties of these objects are nothing more than properties of atoms, is reductionism. That's a philosophical concept, not a scientific theory. It's a metaphysical belief (yes, BELIEF) about the nature of science itself, rather than a particular theory within science. These are the concepts you study in a Philosophy of Science class, not in a physicist's laboratory.

My proposed "mechanism" for free will involves the proposal that aggregates of smaller particles can exhibit properties which emerge only at certain thresholds of very large numbers of these particles--and thus these properties can in no way be explained in terms of properties which the individual particles exhibit on a much smaller scale.

Holism: an object is more than the sum of its parts. There's your mechanism.

There are plenty of things in our world which can't be rendered into properties of interacting atoms. For instance: meaning, value, significance, knowledge. There is no way to explain how a story, for instance, conveys meaning to intelligent beings by referring to the atoms which make up the pages of the book, the ink of the letters, the photons conveying these light-dark patterns to the optic nerves, and the processing of those patterns by the neurons. NO WAY. If you're going to accuse us of providing no mechanism for our "freewill" concept, you must at least step up to the plate and present your theory about how symbolic and narrative meaning can be rendered into atomic forces. No interaction of atoms can explain the relevance of fictional characters to our personal lives. Human symbolic communication operates on a level of organization that transcends atomic interactions. One must make a distinction between the message and the medium. The message "rides on top of" the atoms which make up the book-photons-neurons in this chain.

And that level of organization can operate downward upon those atoms in a way that is completely unpredictable with the laws of physics--it can't even be described with the laws of physics, because those laws deal with interactions of atoms, NOT with imagination/intelligence ordering atoms according to conceptual meaning.

For instance, when Donaldson is writing his next book, his imagination will be acting up the atoms of his computer's RAM to arrange them into meaningful patterns--patterns which emerge not out of the necessity of deterministic atomic causation, but which emerge out of the thoughts, feelings, memories, and values of the author. While those memories and feelings "ride on top of" the neurons in his brain, they have as little to do with those neurons as the meaning of these words you're reading right now have to do with the photons which are arranged on your monitor.

If everything is reductionist, then you must admit that meaning and knowledge are nothing more than bits of matter. You must admit that meaning itself is a physical thing which can be rendered into a mathematical formula. According to that view, ideas and concepts would be actually floating around in the universe as quantifiable, measurable objects--just as measurable as pulses of electricity and paths of photons. Is that what you guys are saying?

If not, then you must admit that there are levels of order in this world which can't be reduced to atomic forces. And it is precisely at this level of organization where our most important actions and decisions occur. Given that our decisions are taking into account immaterial factors such as meaning and relevance, then no physical theory can account for these decisions. That doesn't mean that it's magical, or a violation of physics. The interaction of atoms work together to create the mind. But that holistic entity then acts downward upon the matter in a way that no theory of physics can explain, because no theory of physics can take into account knowledge of those theories themselves. (Scientific theories aren't self-referential.) If THAT were the case, then you'd have a situation in which physical theories are aware of themselves. Theories would be alive and knowing. So the reductionist view--in order to take into account everything--involves a kind of "magic" that is even more preposterous than what you're accusing us of believing.

But even if you believe that there's a little bit that can't be explained, I equate that with the paranormal (the literal meaning of the word - beyond normal, and hence the reason I said 'untenable', as I don't think it helps to pull the argument to this area).

See, this displays your bias. You assume that something which can't be explained is "paranormal." But that assumption rests upon the BELIEF that the universe is completely explicable with current (deterministic) science. So you are talking about your beliefs, Lore, and not strictly theories.

In addition, you're also assuming that any scientific explanation will be a deterministic explanation. But that idea has already been shown to be false with quantum mechanics. Your view of science, and scientific explanations, is about 100 years out of date.

Regardless, that 'bit' that makes free will has to exist within some ordered system (whether it be quantum, the soul, etc). . .

I agree. But "ordered" and "determined" aren't the same thing. That's just another assumption.

. . . and therefore is amenable to being understood. And once that happens I theorise we will understand the factors behind it.

"Being understood" doesn't mean "being deterministic." That's another assumption--belief--that you have which isn't any particular scientific theory. The only way you can believe that these two are equivalent is to assume that the universe is deterministic to begin with, and thus as we come to understand the universe, we learn more of its determining factors. Over and over again, you are revealing assumptions and beliefs, not theories.

I do not think that you can have the 'spark of free will' arise from chaos - it's counter-intuitive.

Much of science is counter-intuitive. If it weren't, we wouldn't have to dig so deep to find the truth. We'd just rely upon our intuitions. The idea that the world is round was counter-intuitive. The idea that the solar system is heliocentric was counter-intuitive. So were the ideas that time and space are relative, that gravity was a curvature of space, that the quantum world was random and non-local . . . etc.

But aside from your fallacious implication that counter-intuitive conclusions must be false, your example also contradicts the FACT that pattern arises out of chaos all the time. In fact, ALL order we detect on the marco world "falls out" of the randomness of the quantum world as quantum proxy waves are collapsed.

[Prebe]

So, holistically, you can't predict anything for a rock either because it is more than a sum of its parts.

[Zarathustra]

No, rocks are not more than the sum of their parts (well, ignoring the fact that they no longer exhibit the quantum properties of their individual atoms--see below). Just because the particular holism I'm talking about is possible in some parts of the universe, for some objects, doesn't mean that it holds for all objects. As I said, the collection of atoms must reach a certain "threshold" level of complexity and number of constituent parts. Rocks don't have any higher levels of order besides the physical forces holding them together.

The fact that aggregates of particles exhibit properties completely different from the individual particles themselves is already an established scientific fact. Indeed, this is the whole idea behind quantum mechanics: that individual particles on the atomic scale exhibit features and behaviors that marco-sized objects don't exhibit. So my idea isn't without physical precedent. We already have a scientific tradition of threshold levels of aggregates of particles behaving in entirely different ways than their individual parts. And this is one of the great mysteries of quantum theory: how and where this transition from one to the other occurs.

All I'm saying is that it is possible that another such transition happens on a higher level in brains. And this transition is directly related to the first, because it involves magnifying those quantum properties on a larger scale.

[Prebe]

What about vira? Are they more than the sum of their parts? I'm fishing for when this level of complexity occurs, in case you are in doubt

[Zarathustra]

What about vira? Are they more than the sum of their parts? I'm fishing for when this level of complexity occurs, in case you are in doubt

That's the million dollar question. At both the (A) quantum-to-classical transition stage, and the (as I'm proposing, along with Roger Penrose) (B) classical-back-to-large-scale-quantum stage, it's a vast mystery.

Penrose gives a very technical, detailed guess as to where this occurs (cytoskeletal structures which create microtubules within neurons).

But really, science isn't advanced enough to provide an answer to either the known mystery (A), much less the proposed mystery (B).

However, Penrose gives both a logical, mathematical argument as to why there MUST be a mystery (B) [Godel's Theorem, which shows that consciousness cannot be explained in a computational, deterministic scientific theory], as well as a hypothetical direction that science may proceed in order to develop a theory for non-computational physical processes.

[Prebe]

Penrose gives a very technical, detailed guess as to where this occurs (cytoskeletal structures which create microtubules within neurons).

I assume that you are aware that all eucaryotes have microtubules? And that all neurons have cytoskeletons constructed of microtubules? And that all but the most primitive multicellular animals have neurons? And that there are other cell type than neurons that can be responsibe for signal transduction?

[Zarathustra]

Penrose gives a very technical, detailed guess as to where this occurs (cytoskeletal structures which create microtubules within neurons).

I assume that you are aware that all eucaryotes have microtubules? And that all neurons have cytoskeletons constructed of microtubules? And that all but the most primitive multicellular animals have neurons? And that there are other cell type than neurons that can be responsibe for signal transduction?

Oh yes, I'm aware of that. In fact, part of the support for his argument comes from the fact that even organisms without neurons--like paramecium--still respond to their environment in terms of seeking out food and avoiding dangers. He doesn't suggest that they are therefore conscious, but that, at the very least, purposeful action happens on a level below neuronal activity.

What we gain by removing such action from the level of neurons down to smaller structures is the possibility that quantum effects are in play--whereas neurons are too big for this to plausibly happen at their level.

[Loredoctor]

See, this displays your bias. You assume that something which can't be explained is "paranormal." But that assumption rests upon the BELIEF that the universe is completely explicable with current (deterministic) science. So you are talking about your beliefs, Lore, and not strictly theories.

No. I am saying that something that can't be explained is a poor technique to use in the debate about free will. It's an escape clause.

In addition, you're also assuming that any scientific explanation will be a deterministic explanation. But that idea has already been shown to be false with quantum mechanics. Your view of science, and scientific explanations, is about 100 years out of date.

Malik, try and take part in a discussion without making such remarks.

My science is very much up to date - as up to date as heavy reading into modern journal articles can allow.

And do you want to know how up to date it is? It's at the point where I can point out the error in your statement on quantum mechanics. Many quantum physicists believe the view of uncertainty is incorrect - or a wrong way of looking at this world. They argue that when you factor in Wave Functions. There are many scientists who still believe in determinism and do not think there's a clash with the quantum world.

I am aware of how studies like the Delayed Choice experiment and the Double Slit experiment counter determinism, as well as the effects at Planck time or lengths and the implications of probability. But none of that disputes, or proves, my theories. Certainly, it does not explain consciousness. We're debating an ephemera, Malik.

Man, I moved this thread from the science forum because this debate has become a philosophical one. I could have left in the science forum, but it doesn't belong there. Cut me some slack for at least trying to debate this.

[I'm Murrin]

Determinism states that there is some as-yet unknown mechanism behind the seemingly random events.
Your theory states that there is some mysterious thing about living beings that is "more" than just their physical forms.
Both are unknown, but one is potentially verifiable and the other is not. Occam's razor dictates the deterministic model is the more likely of the two.

[Loredoctor]

Determinism states that there is some as-yet unknown mechanism behind the seemingly random events.
Your theory states that there is some mysterious thing about living beings that is "more" than just their physical forms.
Both are unknown, but one is potentially verifiable and the other is not. Occam's razor dictates the deterministic model is the more likely of the two.

Thankyou, Murrin. That's is where I am coming from.

[Fist and Faith]

Argh. Lots of catching up to do again. Likely not until tomorrow. In the meantime...

Fist, what is your opinion on nature and nurture and their impact upon the growth of a human being?

Although I don't have a guess about percentages, I'm sure both play a big role. I believe Mozart or Einstein were strongly hardwired for their areas of genius. Yes, people can be taught to develop the same areas, but those two (Well, Mozart for sure, but I don't know as much about Einstein's early life.) had huge amounts right from the start.

And my children have shown me that some things about personality are there right from the start. Particularly my 9 yo daughter. She's very high-strung, stubborn, and competitive (not in good, sports-like ways, but in sibling rivalry ways), and she showed very clear signs of these things when she was much less than a year old. Also extremely independent, which I'm happier about.

OTOH, I know that being exposed to particular things can influence our likes and dislikes. Heck, if for no other reason, because you can't like something you've never been exposed to.

(I'm not sure where my love for Bach's music falls. I was taking piano lessons for years. My teachers all seemed to be big Mozart fans, because that's largely what I was given. I thought it was all nice enough. But it wasn't until I was in college that I was given my first Bach piece. I was in heaven! It was as though I'd been waiting for Bach my whole life! I seldom listen to Mozart, and only really like a handful of his compositions. But Bach is God! [This happened at the same time I was first exposed to Baroque music in general. The first thing I heard that I was told was Baroque was, for those who want to know , the overture to Purcell's Dido and Aeneas. It simply stunned me!)

I've read very briefly about studies done on twins, identical and not, who were separated very close to birth. The studies seem to show that some things are more strongly influenced by nature, some by nurture.

Determinism states that there is some as-yet unknown mechanism behind the seemingly random events.
Your theory states that there is some mysterious thing about living beings that is "more" than just their physical forms.
Both are unknown, but one is potentially verifiable and the other is not.

My theory could state that there is some as-yet unknown mechanism, or law of nature, that allows free will to arise in a cause & effect system. Or, it could state that we are not yet aware of the frequency of uncaused events in our universe (although free will, the situation I've been told about sub-atomic particles coming into existence without cause, and the universe itself might all be good examples), meaning cause & effect don't rule with such an iron fist after all. Either of us simply doesn't have all the facts. True, I've never put much effort into looking, because I've never had reason to. I've never doubted free will. And until I'm given strong evidence that I don't have it, I'm not likely to get too involved in such research. And it would need to be strong evidence, indeed, to make me doubt that I have no more free will than billiard balls getting bounced around on the table.

Occam's razor dictates the deterministic model is the more likely of the two.

Not to throw an entirely new topic into this mess... But don't we have situations out there that could be done much more simply and efficiently? I hear doctor's say, "If I ever meet God, I'm going to ask why he made the knee like it is. Such a terrible way to do it! It would be much better if..." Is everything we are aware of in the simplest form we could imagine it being in? What I'm getting at is that I don't see O's R as determining the more likely of two choices; only helping us decide which we would prefer to look into, because it would be easier to study.

[Loredoctor]

your example also contradicts the FACT that pattern arises out of chaos all the time. In fact, ALL order we detect on the marco world "falls out" of the randomness of the quantum world as quantum proxy waves are collapsed.

Do you like to deliberately forget stuff that I have discussed earlier, Malik? I posted in this very same thread that patterns emerge from chaos all the time. I have also posted about collapsing wave patterns.

Why is it you ignore this (like in the AI thread where my arguments about artificial networks were ignored, and then you through it at me)? Yes, I am annoyed, because it's a pretty poor stunt you just pulled, Malik, to throw the 'out of date with science' issue at me specifically, when I am not the only determinist here.

[Zarathustra]

See, this displays your bias. You assume that something which can't be explained is "paranormal." But that assumption rests upon the BELIEF that the universe is completely explicable with current (deterministic) science. So you are talking about your beliefs, Lore, and not strictly theories.

No. I am saying that something that can't be explained is a poor technique to use in the debate about free will. It's an escape clause.

First of all, no one here said that freewill can't be explained. That was you mischaracterizing our position. Secondly, my comment wasn't an endorsement of using that technique as debating tool, but merely pointing out that "paranormal" isn't an accurate description of what we're talking about here, even if we were talking about something inexplicable. Answers.com says: ". . . the term paranormal describes any phenomenon that in one or more respects exceeds the limits of what is deemed physically possible according to current scientific assumptions." There's nothing in there about an inability to explain the phenomenon. Things can be inexplicable for many reasons that have nothing to do with being physically impossible.

But even if we go with your qualifier--that you're merely talking about "beyond normal"--how is this in any way a criticism of our position on freewill? We're already, both you and I, talking about something "beyond normal." It's not normal for things in the universe to make decisions. Perhaps you mean that it's normal for things in the universe to be explicable. Maybe. And if anyone here was saying that freewill was inexplicable, you might have a point. But we're not. Or perhaps you mean that it's normal for things to be deterministic. In that case, your argument devolves into: "Your position isn't normal. Therefore it must be wrong." If that's not your point, then I'm at a loss to understand what your point was.

In addition, you're also assuming that any scientific explanation will be a deterministic explanation. But that idea has already been shown to be false with quantum mechanics. Your view of science, and scientific explanations, is about 100 years out of date.

Malik, try and take part in a discussion without making such remarks.

I'm trying to be patient, but this tendency to control what others say is developing into an annoying habit. You're exhibiting quite a double standard in this debate--which I've pointed out in several posts. You didn't want Wayfriend to say that your position was fallacious. When Fist disagrees, you tell him to stop misreading you. When I make a counterargument, you tell me not to put words in your mouth. Telling other people what to do--rather than how their point is wrong--is surely not a legitimate debating technique.

And do you want to know how up to date it is? It's at the point where I can point out the error in your statement on quantum mechanics. Many quantum physicists believe the view of uncertainty is incorrect - or a wrong way of looking at this world. They argue that when you factor in Wave Functions. There are many scientists who still believe in determinism and do not think there's a clash with the quantum world.

Yes, I'm aware that many scientists think the world is deterministic on the macro scale, and that this doesn't clash with quantum mechanics because the randomness of quantum events seems to "cancel out" as one looks at large aggregates of particles. However, my point was about "any scientific theory." I said:

. . . you're also assuming that any scientific explanation will be a deterministic explanation.

Thus, I'm not saying that every scientific theory will be indeterministic since the discovery of quantum mechanics. I'm merely saying that with the advent of Q.M., we can no longer assume that every future scientific theory will be deterministic--which seems to be the case with your assumption that freewill, and consciousness in general, will eventually give way to a deterministic explanation without even knowing what that explanation will turn out to be. Indeed, you characterize any other possibility as "paranormal," even though Q.M. clearly shows that not only do indeterministic theories exist, but that on extremely small scales, it's quite normal.

The determinism of macro scales which many (if not most) scientists believe in, in no way invalidates the statistical, random nature of Q.M. on the micro scale. Therefore, we can't conclude on the basis of our preconceptions of what is normal that an opposing view is untenable.

I am aware of how studies like the Delayed Choice experiment and the Double Slit experiment counter determinism, as well as the effects at Planck time or lengths and the implications of probability. But none of that disputes, or proves, my theories. Certainly, it does not explain consciousness. We're debating an ephemera, Malik.

But the specific points of mine which you're referencing were not an attempt to prove your position is wrong; they were a defense against your charge that our position can't be right because it's "beyond normal."

Cut me some slack . . .

Sorry, those words aren't in my vocabulary. You'll have to be more specific.

I didn't mean to insult your understanding of science. I'm no scientist myself. I should have said, "The implications you seem to be making about any possible future scientific theory run counter to the findings of Q.M. nearly 100 years ago."

Your theory states that there is some mysterious thing about living beings that is "more" than just their physical forms.

See, there is the mischaracterization thing again. You guys keep using words like "mysterious" and "paranormal," to describe our position, while we haven't used those words at all. Perhaps we haven't used them because that's not what we're talking about. I gave a clear-cut model for holistic top-down causation. Nothing mysterious there. If there's nothing mysterious about atoms "acting upward," then there's nothing inherently mysterious about people "acting downward." Surely inanimate objects don't have more active power than human beings.

And there is nothing paranormal about something being more than the sum of its parts. In fact, there can be no determinism on the macro scale if aggregates of particles didn't take on this NEW property at the threshold between the quantum scale and the scale of everyday events.

Yes, I do think there are things about humans that aren't physical. I think there are things about the universe that aren't physical. Numbers, for instance. Mathematics. Formal patterns and relations. Logic. Ideas. Concepts. Feelings. Opinions. Is it your position that all these things are just as physical as atoms?

Both are unknown, but one is potentially verifiable and the other is not. Occam's razor dictates the deterministic model is the more likely of the two.

Why is the other not verifiable? This, I believe, is another example of bias, or at least mischaracterization. Are quantum events unverifiable just because they're indeterministic?

Occam's razor is just another way to say that ad hoc complication may be unnecessary. It's a rule of thumb, not a physical law. After all, things would be a lot simpler if the universe didn't exist. Does that prove the universe doesn't exist? Of course not.

And I don't see how a model where every single future choice we might make is already contained within the past is simpler than the idea that we improvise on the fly. Surely it's a lot more complicated to write an entire symphony in advance than it is to make it up as you go.

Do you like to deliberately forget stuff that I have discussed earlier, Malik? I posted in this very same thread that patterns emerge from chaos all the time. I have also posted about collapsing wave patterns.

Why is it you ignore this (like in the AI thread where my arguments about artificial networks were ignored, and then you through it at me)? Yes, I am annoyed, because it's a pretty poor stunt you just pulled, Malik, to throw the 'out of date with science' issue at me specifically, when I am not the only determinist here.

If you acknowledge that complex patterns can arise out of chaos, then why do you think it's counter-intuitive that freewill can arise out of chaos? It seems like you're forgetting what you're saying, not me.

Just because I'm responding to points you've made in the current post,
doesn't mean I'm ignoring the totality of points you've made a week or more ago. My posts are already fairly long (containing many points that go unremarked upon by anyone). I have to draw the line somewhere.

Yes, you're not the only determinist here. I've tried to respond to every single point that you, Murrin, Prebe, and James have made. And yes, I can tell you are annoyed. But you've carried this tone since the beginning, no matter whom you address. I didn't realize it was something I was doing specifically that annoyed you. If everyone here annoys you . . . well, what can I say? It seems to be a general trend.

[Prebe]

What we gain by removing such action from the level of neurons down to smaller structures is the possibility that quantum effects are in play--whereas neurons are too big for this to plausibly happen at their level.

So what is it? You mentioned something about microtubules in neurons? And now neurons aren't necessary for determinism to be meaningless?

What I'm reading is, that Paramecium does not respond in a deterministic way. So the level where determinism kicks in is below the level of eucaryotic protists and above the level of rocks?

Now, I'm sure that you know that there are plants that are vastly more evolutionary advanced than paramecia. What about them? Can we predict what they do? Or do they have a free will too?

[Zarathustra]

And it would need to be strong evidence, indeed, to make me doubt that I have no more free will than billiard balls getting bounced around on the table.

Yeah, it seems that the burden of proof would lie with those who claim things are not what they appear. It certainly does appear that our choices are nothing at all like billiard balls bouncing around. As it stands now, the "freewill is an illusion" idea is just a theory that can't even be tested, much less worked out in detail.

One thing that bothers me about this idea that we can figure out all of the factors going into making a decision (and therefore prove the decision is mechanical and deterministic) is that some of these factors aren't even physical objects. The knowledge of the past and our expectations of the future aren't physical objects. Yet this knowledge and expectation certainly modifies our decisions. How can knowledge be included in a description where everything proceeds like billiard balls, where every causal factor is either matter or energy? Knowledge is certainly not matter or energy. No other system in the universe proceeds with knowledge affecting its direction.

Sure, we could say that the difference is consciousness. But that just introduces another mystery, one that must be explained first. And such an explanation wouldn't really help, because the phenomenon of consciousness is distinct from the contents of consciousness. There may very well be a deterministic process that produces consciousness, and therefore we could say that consciousness is a property of physical mechanisms. But consciousness itself holds as its objects things which are both physical (like the consciousness of table and chairs) as well as things which aren't physical (like the awareness of today's date). Today's date isn't a physical thing, yet we use this information to modify our decisions. Pure information, knowledge, and meaning are causal factors in our decision process. Yet, for this to be described as determinism, you'd have to admit that immaterial concepts, information, and meaning have causal powers upon physical objects. So how is this any better than saying a "mysterious, paranormal" freewill plays a causal role in the physical world? What physical mechanism links immaterial things like meaning to tables and chairs? Are meaning, knowledge, and information all illusions, too?

[Zarathustra]

What we gain by removing such action from the level of neurons down to smaller structures is the possibility that quantum effects are in play--whereas neurons are too big for this to plausibly happen at their level.

So what is it? You mentioned something about microtubules in neurons? And now neurons aren't necessary for determinism to be meaningless?

What I'm reading is, that Paramecium does not respond in a deterministic way. So the level where determinism kicks in is below the level of eucaryotic protists and above the level of rocks?

Now, I'm sure that you know that there are plants that are vastly more evolutionary advanced than paramecia. What about them? Can we predict what they do? Or do they have a free will too?

I'm not saying that anything with cytoskeletons or microtubules is indeterminate. I'm saying that these structures present the possibility for indeterminism to arise by producing a form of consciousness which makes use of quantum properties (actually, it's Roger Penrose who is saying it, I'm just repeating).

[Prebe]

Yet, for this to be described as determinism, you'd have to admit that immaterial concepts, information, and meaning have causal powers upon physical objects. So how is this any better than saying a "mysterious, paranormal" freewill plays a causal role in the physical world? What physical mechanism links immaterial things like meaning to tables and chairs. Are meaning, knowledge, and information all illusions, too?

Information is very much physical. Information is physical signals. information storage is too. Neuronal states and all that.

Paramecia don't know tables and chairs. I suggest we try to scale this down from the human/higher animal pedestal, since according to the theory you subscribe to, non-determinism kicks in way before that. And removing the human element would make things a lot less religious.

Edit:

I'm not saying that anything with cytoskeletons or microtubules is indeterminate.

Nor art thou answering any of my questions three.

[Zarathustra]

Prebe, I guess I don't understand you questions. I'm honestly not trying to avoid them. In fact, I'm trying very hard (too hard) to thoroughly keep up with everything said here.

So what is it?

Depends on what the meaning of "is" is . . . ah, just a Clinton joke there. No, I don't know what you mean.

You mentioned something about microtubules in neurons?

Yes I did. There, a straight answer to a simple question.

And now neurons aren't necessary for determinism to be meaningless?

I don't think determinism is meaningless. Neurons are certainly necessary, as they are the (theorized) transfer or conduit between the (theorized) quantum properties and the classical world of electrical pulses. But I have a feeling that's not at all what you were asking.

So the level where determinism kicks in is below the level of eucaryotic protists and above the level of rocks?

I'm not sure where determinism kicks in, and neither are most physicist. That's one of the fundamental mysteries of quantum mechanics . . . how and where exactly the random world of Q.M. becomes our familiar world of apparent determinsm. But again, I feel like I'm missing the gist of what you're asking. My bad.

Now, I'm sure that you know that there are plants that are vastly more evolutionary advanced than paramecia. What about them? Can we predict what they do? Or do they have a free will too?

Argg!! I thought you said there were just three questions. I have no idea about plants.

Please tell me again where you think I've contradicted myself, and I'll try to do better.

However, I must take issue with the claim that information is physical. The fact that the same exact information can be stored with carbon scratches on wood pulp, or electrical pulses in computer wiring, or chemical reactions in living tissue . . . shows that the information being stored here is completely independent of the medium in which is it stored. Sure, you have to have some medium, but that's only to transfer the information or to store the information, or otherwise make use of it. Transferring and storing are physical activities. But the information itself isn't a tangible object. In fact, the stored information in electric circuits of a computer's memory have nearly the same relationship to those electric circuits as metaphors have to the literal words which convey them (well, not a perfect analogy, but I hope you get my point). The electric currents can by used to symbolize the information, but they are not equivalent to that information. Just as written words can be used to symbolize that same exact information. Or you can use Chinese symbols if you want. The symbols are physical. What they symbolize--their meaning--is intangible.