The 'second front' of WWI.

[peter]

With the formation of the 'triple entante' between France, Russia, and Great Britain prior to the first world war, Bismark's [the german chancellor] worst fears were realised in that it became obvious that the approaching war would have to be fought on two fronts instead of one [it had been Bismarks desire to 'keep the russians on side' so that war could be restricted to a single theatre inFrance/Belgium]. A calculated risk was taken when the 'Schliffen Plan' was initiated in 1914 - one that was based on the assumptions that France would be able to mobilise in approximately the same time that Germany could [about 2 weeks], where Russia would take about 6 weeks, given the much bigger distances and poorer rail network that pertained. The assumption was that the French would be rapidly defeated and the window of time be used to bring the german forces back to deal with the russian forces on the second front. The problem was that by the time the Schliffen Plan was put into opperation it was already a decade plus out of date given that it assumed a french state of unpreparedness resulting from it's recent defeat [when the plan was devised] in the franco-prussian war. This was not however the case some twenty or so years later in 1914. The french had used the intervening years well and as a result were able to mobilise a force approximately equal to that of the german opposition. Also von Moltke [the nephew] was an indecisive and 'tinkering' commander without the boldness and flair that the bold plan demanded. As a result the german advance was stalled and thus commenced the extended and wastefull war of atrition that occupied the opposing forces in the trenches for the next four years.

My question is this. Why did not the 'other war' of the second front result in a swift russian defeat of the minimal german forces ranged against them, freeing the russian army thence to make it's way leisurely to the rear of the german forces, where it could have brought about a swift and decisive end to what was to become perhaps the worst waste of human life that ever occured on the field of war?

[There is probably a really simple answer to this that will expose me as a fraud in the thin patina of knowledge I have pretended to above ]

[I'm Murrin]

Cherry picking from wikipedia:

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Front_(World_War_I)

This early Russian success in 1914 on the Austro-Russian border was a reason for concern to the Central Powers and caused considerable German forces to be transferred to the East to take pressure off the Austrians, leading to the creation of the new German Ninth Army. At the end of 1914, the main focus of the fighting shifted to central part of Russian Poland, west of the river Vistula.[22] The October Battle of the Vistula River and the November Battle of Łódź brought little advancement for the Germans, but at least kept the Russians at a safe distance.[23]

In 1915 the German command decided to make its main effort on the Eastern Front, and accordingly transferred considerable forces there. To eliminate the Russian threat the Central Powers began the campaign season of 1915 with the successful Gorlice-Tarnow Offensive in Galicia in May 1915.

[peter]

Thanks Murrin - clearly there was much going on other than at the 'trenches' where our attention tends to be fixed. I'm guessing there is going to be some informative programs coming up over the next few months that will amplify the sequence of events further.

[Damelon]

Transportation was a major problem for the Russians. At the time armies were transported to the front by train. The Russians used a different gauge of track than the rest of Europe. Therefore, with a Russian advance they would either have to hope to capture some German equipment or physically change the tracks to accommodate their own trains in order to keep their troops supplied during an advance.

That wasn't their only problem, but it was a big one.

[peter]

Yes Damelon, I thought about this after making the post - but then it did occur to me that as it had been the German intention to transfer forces from the [what they assumed would be] defeated french front to the russian, it must be possible and not too difficult.

It's amazing to think that even to this day there is contention in history departments about both how and why the FWW started - and thats only 100 years ago. A clear illustration if ever one was needed, of the problems of teasing out a core of fact and 'truth' from the fog of ambiguous detail which contempory record presents the historian to work with.