Determinism

[Gadget nee Jemcheeta]

While it may have been possible to make decisions other than the ones we've made, keep in mind that we didn't, and don't, and never do Hehehe...sorry for that semantic rubbish there....



Anyway, ahem, Fist... as far as the shrew goes, you said that he doesn't have much room for free will, he MUST eat and MUST flee from predators... does that mean that a starving human loses his free will?

Also, as far as the 'useless' 'illusion' of free will, I don't think it's free will you're talking about, I think you're talking about the process of making decisions. That process is neither illusory nor useless, it's the foundation of human behavior, the act of making choices based on what you have to go on.

By the way, just so we're clear here, and just to expose myself to more bashing, I also don't believe in irrational action, and think that crazy people ALWAYS have reasons on some level for what they're doing...

Av, I like that you're warming up to the position here.... I'm not sure if we're really in agreement though... but how about this for a picture of human life?

We definately have pleasure/pain responses, that's fairly clear. Our first actions are basically living those out, and our experiences are largely involuntary. I'm saying that there's no difference between the actions of a child and the actions of adults, except better (hopefully) and more complicated decisions.
I'm talking about 'free will' as an involuntary process So maybe I'm not talking about free will at all. But rather, more likely just will.

[[Syl]]

From The Mind's Sky by Timothy Ferris

The American brain researcher Michael Gazzaniga writes, "The strong subjective sense we all possess of ourselves is that we are a signle, unified, conscious agent controlling life's events with a singular, integrated purpose."
And yet, as Gazzaniga adds, "It is not true." His research and that of many colleagues reveals that the brain is by no means monolithic, but consists of many different modules modules- Gazzaniga calls them "programs"- that function more or less independently.

...Consciousness forms a much smaller part of the operations of the brain than was once supposed. Mind is not the all-knowing monarch of the brain, but a little circle of firelight in a dark, Australia-sized continent where the unconscious brain proceses carry on.

This strange circumstance- that one's mind neither controls nor comprehends most of what goes in in one';s brain- is emphasized in the results of two recent experiments. One was conducted by Benjamin Libet, a neurophysiologist at the School of Medicine of the University of California at San Francisco. The other was pioneered by Roger Sperry and his colleagues at the California Institute of Technology...
Libet asked the subjects of his experiments simply to flex one finger. To do so would seem to be a purely volitional act, one that the conscious mind orders and the rest of the nervous system carries out. But Libet's results proved otherwise.
Libet wired up his subjects with electrodes that measure brain activity, and seated them in full view of a rapidly rotating clock hand that enabled them to note exactly when they "ordered" their finger to flex. Libet could then mark three events in time: The onset of increased brain activity recorded by the electrodes, the flexing of the finger, and the point at which each subject had consciously willed his finger to flex.
What Libet found was that in each instance, a flurry of brain activity took place a fraction of a second before the "order" to flex the ginger was dispatched by the conscious mind. "In other words," says Libet, "their neurons were firing a third of a second before they were even conscious of the desire to act. Hence it appeared the brain had begun preparing for movement long before the mind had 'decided' to do anything."
The illusion of conscious control is maintanined, Libet notes, because another mechanism in the brain delays the sensation of the finger moving, so that the concious mind continues to think that it has first decreed the action, then felt the muscles act.

... in experiments conducted by Sperry, Gazzaniga, and others on what are called "split brain" patients. The cerebrum- the seat of thought and voluntary action- is divided into two lobes or hemispheres. In most individuals, the left cerebral hemisphere processes visual information from the right side of each eye's field of view, and controls the right side of the body, while the right hemisphere performs the same functions for the left side. Communication between the two hemispheres is handled by the corpus callosum, a bundle of over two hundred million nerve fibers. Sufferers from grand mal epiepsy may find relief through a surgical procedure in which the corpus callosum is cut, terminating communication between the right and left sides of the higher brain. Typically these individuals go on to lead normal lives, with few obvious side effects. But careful studies of their perceptions and actions has taught scientists a great deal about how the brain works.
...Sperry and his colleagues flashed pictures on a screen in such a way that their subjects could see them on only one side of their field of view. This apparatus could, for example, show a picture to the right brain while keeping the left brain in the dark. In a normal individual this would make little difference; the corpus callosum, a high-bandwidth transmission channel that shuttles information back and forth between lobes, would inform the left brain of what the right brain had seen. But a split-brain patient has lost the use of the corpus callosum; consequently his left brain has little or no way of knowing what the right brain has seen.
...When a word is flashed to the right hemisphere of a split-brain patient, she cannot tell the researcher what the word was. The left brain, which handles speech, does not know what to say, because it has not seen the word. The right brain knows, but cannot speak. It can, howeer, answer questions in other ways.

But the implications of localized brain functions can also help us understand the unity of mind. The split-brain modules that operate more or less independently, and that the function of the mind is not so much to tell the other units what to do as to try to make some coherent sense out of what they already have chosen to do.
This is where Gazzaniga came in. he worked with split-brain patients whose right hemispheres had sufficient linguistic facility to understand simple commands... When a command- "Walk!"- was flashed to such a patient's right brain, he got up and began to walk out of the room. The remarkable thing is that when asked, the patient invariably came up with a rational though bogus explanation of his actions. Asked, "Where are you going?" a typical response was something like, "Uh, I'm going to get a Coke."
This behavior calls to mind a similar phenomenon often observed in connection with hypnosis. "Under hypnosis the patient is given a post-hypnotic suggestion," writes the philosopher John Searle, of the University of California, Berkeley. "You can tell him, for example, to some fairly trivial, harmless thing, such as, let's say, crawl around on the floor. After the patient comes out of hypnosis, he might be engaging in conversation, sitting, drinking coffee, when suddenly he says something like, 'What a fascinating floorin this room!'... He then proceeds to crawl around on the floor.

The implication seems clear that there is a program in the brain responsible for presenting the mind with plausible explanations for actions, and that it acts, so to speak, unscrupulously, blithely explaining matters about which it is uninformed.

Fingers tired. Quitting now.

[Gadget nee Jemcheeta]

I am almost ashamed that I didn't think of Sperry and the split brain studies. *sigh*
Caer, thanks for that set of quotes by the way, that was really good stuff, and brings our debate a bit closer to phenomenal reality

[Fist and Faith]

While it may have been possible to make decisions other than the ones we've made, keep in mind that we didn't, and don't, and never do Hehehe...sorry for that semantic rubbish there....

Quite alright.

Anyway, ahem, Fist... as far as the shrew goes, you said that he doesn't have much room for free will, he MUST eat and MUST flee from predators... does that mean that a starving human loses his free will?

No, that person still decides what to do about the situation. Some decide to continue to starve. Intelligence plays a huge role in how independent an organism is from its environment. The more intelligent a species, the more independent. Or, to put it another way, the more intelligent, the more free will. The circumstances of the moment don't change that.

Also, as far as the 'useless' 'illusion' of free will, I don't think it's free will you're talking about, I think you're talking about the process of making decisions. That process is neither illusory nor useless, it's the foundation of human behavior, the act of making choices based on what you have to go on.

I don't understand why we should perceive this process to be something that it is not.

This strange circumstance- that one's mind neither controls nor comprehends most of what goes in in one';s brain- is emphasized in the results of two recent experiments. One was conducted by Benjamin Libet, a neurophysiologist at the School of Medicine of the University of California at San Francisco. The other was pioneered by Roger Sperry and his colleagues at the California Institute of Technology...
Libet asked the subjects of his experiments simply to flex one finger. To do so would seem to be a purely volitional act, one that the conscious mind orders and the rest of the nervous system carries out. But Libet's results proved otherwise.
Libet wired up his subjects with electrodes that measure brain activity, and seated them in full view of a rapidly rotating clock hand that enabled them to note exactly when they "ordered" their finger to flex. Libet could then mark three events in time: The onset of increased brain activity recorded by the electrodes, the flexing of the finger, and the point at which each subject had consciously willed his finger to flex.
What Libet found was that in each instance, a flurry of brain activity took place a fraction of a second before the "order" to flex the ginger was dispatched by the conscious mind. "In other words," says Libet, "their neurons were firing a third of a second before they were even conscious of the desire to act. Hence it appeared the brain had begun preparing for movement long before the mind had 'decided' to do anything."
The illusion of conscious control is maintanined, Libet notes, because another mechanism in the brain delays the sensation of the finger moving, so that the concious mind continues to think that it has first decreed the action, then felt the muscles act.

I'm not understanding this. How did they detect the conscious will/order? Is this saying that the subject was looking at the clock, and said, "I willed my finger to flex at exactly X"? And then they checked the printout of the electrodes, and found that the brain activity happened before the time that the subject said the "order" was given?

[[Syl]]

I think you mostly have it, Fist. As I understand it, there are are three measurements taken. The first is by the subject when he records what time he willed his finger to move. The second is taken by the electrodes that record what time the brain activity occurred. The last is recorded by an observer (or mechanism) that notes the exact time the finger moved.

[Fist and Faith]

Free will and determinism may not be mutually exclusive. Just because you make the choice you had to make, doesn't mean you didn't make the choice yourself. If it wasn't you then who was it? Don't your experiences belong to you?

I'll go along with them belonging to me.

You went round collecting them up, so you must have some kind of responsibility for what they do.

How do you define responsible? If, as Jem suggests, and seems likely to me, our first experiences are basically living out pain/pleasure responses, and we must make the later "choices" that we make, I don't see how we could hold anyone accountable for theirs.

Don't get the wrong idea. I'm not arguing for the sake of arguing. If I wasn't open to different ideas, I would have stopped posting here long ago. As I've said, I can't argue against your stance, and I agree with it to a large extent. It's possible that you're right. I'm just hoping you'll continue to discuss this idea.

[Fist and Faith]

I think you mostly have it, Fist. As I understand it, there are are three measurements taken. The first is by the subject when he records what time he willed his finger to move. The second is taken by the electrodes that record what time the brain activity occurred. The last is recorded by an observer (or mechanism) that notes the exact time the finger moved.

I have a couple of problems with this study. Maybe there's more detail that would clear them up?

First, it does not say that the brain activity measured while the subject is staring at the clock, thinking, "OK, I'm gonna flex my finger soon. I'm gonna flex my finger soon. I'm gonna flex my finger soon," is at all different from the brain activity that began at the instant the subject claims to have willed the finger movement. Surely, thinking, "I'm gonna flex my finger soon. I'm gonna flex my finger soon. I'm gonna flex my finger soon," produces brain activity, and it might look the same to the instruments used as the activity that occurs when the mind is actually giving the order.

It's also possible that the subjects were not quite right in their perception of exactly when they willed the flex. We're talking about a third of a second, after all. I'm not sure I'd be able to say the exact instant that my thoughts changed from preparing to give my finger an order to flex and giving my finger an order to flex. When I move a finger, I don't silently yell "Move!" to it. I simply move it, and I cannot feel any gap between willing it and it moving. So any brain activity detected before the actual motion could conceivably be from my thinking "I'm gonna flex my finger."

There have got to be errors of some sort, because the reason the subjects' fingers moved is that the subjects consciously willed the fingers to move. The were not told to tap their feet, and suddenly their fingers moved. It was planned.

[[Syl]]

Well, this was actually just a siting of an experiment, not the actual experiment's result, so I can't say with any authority. However, the inference I made was that there's a neurological (neurospatial?) difference between planning and volition... motor cortex and all that. I believe they knew exactly which area of activity they were looking for and would've separated the two, otherwise any brain activity could've been used.

I take it you're not a big proponent of the Akashic and Warrior Poet's art of reading programs in Neverness? I believe that was a large part of the overall message Zindell was trying to convey- that in order to truly find free will we must stop being slaves to our own subroutines.

[Nathan]

How do you define responsible? If, as Jem suggests, and seems likely to me, our first experiences are basically living out pain/pleasure responses, and we must make the later "choices" that we make, I don't see how we could hold anyone accountable for theirs.

I suppose when I say responsible I mean that you have an obligation or duty to accept that the effect your decisions have on other people is your own doing. You may not have total control over your choices (because your experiences do) but when it comes down to it you are you, and it's not anybody else making the decisions for you so it's only you who can be responsible for them.

[Gadget nee Jemcheeta]

Interesting ideas here... Fist, I'd like to focus on this responsibility idea, but not because I have an answer, because I want an answer
But before that, I was thinking about the part of our brain that does the rationalizing. It's not the largest part, but if free will exists anywhere, it's there.... it would be interesting if we could somehow learn to 'surrender' our decisions over to that part of our brain, and instead of rationalizing post-action, instead try to formulate action from the variety or rationales available. Even if the person who was hypnotized to crawl on the ground makes a rationale up, if he could learn to delay action until he looks at all possible options in mental list form, and try to rate them based on rational logic/perceived benefits, he might be able to overcome the compulsion, no?

[Fist and Faith]

I suppose when I say responsible I mean that you have an obligation or duty to accept that the effect your decisions have on other people is your own doing. You may not have total control over your choices (because your experiences do) but when it comes down to it you are you, and it's not anybody else making the decisions for you so it's only you who can be responsible for them.

Can we have an obligation or duty to accept this? Certainly, I'm still not sure of exactly what you think, but I would have thought that you thought our experiences, physical makeup, and other factors determined whether or not we accepted it.

Fist, I'd like to focus on this responsibility idea, but not because I have an answer, because I want an answer

Cool! Of course, since I believe we have free will, responsibility is a given. (Of course, we get to choose whether or not to accept responsibility.)

[Avatar]

Is there a difference between "will" and "free will"? I can accept the idea that your brain "knows" you're going to move your finger before you decide to move it, largely from the perspective that Fist suggests. In fact, he raises many of the same points I did when first hearing of the experiment.

But doesn't the fundamental question come down to whether or not we can make any descision? If the descision making process is autonomous, doesn't that imply free will rather than the opposite?

I realise we're more in danger than ever of going round in circles here. But doesn't it come down to our perception anyway? Do the proponents of determinism feel that they are not in control of their actions? Do they feel unable to do something other than whatever it was that they did?

Is this an acceptable definition of free will? "The ability to select any of a number of options, regardless of the outcome thereof."

If not, perhaps we would be better served by first defining it? How does Nathan or JemCheeta define "free will"? What would you consider to be "free will". Leave aside all other opinions about whether or not it exists, and tell us what you see it as.

I fear our confusion comes from not knowing exactly what we're talking about in the first place.

What is Free Will? How do you understand the concept?

--Avatar

[Gadget nee Jemcheeta]

Good plan, Av, now that I think of it this will clear up a whole lot.
I cannot look at a function of the brain that would allow you, as a last ditch effort, to override all conditioning, as a free will.
For me, the only way I could accept the potential of free will is as an acting agent that is not coerced, and uncoercable. It would be unbribable, and I don't think the human will is at all that. To me, that would be a totally free will....
Do you believe that you could have a 'free will' that is limited?

The idea of free will as something that you could develop, that I put forward in my last post, is the first idea of free will that I've had, but even that would be subject to most of my arguments against free will. I think in terms of responsibility, the reason that determinism and responsibility could coexist is if you accepted the responsibility despite determinism, make the choice to be responsible for your actions, the same as you would in any other situation.

[Nathan]

Free will, to be truly free, must be completely free from everything: Influence, coercion, experience, emotion.
But without these things, how can you make a choice? Pure free will cannot exist. What I've been talking about is free will to a point. Free will where you've considered the outcomes of actions and decided on a choice. (although I'm not really sure this is free will at all either)

Can we have an obligation or duty to accept this? Certainly, I'm still not sure of exactly what you think, but I would have thought that you thought our experiences, physical makeup, and other factors determined whether or not we accepted it.

What I meant when I said that was that we are who we are. Our fault or not, we have done the things we've done, therefore we're responsible for them. Yes, people will often not accept responsibility for their actions, they'll blame someone else or attribute it to violent computer games. These things will have an effect of course, but I've played violent games and not murdered anyone. The people who are influenced by things like this are already in a position where they are easily convinced that bad things are a good idea. Their life experience and physical makeup to that point has made them so.

My point is, everybody is in the same situation. Our experiences make us. We make the decisions.

[Gadget nee Jemcheeta]

If there is any responsibility for our actions, it falls on us, because we are the only beings who can correct ourselves so that those actions are not repeated. A test of whether or not we are good at being people is our ability to improve upon ourselves.

[Fist and Faith]

What I meant when I said that was that we are who we are. Our fault or not, we have done the things we've done, therefore we're responsible for them. Yes, people will often not accept responsibility for their actions, they'll blame someone else or attribute it to violent computer games. These things will have an effect of course, but I've played violent games and not murdered anyone. The people who are influenced by things like this are already in a position where they are easily convinced that bad things are a good idea. Their life experience and physical makeup to that point has made them so.

My point is, everybody is in the same situation. Our experiences make us. We make the decisions.

I'm still having difficulty with your use of the word responsible, and I think it's along the lines of your differentiating between our experiences forcing our choices, and determining them. To me, responsibility implies choice. The murderer should have chosen to not murder. That's fine with me, because I believe that we can all choose either way, at any point in our lives.

But to your way of thinking, would it be more accurate to say that a murderer is the cause of the murder? If you think that his act was determined by past experiences and physical makeup, then he couldn't have chosen otherwise. Yes, we would still have to have penalties, because there's the chance that the experience of enduring the penalty might determine the opposite action next time. (That is, if penalties were a good deal smarter than they are in the US at present.)

Yeah, it amounts to the same thing, but, again, I think the difference is the same as that between forced and determined. Unless I'm still not understanding your position, which is certainly possible.

[Avatar]

For me, the only way I could accept the potential of free will is as an acting agent that is not coerced, and uncoercable. It would be unbribable, and I don't think the human will is at all that. To me, that would be a totally free will....
Do you believe that you could have a 'free will' that is limited?

If your will is "uncoercable", that would make it as rigid as determinism would. The very point of free will, to me, is that you are able to change your mind. That you have the ability to select one of a number of possibilities. Any one of that number.

The dictionary seems to define it as:

the power of making free choices unconstrained by external agencies

Now I understand that you and Nathan are suggesting that that "external agencies" constantly constrain your will, and in a sense, I'll agree that they affect it to greater or lesser degrees. But nothing is inevitable. Covenant's acceptance of the Land was an overcoming of everything his life had trained him to believe. It was an excercise of free will. To act in a fashion that every part of him cried out against. It may not be likely, but its likelihood is unimportant. What is important is its possibility.

--Avatar

[Nathan]

But to your way of thinking, would it be more accurate to say that a murderer is the cause of the murder? If you think that his act was determined by past experiences and physical makeup, then he couldn't have chosen otherwise.

What I'm trying to say is:
If someone's in the situation where their experiences and physical makeup determine their choices then there's no way they can be held responsible for their choices because it would really be the people around them causing them to do the things they do.
However, if everyone is this situation, nobody is responsible for any action. At this point we've got a choice, we can either decide that nobody is responsible for anything, which would cause chaos, or we can decide to arbittrarily assign responsibility to people for their own actions, which will create much less chaos.
I'm not saying people should be responsible for their actions, but that's the only way it's going to work.

[Avatar]

So you are saying that nobody is actually responsible for anything that they do? Their experiences and circumstances combine to make it inevitable and unavoidable that they will commit certain acts? No murderer is to blame for his "crime"? In fact, there is no crime, because everything is meant to happen?

Do you believe in fate too?

--Avatar

[Nathan]

No I do not believe in fate. Fate is the notion that everything that happens is meant to happen, no? I believe everything happens because it has to happen.

I'm saying that because NOBODY is responsible for anything we have to assign responsibility arbitrarily for actions, or there would be chaos, and who better to assign it to than the people performing the actions?

Murder is still a crime because we call it a crime. Exactly the same way that someone is responsible because we assignt he responsibility to them.