Language and Thinking

[Fist and Faith]

Yeah, I understand what you mean. I'm just wondering if your understanding of "thought" is accurate, or if its unnecessarily narrow. I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm just exploring the concept. You say "the music does not communicate thought." But what you mean is "the music does not communicate thought that can be expressed with language." I'm just wondering if there are types of thought that can't be expressed with language, but which are, nevertheless, thought.

[aliantha]

The last point in my last post (oh, and thanks for the nod, Vraith, however belated ) was that it seems to me that rus equates thought with reason. Or that reason is the highest form of thought, which we all should be engaging in at every opportunity. Or something like that.

So building on what Fist just said, rus, I wonder if what you mean when you say, "music does not communicate thought," what you're really saying is, "music does not communicate rational thought." The thoughts that music generates can't be reasoned away. They can't be argued with. Therefore they're just emotions/perceptions. Am I close?

So perceptions are the things Weez was looking for -- the thoughts we can all agree on? Stuff like "the sky is blue" and "the grass is green" -- those are what I mean by perceptions.

If I'm right, then I'm starting to see a hierarchy of types of thought and communication (leaving emotions totally out of it for now): perception (the sky is blue), nonverbal communications (caveman gestures; the nod and wink between friends), artistic/creative nonverbal communication (i.e., art and music), verbal thoughts/language, and reason.

Oh, and I think it's quite interesting that both Fist and rus are approaching my arguments about music as a listener.

[Vraith]

Perhaps we are talking semantics at some level. Rus is defining thought in a particular way [ability to do a certain kind of analysis being one property], then comparing it to other things, and if they don't match the definition, then they aren't thought, properly speaking.
But: a musician knows that, for instance "D minor is the saddest of all keys," [heh...little game of identify that quote for y'all].
He plans, structures, builds, assigns instruments and voices, changes keys...and not to do/say/affect others in the same old way, but to say something new, different. And improvisational music, the players definitely talk to each other, spontaneously, speak and reply...also speak to the audience. There are, admittedly rare, but true geniuses that can, untrained, without printed music, play any piece on any instrument [how well they do so only depends on their physical abilities] the logic and structure of the music and the logic and structure of the instrument make perfect sense...though the instruments don't HAVE to be made precisely that way, and they can alter how they play if, for instance, one string is out of tune.
Any decent painter knows that he is not making a precise replica: they think about what things to emphasize, alter, add, leave out. In fact, how good a painting is is NEVER judged primarily on how exact a reproduction is.
And it's not as simple as "perception;" a fair amount of visual art is "talking" recursively about perception itself.
Even most of great photography, which is highly replicative mechanically, carries meaning mostly in dialogue with context, angle, light, perception and perceiving about perception.
And those are not the limits/comprehensive explanation of music, painting, photography.
And they are certainly thought, by my definition.

[aliantha]

for instance "D minor is the saddest of all keys," [heh...little game of identify that quote for y'all].

<googles>

Okay, that's it. That's twice I've been stumped on a "Spinal Tap" reference.* I'm adding it to my Netflix queue *now*.


*The earlier instance was when the firm decided to move two of the attorneys I work for (and, consequently, me) from the 10th floor to the 11th floor, and the department gave my folks some cash to have a sort of happy hour in the one attorney's office after work. Basically everybody in our department wants to be on 10 because that's where the departmental Great Bivogs have their offices, but there aren't enough offices on 10 for the whole department so the management wanted to try to make 11 seem like a cool place to be, too. Anyway, so my attorney sent out an e-mail invitation to the shindig with the subject line, "These go to 11". And then he had to explain it to me. With YouTube as a visual aid.

[Fist and Faith]

Oh, and I think it's quite interesting that both Fist and rus are approaching my arguments about music as a listener.

Well, it's what happened in the movie. (One of my all-time favorites, btw. William Hurt and Marlee Matlin's first role. He's one of my favorite actors. She got an Oscar for it, and earned it.) I've played the piano most of my life. Not particularly well, which is why my degree is in Music History, not performance. But I can still talk about it from that view.

Perhaps we are talking semantics at some level. Rus is defining thought in a particular way [ability to do a certain kind of analysis being one property], then comparing it to other things, and if they don't match the definition, then they aren't thought, properly speaking.

Yeah, could be. I don't know whether or not he's right according to dictionaries and encyclopedias, or whoever the world's experts on thought are. (Other than Chesterton, of course. ) But even if your definition in this matter is right, rus, I'm wondering if it came about only because we, who so very predominantly use language even when thinking inside our heads, just haven't sufficiently figured out how to express thought, or have thought, in other ways.

[aliantha]

Oh, and I think it's quite interesting that both Fist and rus are approaching my arguments about music as a listener.

Well, it's what happened in the movie. (One of my all-time favorites, btw. William Hurt and Marlee Matlin's first role. He's one of my favorite actors. She got an Oscar for it, and earned it.) I've played the piano most of my life. Not particularly well, which is why my degree is in Music History, not performance. But I can still talk about it from that view.

Ah, okay. I had the same problem with clarinet in music school, which is why my degree is in journalism.

I don't play piano (other than plunking out "Heart and Soul" with one finger...) but took lessons on acoustic guitar sporadically -- I might still be able to play a couple of chords, maybe. And I morphed from clarinet to alto sax (for a year in jazz band in high school) and soprano recorder. I'd love to learn the Irish flute, but first I've either gotta grow bigger hands or get a low-D flute with the "small hands" configuration --which I may remember to do, the next time I have a spare $400 lying around. (As if!)

Anyway, apologies for the digression.

[Avatar]

I also equate thought with reason. Music can communicate emotion, but just the sound itself doesn't communicate thought. For that, you need lyrics.

--A

[Fist and Faith]

It's an awfully complex system to not involve thought, though, isn't it? Musical forms can be pretty involved.

And what about the first guy, millennia ago, who dropped a stick on a hollow log, and, for the first time in history, thought the sound that resulted was something more than simply a sound? I don't know whether or not there was language at that time. Could be it was before language came along. OTOH, could be we weren't developed enough for the concept of music before language. But even if there was language, the recognition of what had just happened - an emotional response to the sound of the stick hitting the hollow log - seems like thought. It's not simply an emotional response. Can a complex systems result from an emotional responses if thought doesn't then examine and develop it?

[rusmeister]

The last point in my last post (oh, and thanks for the nod, Vraith, however belated ) was that it seems to me that rus equates thought with reason. Or that reason is the highest form of thought, which we all should be engaging in at every opportunity. Or something like that.

So building on what Fist just said, rus, I wonder if what you mean when you say, "music does not communicate thought," what you're really saying is, "music does not communicate rational thought." The thoughts that music generates can't be reasoned away. They can't be argued with. Therefore they're just emotions/perceptions. Am I close?

Close enough for government work!
Seriously, yes, that's basically what I mean.

So perceptions are the things Weez was looking for -- the thoughts we can all agree on? Stuff like "the sky is blue" and "the grass is green" -- those are what I mean by perceptions.

If I'm right, then I'm starting to see a hierarchy of types of thought and communication (leaving emotions totally out of it for now): perception (the sky is blue), nonverbal communications (caveman gestures; the nod and wink between friends), artistic/creative nonverbal communication (i.e., art and music), verbal thoughts/language, and reason.

Oh, and I think it's quite interesting that both Fist and rus are approaching my arguments about music as a listener.

I have little choice. My ability to generate melodies sucks. Give me a melody, though, and I'll crank out lyrics quickly. A kind of undiscovered Weird Al Yankovich.

[Avatar]

It's an awfully complex system to not involve thought, though, isn't it? Musical forms can be pretty involved.

It involves thought. It just doesn't communicate it.

--A

[Vraith]

It's an awfully complex system to not involve thought, though, isn't it? Musical forms can be pretty involved.

It involves thought. It just doesn't communicate it.

--A

Oh? Really? I think that depends on your facility in that particular form of thought/communication.
An analogy: [here we go again...this won't completely encompass what I mean, or be accurate completely cuz in the second part I'm going to be talking about a non-talking thing, and even if I wasn't...well..it's an analogy...ok [/slaps self, mutters "get on with it"]
Rus has done Lit. Someone [Ali?] was a journalist. Everyone posting here has done language at a fairly high level. If we took up "Romeo and Juliet" we could argue [intelligently and reasonably] all day about minutiae of it. We could do the same about the greater themes/interpretation, and if or how various schools/styles/structures of interpretation are applicable or not, if they add or twist meaning, etc. etc. BUT certain things we would absolutely agree on, mostly negative: there are any number of miniscule and all-encompassing things that someone MIGHT say about it that anyone with the slightest sense would say "That's just wrong." Our threshold of wrongness vs. reasonableness varies according to an assortment of things we know...but eventually we reach it.
Music...and live improv is the best example...works precisely the same way: there are "conversations" that lead everyone new places, ones where they're saying "hmm?" "what?" "ewww" "got it!" "what about?" "I don't get it,"...these all happen at differing levels of both understanding
of the basics/viewpoints, and disagreement about them...at some point, [there's a long continuum before we get there] even a nearly tone-deaf guy there to pick up chicks can say "that just sucked."

[Avatar]

Uh...I'm pretty tone deaf. Music is not a good analogy for me. But listening to Bach for example, doesn't tell me what he was thinking when he composed it.

--A

[Fist and Faith]

Here's a cool article from the NY Times about how language influences thinking:
www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/magazine/29language-t.html

[rusmeister]

Here's a cool article from the NY Times about how language influences thinking:
www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/magazine/29language-t.html

Yeah, I saw that. Some true stuff there, that lines up with my own thesis that the way they think about the issues we argue about has been shaped by the modern use of language itself - which we were born into, creating a Matrix-like situation, where we cannot imagine reality outside the confines of the way we express it. Modern terms like "be in a relationship" (in the sexual sense), "one's partner" (ditto) and a hundred others (OK, more like a thousand) are all modern inventions that helped foist a new view of these things onto people. Ask how our ancestors spoke 100-150 years ago, and (if we avoid anachronistic presentations) we find that they expressed ideas in a different way, and so comprehended reality differently. The main effect, in those examples, has been a tremendous shift in the perception of sexual morality. I would say that the words were deliberately coined by enemies of traditional morality that wanted to be "free lovers" (a contradiction in terms if one ever troubles to think about it), and yet, this is how we are all taught to speak today, if not in the home by parents so-conditioned, then in school and by the media. It's not "our fault", and yet we do see things differently than our ancestors, in great part because we speak differently.

As I began to discover this, I began to reject the modern language that I now see to be loaded with false representations of reality. If you say "gluttony", a mass of language attempting to make fatness a purely medical condition will be revealed to be bull**** for 99.9% of the people who now see it so. If I reject "partner" (which in itself helped make marriage to be seen no longer as a vow, but as a business contract - the former cannot be broken without horrific consequences. The latter can be broken whenever "the business seems to be going bad", a change that happened over the last hundred years or so), then I'm left with "fiancee" or "wife" - which does not grant legitimacy to sexual relations outside of marriage as the modern terms do (so ditto for "boyfriend"/"girlfriend" when the person in question is neither a boy/girl nor a friend).

[Vraith]

Fascinating article. In my Ed. classes we talked a lot about early/related work like this, but it seemed like people stopped looking at it in the 90's...I'm glad they didn't, or at least came back to it [and now I have even more support for something I've been screaming about for 20 years or so...that every child should be raised from infancy with at least 2 languages, preferably as different from each other as possible].
OTOH, Rus...bet you can't guess that I'm going to disagree with your conclusion... . You've narrowed the many implications of what they found, I think...but I'm setting that aside just to point out one of them: In order to truly be a Christian, you'd have to be raised in a desert region, subjugated to foreigners, and speak a semitic language [probably Aramaic], as mother tongue, and likely Latin and/or Greek, at least the fundamentals, in the "native" way of the time. [under your interpretation].
Really, though...I don't see the change in language as some plot or unintended consequence that alters reality...I see the change as we know a hell of a lot more about the world now than they did even 50 years ago, let alone 2000+. The language had to change to accomodate/encompass the simple fact that we have more and truer knowledge of the world, not less. [which is not to say that there aren't any Orwellian twists in the mix.]

[Avatar]

The evolution of language is as inevitable as the evolution of life and society and thinking.

It's too limiting to expect language, or society for that matter, to stagnate. By our very nature, we are against stagnation.

--A

[rusmeister]

The evolution of language is as inevitable as the evolution of life and society and thinking.

It's too limiting to expect language, or society for that matter, to stagnate. By our very nature, we are against stagnation.

--A

Again, let us replace the emotive word "stagnate" (you should remember this from Lewis's article on the Poison of Subjectivism, which I thought you had read) with the descriptive word "permanent".

In truth, what we desire is permanence. We desire to know what IS, not merely 'to get a little closer to it' but to actually discover it - and we want to be as accurate as possible about what we know for that reason.

This whole attempt to jettison traditional values as something subjective and to substitute a new scheme of values for them is wrong. It is like trying to lift yourself by your own coat collar. Let us get two propositions written into our minds with indelible ink.
1)The human mind has no more power of inventing a new value than of planting a new sun in the sky or a new primary colour in the spectrum.
2)Every attempt to do so consists in arbitrarily selecting some one maxim of traditional morality, isolating it from the rest, and erecting it into an unum necessarium.
The second proposition will bear a little illustration. Ordinary morality tells us to honour our parents and cherish our children. By taking the second precept alone you construct a Futurist Ethic in which the claim of "posterity" are the sole criterion. Ordinary morality tells us to keep promises and also to feed the hungry. By taking the second precept alone you get a Communist Ethic in which "production," and distribution of the products to the people, are the sole criteria. Ordinary morality tells us, ceteris paribus, to love our kindred and fellow citizens more than strangers. By isolating this precept you can get either an Aristocratic Ethic with the claims of our class as sole criterion, or a Racialist Ethic where no claims but those of blood are acknowledged. These monomaniac systems are then used as a ground from which to attack traditional morality; but absurdly, since it is from traditional morality alone that they derive such semblance of validity as they possess. Starting from scratch, with no assumptions about value, we could reach none of them. If reverence for parents or promises is a mere subjective by-product of physical nature, so is reverence for race or posterity. The trunk to whose root the reformer would lay the axe is the only support of the particular branch he wishes to retain.
All idea of "new" or "scientific" or "modern" moralities must therefore be dismissed as mere confusion of thought. We have only two alternatives. Either the maxims of traditional morality must be accepted as axioms of practical reason which neither admit nor require argument to support them and not to "see" which is to have lost human status; or else there are no values at all, what we mistook for values being "projections" of irrational emotions. It is perfectly futile, after having dismissed traditional morality with the question, 'Why should we obey it?' then to attempt the reintroduction of value at some later stage in our philosophy. Any value we reintroduce can be countered in just the same way. Every argument used to support it will be an attempt to derive from premises in the indicative mood a conclusion in the imperative. And this is impossible.
Against this view the modern mind has two lines of defence. The first claims that traditional morality is different in different times and places - in fact, that there is not one morality but a thousand. The second exclaims that to tie ourselves to an immutable moral code is to cut off all progress and acquiesce in stagnation. Both are unsound.
Let us take the second one first. And let us strip it of the illegitimate emotional power it derives from the word 'stagnation' with its suggestion of puddles and mantled pools. If water stands too long it stinks. To infer thence that whatever stands long must be unwholesome is to be the victim of metaphor. Space does not stink because it has preserved its three dimensions from the beginning. The square on the hypotenuse has not gone moldy by continuing to equal the sum of the squares on the other two sides. Love is not dishonored by constancy, and when we wash our hands we are seeking stagnation and "putting the clock back," artificially restoring our hands to the status quo in which they began the day and resisting the natural trend of events which would increase their dirtiness steadily from our birth to our death. For the emotive term 'stagnant' let us substitute the descriptive term 'permanent.' Does a permanent moral standard preclude progress? On the contrary, except on the supposition of a changeless standard, progress is impossible. If good is a fixed point, it is at least possible that we should get nearer and nearer to it; but if the terminus is as mobile as the train, how can the train progress towards it? Our ideas of the good may change, but they cannot change either for the better or the worse if there is no absolute and immutable good to which they can recede. We can go on getting a sum more and more nearly right only if the one perfectly right is "stagnant".
And yet it will be said, I have just admitted that our ideas of good may improve. How is this to be reconciled with the view that "traditional morality" is a depositum fidei which cannot be deserted? The answer can be understood if we compare a real moral advance with a mere innovation. From the Stoic and Confucian, "Do not do to others what you would not like them to do to you"; to the Christian, "Do as you would be done by" is a real advance. The morality of Nietzsche is a mere innovation. The first is an advance because no one who did not admit the validity of the old maxim could see reason for accepting the new one, and anyone who accepted the old would at once recognize the new as an extension of the same principle. If he rejected it, he would have to reject it as a superfluity, something that went too far, not as something simply heterogeneous from his own ideas of value. But the Nietzschean ethic can be accepted only if we are ready to scrap traditional morals as a mere error and then to put ourselves in a position where we can find no ground for any value judgements at all. It is the difference between a man who says to us: "You like your vegetables moderately fresh; why not grow your own and have them perfectly fresh?" and a man who says, "Throw away that loaf and try eating bricks and centipedes instead." Real moral advances, in fine, are made from within the existing moral tradition and in the spirit of that tradition and can be understood only in the light of that tradition. The outsider who has rejected the tradition cannot judge them. He has, as Aristotle said, no arche, no premises.

CS Lewis, The Poison of Subjectivism
www.calvin.edu/~pribeiro/DCM-Lewis-2009 ... tivism.doc

I apologize for re-posting, but the argument is still as valid now regarding your idea as it was last year.

The language, however it changes, must continue to express the same truths that must remain constant. It is when it changes so as to fail to express those truths, and to express false understandings instead, that people begin to get false ideas about morality - such as the idea that it could be a changeable thing - something as illogical as the idea of the laws of physics actually changing.

[rusmeister]

Fascinating article. In my Ed. classes we talked a lot about early/related work like this, but it seemed like people stopped looking at it in the 90's...I'm glad they didn't, or at least came back to it [and now I have even more support for something I've been screaming about for 20 years or so...that every child should be raised from infancy with at least 2 languages, preferably as different from each other as possible].
OTOH, Rus...bet you can't guess that I'm going to disagree with your conclusion... . You've narrowed the many implications of what they found, I think...but I'm setting that aside just to point out one of them: In order to truly be a Christian, you'd have to be raised in a desert region, subjugated to foreigners, and speak a semitic language [probably Aramaic], as mother tongue, and likely Latin and/or Greek, at least the fundamentals, in the "native" way of the time. [under your interpretation].

I used to support bilingual education more strongly - but now I am more convinced of the right of people to be centered in their own culture, and even (gasp!) to be monolingual and monocultural.
On your latter comment, the Chinese martyrs of the Boxer rebellion, the Christians of Japan and other non-semitic parts of the world would beg to differ with you. Two of my favorite icons (in the top 10) are of Moses the Black and the Chinese Martyrs.
Not sure how to post images here, though.
www.orthodox.cn/images/chinesemartyrs-htm.jpg
orthodox.net/redeemingthetime/2009/09/10/abba-moses-the-ethiopian-icon-sayings-and-life/
(The latter has my favorite icon of him)

Really, though...I don't see the change in language as some plot or unintended consequence that alters reality...I see the change as we know a hell of a lot more about the world now than they did even 50 years ago, let alone 2000+. The language had to change to accomodate/encompass the simple fact that we have more and truer knowledge of the world, not less. [which is not to say that there aren't any Orwellian twists in the mix.]

I don't see it as a 'plot', for the most part myself - but some people - such as DH Lawrence, that great friend of traditional morality, did create language to justify the morality they wanted to promote (or more accurately, deny). Every time you say "have sex", you can 'thank' him. Your thinking has been formed for you to a significant degree. The great thing to ask is how our ancestors expressed the ideas today - in the English language - in ways very different from how we express them today.

You also seem to be conflating knowledge of the natural sciences with knowledge of morality - something I find to be quite untrue. It is clear to me that our actual knowledge of philosophy and morality is at its lowest point in human history, with more and more being known about less and less, with a smorgasbord of 'ideas' replacing propositions found to be true.

[Avatar]

In truth, what we desire is permanence. We desire to know what IS, not merely 'to get a little closer to it' but to actually discover it - and we want to be as accurate as possible about what we know for that reason.

We might desire permanence, but what we get is change. Attempts to stop change inevitably fail. Because life is about adaptation and growth.

We do desire to know what is. That's what we study it and test it and experiment with it. And once we discover something that is, why, then we've changed a little more.

--A

[rusmeister]

In truth, what we desire is permanence. We desire to know what IS, not merely 'to get a little closer to it' but to actually discover it - and we want to be as accurate as possible about what we know for that reason.

We might desire permanence, but what we get is change. Attempts to stop change inevitably fail. Because life is about adaptation and growth.

We do desire to know what is. That's what we study it and test it and experiment with it. And once we discover something that is, why, then we've changed a little more.

--A

But when we are talking about morality, we cannot speak of change. We must not grow out of our conviction that murder is wrong simply because life whatever we mean by that) changes. The idea that murder is wrong is and must be permanent. That is moral truth. It is not a living organism that grows, changes and dies. That is again to be the victim of metaphor.

We can only make progress toward anything in terms of morality if "Thou shalt not kill" is a fixed, shining beacon that moves not an inch and moves not at all. The hypotenuse does not grow moldy.