Moral relativism; non-contradiction

[Mighara Sovmadhi]

This is not a thread attempting to prove or disprove moral relativism by reference to the idea that truth is not self-contradictory. This is a thread about two topics in philosophy, so that rather than post two different threads, I am just posting one about both, in order.

(1) A possible counterexample to moral relativism
Relativity is opposed to the absolute, as the subjective is to the objective. Therefore some facts are relative but objective (e.g. that a table is to my right, is relative to me, but objectively so) or absolute yet subjective (facts about the mind, for instance--although these can be parsed objectively on some level too). However, moral subjectivism easily becomes moral relativism on a certain scale, and moral relativism can support moral subjectivism by a reflection of the same ideation. To wit, if moral truths depend on my emotions or intentions, then they seem relative to me; and if moral truths are relative to me, it is probably as a function of my emotions or intentions.

OTOH, moral relativism is usually cultural relativism, that morality is relative to cultures instead of individuals. Of course, it has been argued (as I discovered in my Intro to Ethics class once upon a time) that every individual can be thought of as having his or her own unique, private culture. Indeed, the word "culture" is not entirely clear on the face of it, so one wonders about trying to define something like "morality" with reference thereto. Without detaining ourselves on minutiae, we might just go with, "Morality is relative to the standards of the society/community of its subjects," so that what is right or wrong for me, for example, will depend on the commands, desires, etc. of the local legislator and the hierarchy to which it is itself submitted.

The easiest go-to argument for moral relativism is the appearance of intractable disagreement among debaters of various moral claims. Now, genuine disagreement automatically implies the possibility of resolution, in the sense that if two people are actually disagreeing about something, there must be an objective, absolute thing for them to be disagreeing about, or else they are rather just making contrary noises while debating. So the argument-from-disagreement doesn't seem like it can really get started. However, I will allow that it might and offer a different counterargument, from what I think is a clear example of widespread cross-cultural moral agreement.

This example is:

• Self-command is a virtue.

From the Epicureans (properly read) and the Stoics in ancient Greece, to the Christian epistolary of the New Testament, to the concept of an inner jihad in Islam, to Hindu asceticism and the Buddhist middle way, and following Plato and Aristotle and Kant and so on, it appears that even if not every person in the world has always believed that things like self-control, self-discipline, or self-mastery are good or right or virtuous, most have. Base indulgence in the satisfaction of desires is not something even a utilitarian like John Stuart Mill recommended, for even he, for example, speaks of the greater utility of dignity versus the utility of hedonistic sentiments. And the philosophical arguments on behalf of the value of self-command, despite variations among premises and modes of inferences, surpass the appearance of Rawlsian overlapping consensus to become one-to-one consensus: that is to say, parsed to their end, each argument can be seen in a light rather like that one physicist's way of reconciling various forms of string theory as M-theory.

Conclusion of this part of the OP: even if self-command has non-relative value, is it a substantial enough value to ground a further absolute ethic? For instance, if the desires to be resisted or controlled vary by person or culture, it appears that self-command might result in nevertheless a subjectively or culturally variant system of morality. The Nazis are a terribly good example of how such might play out, what with how some of them specifically advocated the action against the Jews as an example of self-denial (of feelings or desires of sympathetic bent).

(2) Can we prove the "law of non-contradiction"?
Are all assertions of the form, "So-and-so is both one way, and the opposite way, completely and at the same time," false? Can something be and not be, entirely, as one? Usually, the rejoinder goes, "No, because if that were the case, the words 'no' and 'not' would mean the same thing as words like 'yes' and 'is,' and any assertion would mean anything at all."

Sometimes people appeal to things like orthodox Christian theology or quantum descriptions of particle structure, as counterexamples to no-contradictions-in-truth. If the Son is God, and if the Father is God, and if the Son is not the Father, then God is not God (or if Christ is God and if Christ is a man and if God is not a man, then there is at least one man Who is not a man). Or if particles are waves, and if particles are also points, then particles are and are not waves and points. I don't know what to say to the argument from Christian orthodoxy, because it does seem as if the (classical) Trinity idea is self-contradictory however one tries to unravel it. But so much worse for the (classical) Trinity idea, then. As for quantum physics, well, it seems more as if particles are points while observed (hence "wave-function collapse") and waves while unobserved, which means they are not both simultaneously, which means their duality is not by any means a violation of no-contradictions-in-truth.

Because philosophers love to question as much as they know how to, I think there is a different way to ground no-contradictions-in-truth--to prove it, if you will--than appeal to "language doesn't make sense otherwise." If the axioms of philosophy ultimately are the form of our very ability to ask questions, and if the structure of closed questions (ones without wh-words defining them) corresponds to a yes-no dichotomy, e.g., "Is this blue?" means, "This is or is not blue," then we see that no-contradictions-in-truth is true because the point of asking a closed question is to get a yes-no answer, and because on the abstractmost level of these things erotetic functions define axiomatic assertoric ones.

[Avatar]

Are there not circumstances in which lack of control/discipline etc can be a "virtue?"

--A

[Mighara Sovmadhi]

Depending on how one conceives of goodness arising in the world, yes or no. Since I follow Kant in this, I would say that morality is a function of the metaphysical essence of free will, and self-command is the expression of free will over desire/instinct, so in some sense, I don't think it is ever really good to do something for the sake of satisfying instincts/desires. Now maybe it would be good to do something, that just so coincidentally happened to satisfy such a desire, though.

[Avatar]

As a moral relativist, I have to say that it all depends...

--A

[Vraith]

As a moral relativist, I have to say that it all depends...

--A

As a moral evolutionist/contextualist, I'd agree, depending.
There are things that were "good" in the past that are now "bad."
[[and probably the opposite]].

[Mighara Sovmadhi]

Before I try to argue any further...

Avatar and Vraith, what are the definitions of "moral" and "good" and the like that you're working with?

For myself, maybe I should just as well not use words like "moral" and "good" to explain what I mean. Instead of, "X is good," I should say, "X is something that it is rational for me to support the existence of, regardless of whether I passively want it to exist." And instead of, "X is moral," I should say, "X is what it would be rational for me to do, regardless of whether I passively want to do it."

[Avatar]

As a moral evolutionist/contextualist, I'd agree, depending.
There are things that were "good" in the past that are now "bad."
[[and probably the opposite]].

Hahaha, I will grant you that. "Contextualist," I like that.

Avatar and Vraith, what are the definitions of "moral" and "good" and the like that you're working with?

Well now, that's the eternal question, isn't it? I'm not sure we've ever managed to define it sufficiently to have a shared definition, and that is a big part of the problem.

--A

[Vraith]

As a moral evolutionist/contextualist, I'd agree, depending.
There are things that were "good" in the past that are now "bad."
[[and probably the opposite]].

Hahaha, I will grant you that. "Contextualist," I like that.

Avatar and Vraith, what are the definitions of "moral" and "good" and the like that you're working with?

Well now, that's the eternal question, isn't it? I'm not sure we've ever managed to define it sufficiently to have a shared definition, and that is a big part of the problem.

--A

Thanks, Av. I THINK I invented it--not the word, but the particular usage/application. One of half a dozen I did the same with trying to finish up grad school. What a slog, stupid me. It took a lot of pages just explaining/defining the things I was using/altering/inventing---then I had to do something with them.

On what is the definition of moral---good question.
I start from kinda/sorta "All the things people really care a lot about that science hasn't found the rules and particles for yet." And then take a leap.
I have a few other things in it---like it isn't something that IS, it's things we do.
And/or the basket of things that, when we say "X ought..." the universe responds "Really? Why?"
And/or "all the stuff our minds want to be valuable, and not just useful."

[Mighara Sovmadhi]

Sometimes I think of comparing A Theory of Justice to The Origin of Species or something, like it's actually a valid, sort of scientific model of ethical judgment or whatever. Like, if you really read it, you see how ethical theory doesn't have to be so cloudy. You don't necessarily see that something like relativism is incorrect, but you rather see how it would have to be correct, if it were. And it's a different way than arguing from appearances of disagreement; it's more refined, as indicated by the concept of e.g. "contextualism."

But the other thing, then, is that there is an element of creationist-like sentiment in moral relativism. That is to say, in the field, moral relativism is as well or poorly supported as "creation science" or "intelligent design theory" in biology. The parallel is unnoticed at large because ethics is treated more superficially than biology. It's easy to assume that ethical questions can be satisfactorily answered just by quoting airy platitudes about cultural variation or societal inhibitions or the like. Or it's easy to assume that moral imperatives just have to be the result of an arbitrary God's commands. Or that self-interest or pleasure are obviously the meaning of life. Or whatever.

However, why should this be true? There is a continuum from ancient Greek ethical theory through the theology of the Catholic Church to Immanuel Kant and so on, down to the present day. There is some overlapping consensus at many relatively(!) high levels of moral philosophy. I could give many, many examples: of definitions, tendencies or drifts in reasoning, intuitions, examples, syntheses, paradigms. The fact that there is such a thing as mathematical deontic logic tells us that morality is more than just a random sequence of desires or pressures that our bodies or our society or our God or whatever imposes upon us.

EDIT: And this is a crosscultural phenomenon, too. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy contains a plentiful array of articles on Chinese, Hindu, Islamic, African, and so on philosophy. Themes resonate between all of these and the "traditional" image of Western/Greek/w/e philosophy. Just as Confucius taught a Silver Rule that mirrors Christ's own gilden law, Taoism and Catholicism have taught isotopic ideals at various points, enough to where there were some Jesuits or Figurists or something who thought that Enoch had been teleported from the Middle East to China, and that explained (a) what the Bible meant when it spoke of Enoch's walk-with-God translation thing, and (b) (I think) why Taoism taught that the absolute nature (the Way) exists in itself as three divine persons Who are responsible for all other things, from Whom all other things proceed.

[Avatar]

I was never a fan of Rawls for some reason...can't remember why now...been too many years.

--A

[Zarathustra]

Before I try to argue any further...

Avatar and Vraith, what are the definitions of "moral" and "good" and the like that you're working with?

For myself, maybe I should just as well not use words like "moral" and "good" to explain what I mean. Instead of, "X is good," I should say, "X is something that it is rational for me to support the existence of, regardless of whether I passively want it to exist." And instead of, "X is moral," I should say, "X is what it would be rational for me to do, regardless of whether I passively want to do it."

Those aren't bad definitions. They are specific enough to give us something to work with. But what exactly is "rational" about the existence of anything? Things either exist or do not. Why would the existence of one be rational and another not? Or why would one's support of that thing's existence be rational, and otherwise not?

I suppose the latter question depends upon your values. If you value life, for instance, it's rational to support its existence. Ditto for everything else you value. But your qualifier seems to negate this logic, namely, the "regardless of whether I passively want it to exist." I'm not sure what passively gets you in that formulation, but if you don't want something to exist (i.e. you don't value it), then it wouldn't be rational to support its existence.

So does the rationality lie in one's support lining up with one's values? (If so, I can agree: I'd call it acting authentically.) Or is the rationality inherent in the value of the thing which is existing? If the latter, then this is problematic because everyone values different things, and some things they value aren't rational. That's where moral relativism comes into play. I might think a thriving economy is more important than global warming, because people suffer much more from poverty than heat. But others would disagree, pointing out damage to nature. Which is more rational? Does morality reduce to a cost/benefit analysis?

David Deutsch points out that all evil in the world (which I suppose he equates with human suffering) can be solved by rationality. And conversely, irrationality causes or prolongs human suffering, i.e. "evil." So rationality is a good unto itself, a means to eliminate human suffering. He points out that many humans throughout prehistory died of exposure on top of the material to produce fire. Knowledge of fire would have prevented that "evil." I'm not sure how this would apply to things like child rape, but I do agree that rationality can solve most of the problems humans fight over. Racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. are all irrational, based on fear and prejudice. Simply eliminating irrationality from our thought can be a methodological path to a moral life, without even considering the objects of our rationality or their (inherent?) value.

[Mighara Sovmadhi]

I'm not sure what passively gets you in that formulation, but if you don't want something to exist (i.e. you don't value it), then it wouldn't be rational to support its existence.

One of the most abused distinctions in my "philosophical" scheme of things is the difference between the active and the passive. I say "most abused" in the sense that I appeal to this distinction a lot, make it do some hefty conceptual work. So, what is action? At the risk of not explaining it at all, I say,

• X acts on Y if X assigns a determinate value to Y.

... where "value" is read in the sense of solving for a variable's value, not the moral sense of it.

Desiring, wanting, intending, etc. can all seem the same, on the surface. Within my technical ideological space, though, desires/wants are things that we passively experience, whereas intentions are proactively represented. So desires are "impressed" on me (in a Humean sense of "impressions") from "the outside," impressed upon my will, that is. Intentions arise from the initiative of the will. Hunger, thirst, pain, and so on are all like imperative sentences that our consciousness perceives arising from outside of itself, whereas consciousness acts on itself to produce intentions. "To passively want something" then is a redundant phrase, but, anyway, the point of the modifier "passively" in the definition of moral action is to highlight the passive versus the constructive role of consciousness in the relevant form of "rationality."

I actually have three more precise definitions of things like "good" or "right" or whatever:

• 1. Definition 1. An action X is right if and only if X is the conclusion to the retrograde series of practical reasoning.
  
  Def. 2. An action X is right if and only if doing X is necessary in order to judge of the fact F, that F (i.e. right/wrong are identical to true/false with respect to sentences that cannot be spoken merely by using the voice but which require some behavior to express).
  
  Def. 3. An action X is right if only if the question, "Why do X?" has a constructive (in the mathematician's sense) answer.

Def. 1 and 2 more clearly deepen the notion of rightful action as rational action. For example, the retrograde series of practical reasons is the reverse series of means and ends. I do X for the sake of Y, and Y for the sake of Z; eventually I either am doing something for the sake of nothing, or for itself. Conscious recognition of what it is that I really am doing for its own sake is part of the rationality at moral play, here. Once I have regressed in the series of practical reasons to its start, I will know what is truly an "end in itself," and I will know how to make my other actions consistent with this axiomatic (as it were) goal/end. Then the issue is whether mere abstract practical reasoning is grounded in some substantial, meaningful end. For as you ask,

Or is the rationality inherent in the value of the thing which is existing?

And here I would technically have to say "no." Objects don't have value unless we project it on to them, add it to them, from our own evaluative consciousness. There are two sides to the limit on projection, though. First, there are internal constraints: the act of values-projection requires at least an attempt at impartiality, or generality, or universality, or whatever. Secondly, for an object to have "intrinsic" rational value is just for it to be open to having value substantially projected into it. The fact that I am alive, for example, can be valuable, if I project thusly, but my death (say), however much I might be of a suicidal mind, is not something I can project goodness on to. (This doesn't make my death necessarily wrong/bad either; it might just be essentially neutral.)

This position, overall, is known as "moral constructivism." It is an attempt to balance the insights of e.g. existentialism, non-cognitivism of various kinds, etc. with the insights of more "objectivist" or "absolutist" or "natural-law theorist" kinds of approaches to ethics. It recognizes morals as flowing from our subjectivity, but subject to (a few, not an obsessively meticulous number of) constraints that determine how the relevant subjective facts become more objective, by being constructed (and thus stabilized).

As esoteric as it might or might not be, constructivism seems commonsensical to me if we think e.g. of promises. A promise is something that we do, an obligation we project from our will; but there are constraints (like, if we are in a confused state of mind, or are pressured in various ways to make the promise, or whatever, these things nullify the obligation-creating force of the promissory act).

Anyway, to return to the definitions, (1), to fully account for a non-relativistic ethic (especially a non-egoisic relativism, i.e. a morality relative to every individual without distinction as such), would require humans to share, as a matter of abstract reason, some fundamental motive that can be expressed in an interpersonally harmonious way. Things like hunger and other "needs" are too vague in this context to serve the purpose. So we speak of our ability to be rational, or our ability to happy, as possible "ends in themselves."

(2) also pertains to the idea of rational action, since in this case rational affirmation of certain truths depends on more than just saying rationally-approved sentences in one's head (depends on more than belief) but on acting a certain way. This would even be relevant to the difference between moral and non-moral/practical and theoretical beliefs: I do not have a moral belief that stealing is wrong, if I do not act in a certain way when it comes to the question of stealing. (I'm reminded of an analogy Christine Korsgaard came up with for normative truths: knowing these truths is not like looking at a map and knowing "where" it would be normatively good for us to go; instead, our knowledge of these truths is like knowing how to use the map in the first place.)

[Mighara Sovmadhi]

Say that morality for a person in some culture, is relative to that culture. Now, to be a culture, a group of people has to have a certain relationship across a certain historical space, or something along such a line. To form a culture, people will have to adopt certain attitudes that are partly constitutive of acculturation. As preconditions for something's being a culture, these attitudes will be implicitly encoded into whatever particular morality emerges in the local context. Accordingly, even across cultures there would have to be some primordial normative coherence. Now, does this mean that there can be local cultural norms that are better off disobeyed by locally acculturated people? Or that we could somehow assess relative moralities on a non-local level, by comparing particular cultures to some Form of Culture, as it were?

[Zarathustra]

So, what is action? At the risk of not explaining it at all, I say,

• X acts on Y if X assigns a determinate value to Y.

... where "value" is read in the sense of solving for a variable's value, not the moral sense of it.

I suppose I'm still having trouble with your terminology, but these complaints might just be nit-picky. If you solve for a variable's value, you're not really assigning it, you're discovering it. And outside of a mathematical context, I'm not sure what "solving for" would mean. In addition, I believe we can and do assign values to things (and/or to processes, actions, etc.) in the moral sense, and this is an action, not always passive, though it can be passive sometimes, e.g. when we simply accept the values of our culture. But being able to choose our own values is one of our most important functions as sentient creatures.

So assigning a moral value to something isn't the same as liking or wanting that particular something, the latter which I'd agree are largely passive experiences, as you say (though I thought Hume only meant sense perceptions by "impressions.") For instance, I can't help that I like women, I was born that way, so that's passive. However, some of my innate "likes" can be changed, e.g. my tastes change as I experiment with new foods and intentionally try to see the value in things others like. That processs is not always rational, even when intentional. So I don't think the lines are as clear or fundamental as you seem to imply. But perhaps you're just simplifying your own views for the sake of a succinct post?

I actually have three more precise definitions of things like "good" or "right" or whatever:

• 1. Definition 1. An action X is right if and only if X is the conclusion to the retrograde series of practical reasoning.
  
  Def. 2. An action X is right if and only if doing X is necessary in order to judge of the fact F, that F (i.e. right/wrong are identical to true/false with respect to sentences that cannot be spoken merely by using the voice but which require some behavior to express).
  
  Def. 3. An action X is right if only if the question, "Why do X?" has a constructive (in the mathematician's sense) answer.

Another nit-picky criticism: you're using "if and only if," which is a biconditional connective. That seems to produce some problems. For instance, in Def. 1, that implies that any conclusion to a retrograde series of practical reasoning would be right (morally right, I assume, not merely rational). Is that what you meant to say? Aren't there some instances where we rationally deduce the correct or appropriate action that has nothing to do with morality? Such as the right tool for a particular task? Or problem-solving in general?

Also, it would seem to preclude the possibility of multiple definitions, unless you're simply using it to mean "necessary and sufficient," in which case there could be multiple conditions that are both necessary and sufficient (I think).

Or is the rationality inherent in the value of the thing which is existing?

And here I would technically have to say "no." Objects don't have value unless we project it on to them, add it to them, from our own evaluative consciousness.

I would mostly agree. However, I'm coming around to the idea of things like "objective beauty" and hence "objective value." I think life is inherently more valuable than the absence of life. I think complexity/order is inherently more beautiful than chaos. I think that intelligence is the most valuable phenomenon in the universe. I don't believe in absolutes, so all these would still be contingent truths, but I think we can still retain a sense of objective and inherent without the concept of absolute.

You seem to echo these thoughts here:

There are two sides to the limit on projection, though. First, there are internal constraints: the act of values-projection requires at least an attempt at impartiality, or generality, or universality, or whatever. Secondly, for an object to have "intrinsic" rational value is just for it to be open to having value substantially projected into it. The fact that I am alive, for example, can be valuable, if I project thusly, but my death (say), however much I might be of a suicidal mind, is not something I can project goodness on to. (This doesn't make my death necessarily wrong/bad either; it might just be essentially neutral.)

This position, overall, is known as "moral constructivism." It is an attempt to balance the insights of e.g. existentialism, non-cognitivism of various kinds, etc. with the insights of more "objectivist" or "absolutist" or "natural-law theorist" kinds of approaches to ethics. It recognizes morals as flowing from our subjectivity, but subject to (a few, not an obsessively meticulous number of) constraints that determine how the relevant subjective facts become more objective, by being constructed (and thus stabilized).

Very interesting! I'll have to brush up on constructivism. It's probably one of those concepts I already understand, but forgot that that word refers to it.

[Mighara Sovmadhi]

If you solve for a variable's value, you're not really assigning it, you're discovering it. And outside of a mathematical context, I'm not sure what "solving for" would mean.

There is a sense of discovery as becoming conscious of something we were not at all, as in stumbling upon a new species in the midst of a remote jungle. There is also a sense of discovery as in realization, which is when we have attentional consciousness where we lacked it before. The apriority of a number, for example, means that when we learn things about it, for example that 5 is prime, this is not a discovery in the first, but the second, sense. In a way, the number 5, floating in our minds (the function for assigning "5" to things), has its primality evident on its face, but unless we focus on the number, this evidence will not be... evident.

So discovery becomes passive learning and realization proactive learning, on the relevant level--with obvious overlap in many areas, though.

The metaphor of solving for variables in general, is not so metaphorical I guess. For example, when Kant "derives" the categorical imperative in the practical Critique, he seems to start with an empty formula, "X is a law willable by rational beings, on the mere ground of rationality," and assigns "X" a value from the meaning of the other terms in the formula. Generally, Descartes talks about this process as the thirteenth (IIRC) rule for the direction of the mind in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind.

So assigning a moral value to something isn't the same as liking or wanting that particular something, the latter which I'd agree are largely passive experiences, as you say (though I thought Hume only meant sense perceptions by "impressions.")

I think he thought of a moral sense, or at least a moral sensibility, in feelings or attitudes or whatever of justice and sympathy and so on. An impression is a basic cognitive unit, on Hume's scheme of things (IIRC), so the basic theoretical unit is a perceptual impression, but the basic practical unit is an emotional impression, or something.

So I don't think the lines are as clear or fundamental as you seem to imply. But perhaps you're just simplifying your own views for the sake of a succinct post?

You do bring up something I haven't fully reflected on to where I have a full answer to all the questions to be asked about this... However, one direction my thoughts have gone, along this line, is in defining "interaction": when X determines Y, and Y determines X, and then X and Y, in this determination, determine O, then X and Y are interacting, and moreover jointly acting on, O. So there is a diffusion of clarity in the action-reaction dichotomy as applied in such a situation.

For instance, in Def. 1, that implies that any conclusion to a retrograde series of practical reasoning would be right (morally right, I assume, not merely rational). Is that what you meant to say? Aren't there some instances where we rationally deduce the correct or appropriate action that has nothing to do with morality? Such as the right tool for a particular task? Or problem-solving in general?

I should've not said what I said, as if it were so plain... Reasoning goes from premises to conclusions as well as from conclusions to (possible) premises. The act of understanding, as it were, constructs the sentences about the facts, that reason then orders in a totality, so that some sentences end up placed more like axioms, and others more like well-argued theories. But anyway, the retrograde series doesn't indicate rationality in an imperative as a result of deduction. E.g.,

• 1. Go to the store.
  2. Going to the store requires putting shoes on.
  3. Therefore, put on shoes.

... is a reasonable thing to think as it goes, so if (1) is rational to demand, then so is (3). It is easy to see how logic supports (3). But is there something in the retrograde logic of imperatives, that supports an axiomatic imperative, as it were? This is what Kant really means when he speaks of rational nature being autonomous: the imperative sentences supported by reasoning at the (1)-level are constructed from within reasoning itself. We could, it might be supposed, use sentences based on divine revelations or instincts or social pressure as axioms, believing that reason in itself has no content and thus can only be brought into play once other content is given.

Also, it would seem to preclude the possibility of multiple definitions, unless you're simply using it to mean "necessary and sufficient," in which case there could be multiple conditions that are both necessary and sufficient (I think).

Well, the unity of the concepts to be applied means that, "Doing X is required to correctly judge of 'F?,' that F, if and only if doing F is an end in itself," as well as, "The prescriptive question, 'Do X?' has a constructive answer if and only if doing X is required to correctly judge of, 'F?,' that F," and so on. At that point the question is: does any moral code meet all these definitions simultaneously, at this level? It seems as if a code based on respect for the ability to have goals, to engage in practical reasoning, is one that satisfies all these definitional desiderata.

[Mighara Sovmadhi]

Does this get us anywhere substantial, though?

Suppose that the ability to intend things is morally good, as an objective value. This ability has a general form (self-mastery), a specific way it can be used (creative reasoning), a general context for its use (the physical world), and a specific way it exists in this context (in life). So self-mastery, creativity, the environment/ecosystem, and the conditions of living, are all things with "intrinsic" "objective" value, as constituents of the presence of intentional ability. E.g. we ought to respect the ecosystem (on this theory) out of quasi-gratitude for making intentional action possible for us in life (I say "quasi-" since I don't suppose that the Earth intentionally created us, and yet in creative moral thought it is within justice to represent the Earth as a specific person, and derive our duties to the Earth on the metaphor of this personality).