Free Will and Determinism

[Avatar]

The identity of the person.

--A

[Loredoctor]

The identity of the person.

--A

Do you think that identity is the self looking inwards and making a judgement on who he or she is based upon some view of their history?

[Avatar]

Hmmm, interesting question.

First, I'm not sure if you're using self & identity interchangeably. For me, they are interchangeable, so let's proceed on that assumption for now. (Until somebody can show me a difference anyway.)

Next, I believe that the self/identity is a product of every experience (of any kind) that the brain has...well...experienced.

Therefore, in that sense, yes, I believe that the self is dependant on that history.

However, I think that the self has the "ability" of counter-acting the impetus of experience if reason suggests that the "natural" reaction/choice is undesireable.

Furthermore, the self has total discretion when it comes to any decision in which experience doesn't have a stake. As in Malik's example of choosing between beer & steak. Experience shows both are desireable. If any one is available, and neither has an appreciable advantage, you choose.

Of course, even writing that I can see your point...the choice will be affected by a variety of other factors as well. Are you hungry? Thirsty? Is it hot? Etc. Those will all be taken into consideration. But in the end, it is possible for you to ignore the impact of those factors and eat a steak on a hot day when you're thirsty.

Take a less concrete example...giving money to a beggar. Some days I do, some days I don't. Some days I tell myself I won't and I do, and vice versa. It's never inevitable. And its never possible to know what variables crop up. Why do I change my mind at the last minute?

--A

[Zarathustra]

We've been arguing determinism and freewill as if they were the only two choices. I'd like to go in a new direction and propose a third alternative. Perhaps this alternative encompasses both positions, and therefore our argument is unnecessary.

What if freewill is characterized as self-determination? In that way, our choices would be determined by who we are (which includes our DNA, experiences, context, and memories), but since we determine the choice, this could still be regarded as freewill. After all, Fist and I (and Av, and now possibly James) aren't saying that freewill means arbitrary or random choices. Instead, we mean freewill to imply freedom from external--or internal--compulsion. To distinguish "internal compulsion" from what I'm proposing (e.g., "allowing your DNA to express itself") imagine the tremors of Parkinson's disease. That motion is happening against your will.

Indeed, this distinction brings up an important point. If there is no freewill, and everything is determined, then no meaningful distinction can be made between freely moving your body and your movements due to Parkinson's. Indeed, this distinction would be entirely illusory. How do the determinists here account for this distinction (if you make one)? Isn't there a difference between my heart beating and my fingers typing? According to determinism, there is no essential difference. One is just more complicated than the other--a difference of quantity rather than type.

And this kind of distinction-seeking strategy can help us in other ways. For instance, if freedom isn't real, then there is absolutely no distinction between being true to yourself and being fake. There would be no distinction between being authentic, and inauthentic. If everything is determined, then every single choice would be an authentic one, and we'd have no grounds upon which to accuse someone of not being themselves.

And yet the issue of being true to yourself has to be a real issue. Why else to we often disappoint ourselves? How could this even be a meaningful reaction? There would be no basis to judge our actions as failures or successes--in terms of living up to our potential--because the possibility of living up to one's potential would be meaningless. Every choice, if determined, would be living up to our potential, because there would never have been any other possibility except to do what we just did. We'd be living to our fullest potential every single moment, because there wouldn't be any potential alternatives.

Is that how you determinists feel? You feel like you're living up 100% to your full potential? This is all you can be? You must be relieved, and feel absolutely no angst for wasting any time or wasting any potential.

Here's another useful distinction to illustrate the meaninglessness of determinism: there would be no difference between someone physically forcing you to do something "against your will" and someone persuading you to do the very same thing. If everything is determined anyway, then what possible difference could it make if this compulsion came from the "outside?" There would be no meaning to the phrase "against your will" because your will would be an illusion. Indeed, the whole concept of rights dissipates into fiction. You can't give rights to people who are not free in the first place.

Let's conduct a thought experiment: What if I had a machine that could exactly measure the state of my body down to individual particles and it was encoded with every physical law governing our bodies – even future laws we haven’t discovered yet. According to your assumptions, this machine could predict what I will do next, since my choices are nothing more than the physical processes in the brain.

Now suppose that I read the output of this machine, which predicts action A, but I decide to rebel and do something other than this prediction, which we call action B. This is a perfectly possible situation, given the above assumptions. The key question now is: why couldn’t the machine predict I was going to do action B? If it perfectly knew my state and could completely calculate my future choices, then how is this possible? The only answer is that it’s not possible to choose an action other than this machine predicts. But that is clearly nonsense. I can choose to refrain from any action. A prediction in no way compels me to act.

You might respond by saying that as soon as I choose to do something different, the machine would compensate by presenting a new prediction, but you could just as easily choose to do something different from that prediction, too. This series could keep repeating itself indefinitely. In each case, the machine NEVER successfully predicts one’s behavior because each prediction turns out to be wrong, even when the machine has perfect knowledge of everything that is supposedly a cause of one’s choices.

You might now object that this machine is introducing something new, something external in the form of knowledge we didn’t previously have before looking at the machine’s output, and therefore this alters the situation to a state different from the state prior to our looking at this output. But our being-aware-of-the-output is just another brain state, right? So this would be something detectable by the machine, and presented in the output. But this new output alters things again, so the machine would have to make a new prediction to take this into account . . . and so on. In effect, no correct prediction would ever be made because each time we become aware of the prediction we are in a new state requiring a new prediction, and each previous prediction would turn out to be wrong. Another indefinite loop.

The introduction of full knowledge of the possible outcomes and causal factors, rather than securing a place for determinism, introduces the very possibility of violating that determinism, because once those factors are known, we can simply side-step them. Knowledge itself introduces an unpredictable element into the equation. James was right that the difference between billiard balls and us is consciousness.

[hierachy]

Malik, Compatibilism is where I've been coming from. Compatibilism holds that both Determinism and free will are valid, and that they are not incompatible.

First, I want to address the last part of your post:

Your thought experiment demonstrates not indeterminism, but the principle that we cannot know how we are going to act before we make the choice, because to do so would require omniscience. As the Oracle from the Matrix so aptly put it "No one can see past a choice they don't understand. No one."

But I'm sure what most people are thinking right now is "how can you hold that both free will and determinism are true? Aren't' they inherently contradictive?" I believe this view stems from a conceptual association that is so deeply ingrained in most people that it is very hard to undo.

What is free will?

Free will is the ability to shape one's own future through choice.

What is Determinism?

Determinism is the theory that everything in the Universe is causally determined.

Where is the conflict?

If Determinism is true, then all of our choices have been predetermined, therefore we are not shaping our own future, therefore freewill does not exist.

The above argument is invalid.

If Determinism is true, then all of our choices have been predetermined, therefore we are not shaping our own future, therefore freewill does not exist.

The highlighted part does not follow from the premises, and as a result invalidates the conclusion.

This mistake arises from the misconception that in a Deterministic Universe, we act despite ourselves. We do not. Our futures, in a Deterministic Universe, are not determined despite us, they are determined by us; because of us. Us, causally determined beings who are, through conscious choice, determining our future.

[Zarathustra]

Exactly, James. Nice to see that you back in the debate.

I think that self-determinism is a perfect description of freewill in a mechanistic universe. It certainly distinguishes us from billiard balls. They don't determine themselves. They are completely driven by external circumstances. And nothing that is done to them can be "against their will."

I'm not sure we agree entirely, because it seems perhaps you believe that the future can be predetermined, and yet we still have freewill. Instead, I think the future isn't determined, and yet each choice we make is determined (determined by our Self).

But like you, I see no contradiction in saying that our Self determines our choices--thus our choices are in a sense "determined"--and yet we're still free. Self-determination IS freedom, the freedom to express yourself, to choose, and to be who you are--or to be something else (inauthentic). Billiard balls certainly don't have this freedom. They can only be what they already are. Any change in their shape or function is brought about by something outside them.

Either we have freedom through self-determination, or all of our laws and rights are just as illusory as the strict determinist describes freewill. Personal responsibility, punishment, rights . . . all these would be based upon an incorrect assumption that a person could have done otherwise. If a person could not have done otherwise, if they "couldn't help it," then it makes no sense to punish them. Granted, our laws don't guarantee the existence of freewill. But a person who denies freewill will be hard pressed to explain the reasonableness of laws. Certainly distinctions like "premeditated" would be meaningless. Premeditation would be just as "accidental" as a crime of passion. If thoughts and emotions happen deterministically, then there's no reason to punish one more than the other.

[Avatar]

...I think the future isn't determined, and yet each choice we make is determined (determined by our Self).

Excellent posts folks. I can get behind a melding of the two, weighted toward our choice, because I can see how casuality is in effect even in the method in which we make decisions.

--A

[Loredoctor]

If a person could not have done otherwise, if they "couldn't help it," then it makes no sense to punish them. Granted, our laws don't guarantee the existence of freewill. But a person who denies freewill will be hard pressed to explain the reasonableness of laws. Certainly distinctions like "premeditated" would be meaningless. Premeditation would be just as "accidental" as a crime of passion. If thoughts and emotions happen deterministically, then there's no reason to punish one more than the other.

True, but if we treat prisons as educational facilities - which is how they are in Australia - then incarcerating individuals gives the state the chance to ensure that the elements involved in making a person commit a crime are corrected.

[Avatar]

In theory. (But I agree that it should be the purpose of "corrective" institutions.)

--A

[Fist and Faith]

Alas, if there's no free will, and the person committing a crime could not have done otherwise, then neither could the person punishing him.

[Zarathustra]

Alas, if there's no free will, and the person committing a crime could not have done otherwise, then neither could the person punishing him.

Good point.

But of course, everyone has a choice. Every one of us could have done otherwise.

So Lore, what are you thoughts on the distinctions I listed a post or two above? Based on your deterministic view, how do you distinguish voluntary and involuntary actions? Authentic and inauthentic choices? Force and persuasion?

For instance, how is rape different from consensual sex, if a person can't choose otherwise in either case? How can anything be "against your will" if you don't have a will? What difference is there between a person being "forced" to have sex by their DNA + environmental factors, and a person being forced to have sex by someone else in their environment? Environment is environment. The fact that it's a guy with a gun should make no difference from that fact that it's a guy with sexy abs. If the guy with sexy abs determines the girl to have sex, then she's still being raped because she couldn't have chosen otherwise.

Of course, I think that is nonsense. But I'd like to hear how you distinguish the two and maintain determinism.

[Zarathustra]

ok, I know that double-posting is just begging for your previous posts to be ignored, but I really would like a response to my last post. This one I'm putting here for Prebe, primarily, as he was the only one who asked for a specific physical model upon which this idea of freewill is possible (and then I talked about top-down causation and holistic phenomena).

This is copied from a post I made years ago in another forum.

[All quotes taken from THE QUANTUM SELF, by Danah Zohar.]

"The 'pumped system' first described by Professor Herbert Frohlich of Liverpool University in England some twenty years ago, and known to exist in biological tissue, seems to satisfy all the necessary criteria [necessary to explain features of consciousness inexplicable with classical models.]"

"Frohlich's pumped system is simply a system of vibrating, electrically charged molecules (dipoles -- positive at one end and negative at the other) into which energy is pumped. As they jiggle, the vibrating dipoles (molecules in the cell walls of living tissue) emit electromagnetic vibrations (photons), just like so many miniature radio transmitters. Frohlich demonstrated that beyond a certain threshold, any additional energy pumped into the system causes its molecules to vibrate in unison. They do so increasingly until they pull themselves into the most ordered form of condensed phase possible -- a Bose-Einstein condensate."

"The crucial distinguishing feature of Bose-Einstein condensates is that the many parts that go to make up an ordered system not only behave as a whole, they become a whole; their identities merge or overlap in such a way that they lose their individuality entirely."

"And it is only in such condensates , where individuality [of the parts] breaks down, that we can find distinctively quantum mechanical effects in large-scale systems."

". . .but the importance of the type [of quantum synchronicity] found in Frohlich systems is that it exists at normal body temperature. Indeed, it is found only in biological tissue . . ."

"The self-reflective capacity of thought to observe itself and thus, through concentration, to collapse its own wave function rests on the physics of at least some Bose-Einstein condensates (including those that are the physical basis of our consciousness), on the different physical properties displayed by such quantum systems when they are in a low-energy state or a high-energy state."

"In a low-energy state, Bose-Einstein condensates display the familiar quantum superposition effects of multiple possibilities, experienced by us as the blurry images of our dream life, the Gothic twilight of the imagination. In a high-energy state, these condensates behave almost classically, losing their quantum superposition effects."

"In our conscious system, the act of concentration is the process by which energy is pumped into the brain. We are all aware that when our energy reserves are low, we find concentration difficult. But when we do have the energy for concentration, channeling this energy into the brain has the effect of switching the brain's Bose-Einstein condensate from a low-energy quantum state to a high-energy near-classical state, and thus of switching our thought processes from the blurry images of possible thought to the more structured, classical detail for concentrated thought."

"On a quantum view of consciousness, then, we have both a basic definition of choice and a basic understanding of the physics that makes choice possible. Any choice, itself, is simply the collapse of the quantum wave function of possible thought into one definite thought, and the physics by which this happens is the switchover of the brain's Bose-Einstein condensate from a many-possibilitied quantum state to a more definite near-classical state. All such choices are necessarily free because of the brain's essential quantum indeterminacy -- an indeterminacy that exists both in its quantum system and in the firing responses of individual neurons to stimulation."

So you see, that it is not impossible for a physical brain to be the basis of a conscious self with freewill. Even if this particular model proves to be inadequate, surely it illustrates that the assumption of the impossibility of freewill is not certain. We may develop better models of quantum consciousness. Scientists are currently trying to construct a quantum computer that combines the advantages of quantum superposition effects (such as the freedom to choose simultaneously from a range of possibilities) with classical computer logic. A deterministic model of the brain functions much like classical computers, which may soon be outdated.

[Queeaqueg]

I typed in two things into Google; 1. Physical Basis for Conciouness 2. Non-Physical Basis for Conciouness.

I got a lot more for the 2nd question and this from a site which looked interesting.

FreeWill
How are consciousness and energy related? We have three options:

(1) Consciousness is a physical form of energy (even if it is very, very subtle energy);

(2) Consciousness is a non-physical form of energy;

(3) Consciousness is not any form of energy.

(1) Consciousness as a physical form of energy: If we say that consciousness is a form of energy that is physical, then we are reducing consciousness (and spirit) to physics. And few of us, unless we are materialists, want to do that.

(2) Consciousness as a non-physical form of energy: If we say that consciousness is a form of energy that is not physical, then we need to say in what way psychic energy differs from physical energy. If we cannot explain what we mean by “psychic energy” and how it differs from physical energy, then we should ask ourselves why use the term “energy” in any case?

(3) Consciousness is not any form of energy. Our third alternative is to say that consciousness is not a form of energy at all—either physical or nonphysical. Unlike energy, which is some kind of “stuff” that spreads out in space, consciousness isn’t made of “stuff,” and is not located in space. If this is true, then consciousness would not only be different from energy, it would be nonlocated.

[Loredoctor]

So Lore, what are you thoughts on the distinctions I listed a post or two above? Based on your deterministic view, how do you distinguish voluntary and involuntary actions? Authentic and inauthentic choices? Force and persuasion?

Again I am being singled out; I'm not the only one with this theory - wouldn't you like to hear from others on this?

I think there is a difference between voluntary and involuntary actions. The latter does not involve cognitive thought. Force and persuasion? Different forms of decisions are made - the former involves a calculation of the likelihood of self harm, and the latter involves, perhaps, consideration of gain (cost/benefit analysis).

For instance, how is rape different from consensual sex, if a person can't choose otherwise in either case? How can anything be "against your will" if you don't have a will? What difference is there between a person being "forced" to have sex by their DNA + environmental factors, and a person being forced to have sex by someone else in their environment? Environment is environment. The fact that it's a guy with a gun should make no difference from that fact that it's a guy with sexy abs. If the guy with sexy abs determines the girl to have sex, then she's still being raped because she couldn't have chosen otherwise.

Because different forms of cognitions are involved. There's a world of difference between someone wanting to have sex with another and someone not wanting to have sex with another. There's also a difference in how the individual feels - emotions, etc. Determinism does not preclude that.

So if the girl was a determinist, she wouldn't say - one cognition (doesn't want to have sex with the guy) is equal to the other cognition (having sex with a guy she most likely would). The former involves a set of factors that she finds extremely harmful or distressing; the latter involves a set of factors that she finds pleasing. Both of which force her down a path, but neither path is the same because of how the individual feels about it.

Determinists aren't robots. And yes, AI might have a difficulty with this.

Hypothetical consideration: say determinism is true. You're examples are really moral consequences of that being 'the case'. Anyway, interesting post.

Of course, I think that is nonsense. But I'd like to hear how you distinguish the two and maintain determinism.

Aren't you adopting the same tone you tried to correct me about?

[Fist and Faith]

I fear I'll never understand your position, Lore.

"Wanting" to have sex with someone is not truly wanting if the wanting is, in truth, nothing more than the unavoidable result of a combination of various factors. And the actual process of thinking, "Do I want to have sex with X?" is the same. "Voluntary actions" are not voluntary if they are the endpoint of dominoes that could not have fallen in any way other than they did. Words like "choose," "decision," and "voluntary" are meaningless. There are only thoughts and actions that have, or have not, entered into our awareness.

Of course, I think that is nonsense. But I'd like to hear how you distinguish the two and maintain determinism.

Aren't you adopting the same tone you tried to correct me about?

I had hoped Malik meant so say, "Of course, I disagree entirely with that." As I said earlier, absurd, but in the incomprehensible sense, not the "Duh!" sense.

[Loredoctor]

"Wanting" to have sex with someone is not truly wanting if the wanting is, in truth, nothing more than the unavoidable result of a combination of various factors. And the actual process of thinking, "Do I want to have sex with X?" is the same. "Voluntary actions" are not voluntary if they are the endpoint of dominoes that could not have fallen in any way other than they did. Words like "choose," "decision," and "voluntary" are meaningless. There are only thoughts and actions that have, or have not, entered into our awareness.

Again, I do not deny that the individual senses a decision has been made (or is being made). Hence, they may want when that 'want' is the possibly the product of factors (and it likely is - sexual preference, social factors, etc).

[Zarathustra]

Again I am being singled out; I'm not the only one with this theory - wouldn't you like to hear from others on this?

I'd love to hear from everyone, but you're the one carrying on the determinism argument with the most determination ( ), so I direct my comments at you mostly.

I think there is a difference between voluntary and involuntary actions. The latter does not involve cognitive thought.

What exactly do you mean by "cognitive thought?" Voluntary actions don't have to involve thinking, reasoning, judging, etc. For instance, most of the time my breathing happens without me noticing it. But I can take my breath under my control, alter its rhythm, pause it, etc. Maybe that attention is what you're calling "cognitive thought." But mere attention isn't enough to distinguish voluntary from involuntary, because I can pay attention to my heartbeat, but I can't alter it, stop it, etc. (I know some monks supposedly can, but I can't.) Neither is any other form of cognition sufficient to distinguish voluntary from involuntary. I can think about my heartbeat all day long, and it still won't be under my control. Control is what distinguishes voluntary from involuntary. But if both processes are deterministic, how does control ever emerge as a difference? How does it make sense to say that some bodily functions are under our control, when we're not even controlling ourselves? And if we are controlling ourselves, then how is this deterministic?

Force and persuasion? Different forms of decisions are made - the former involves a calculation of the likelihood of self harm, and the latter involves, perhaps, consideration of gain (cost/benefit analysis).

But when you say we are determined to behave in certain ways, isn't this the same as saying we are forced to behave in certain ways? If that is so, then the only distinction between the various forms of "force" is the internal/external divide. But, really, what is the difference between my DNA forcing me to do something and the government forcing me to do something? In both cases, I'm not in control.

Because different forms of cognitions are involved. There's a world of difference between someone wanting to have sex with another and someone not wanting to have sex with another. There's also a difference in how the individual feels - emotions, etc. Determinism does not preclude that.

You say there's a world of difference, but all you describe is the way a person feels. Aren't these feelings just as illusory as the feeling of freewill? I feel that I'm free, but you tell me I'm not. If you can tell me I'm wrong about this feeling, why can't the same thing be said of the feeling of being violated? In a deterministic universe, no molecule ever violates another molecule. Lumping a bunch of molecules together shouldn't change the situation . . . unless you agree that a person is more than merely a collection of molecules, and that wholes can be more than the sum of their parts, and these wholes acquire entirely different characteristics that don't exist on the atomic scale--which is what I've been saying.

Hypothetical consideration: say determinism is true. You're examples are really moral consequences of that being 'the case'. Anyway, interesting post.

If determinism is true, and everything follows merely from chemical reactions, then there can be no morality. If there can be no morality for atoms, there can't be morality for large numbers of atoms (people), unless something fundamentally changes on the scale of people to allow morality to be meaningful.

Of course, I think that is nonsense. But I'd like to hear how you distinguish the two and maintain determinism.

Aren't you adopting the same tone you tried to correct me about?

Not at all! I thought you'd agree with me that a it was nonsense that a girl was being raped when she was seduced by the guy with sexy abs.

[Loredoctor]

Not at all! I thought you'd agree with me that a it was nonsense that a girl was being raped when she was seduced by the guy with sexy abs.

Ahhh, sorry for mistaking you.

Excellent post, by the way Malik. I'm at work so I'll have to respond in detail when I get home.
Cheers,

LM