Zarathustra wrote:Xar wrote:
Actually, as a molecular biologist I'd say I'm giving genetics exactly the credit it deserves

More seriously - there is no known gene responsible for these behaviours that we know of - so until one is found, if it ever happens, Occam's razor suggests it's a problem of nurture, not nature.
Sounds similar to "god of the gaps" reasoning to me. Since we don't know the genetic mechanisms (an area of deep ignorance), you're going to assume "nurture?" Whatever. It was a throwaway point. You completely skipped over my next paragraph that makes the point superfluous. (But at least you got to sneak an argument by authority!) The point here is to imagine how a world could have been better if you were god. We are not limited in this thought experiment to your expertise in genetics or your personal views on the power of "nurture." If we're imagining infinite powers, there is nothing about the logic of freewill that would limit us to supposing that God could create humans that aren't irreparably, uncontrollably shaped by "nurture."
Sorry, not buying it. Are you saying that science and religion are both flawed? Or do you apply one standard to science and another to religion?
Occam's razor - which is, by the way, an empirical argument often used in science when faced with doubt - states that if you are confronted with two possibilities to explain a particular phenomenon, the simplest one is likely the right one. Incidentally, you yourself use Occam's razor in your reasoning, even if you don't realize it: considering the problem of evil, and being faced with two possibilities (either God doesn't exist, or God exists and therefore there must be a heretofore unknown reason for evil), you choose the simplest one and state that the presence of evil proves there is no God. I'm merely doing the same with the nature vs. nurture thing. But if you say it's a throwaway point, fine by me, let's go on.
Going back to the whole thought experiment point, then I could just as validly state that this is an impossible experiment because your finite mind simply cannot plausibly conceive a scenario in which you would have infinite power. Or to put it another way: because your mind is finite, you cannot grasp infinity, therefore you cannot grasp what it would mean to be omnipotent. Therefore any idea you came up with would be necessarily based on a false assumption - i.e. the assumption you're able to imagine what "omnipotence" entails.
Zarathustra wrote:First of all, to use the Exodus as an argument in this debate, you first must prove it really happened, otherwise I could just as easily pick up a fairy tale to prove my point

Since I don't think the Bible to be a literal account of the history of the world (and I know you don't either), that topic doesn't prove anything.
I don't think you understand the concept of this thread (a thought experiment), or appreciating that I'm using a reductio ad absurdum. I'm assuming the argument of my opponent to show that it leads to an inconsistent or otherwise untenable result. I don't have to prove Exodus happened in order to show that it undermines another belief being espoused from the perspective of that same worldview.
Sure you do! You may employ reductio ad absurdum and quote the discrepancy between Exodus and the modern world when debating with religious fundamentalists who take the Bible literally, but your whole argument doesn't hold up without evidence as soon as you argue with someone who does not. To put it another way: you say
Zarathustra wrote:I'm assuming the argument of my opponent to show that it leads to an inconsistent or otherwise untenable result.
but it's not
my argument (nor the argument used by most if not all people here), so you're not really showing any inconsistent or untenable result contingent to the worldview of someone who doesn't take the Bible literally.
Zarathustra wrote:Secondly, the source of the prevention matters just as much as the motives behind the prevention.
It doesn't matter in the terms of this argument. You haven't shown how it is conceptually different for God to be the preventer or for man to be the preventer. In regards to violating freewill, how is it different?
Again, apples and oranges. Human crime prevention systems aren't based on a mandate from heaven: in fact, they are not an absolute phenomenon. Cavemen didn't have policemen and tribunals to deal with Caveman A who killed Caveman B; in many societies, these deeds were even encouraged, at least partially. Reducing the whole discussion to the importance of free will: if God prevented crime Himself, he would be impinging on humankind's free will by preventing some humans from exercising it (the criminals, for example). There simply is no way to defy an omniscient and omnipotent God. On the other hand, a human-created crime prevention system - say, the police - is based on the concept of free will: policemen
choose to become policemen, they
choose to enforce the law, and a criminal
can defy a policeman and get away with it. Heck, a policeman could even
choose to let a blatant criminal run away, and face the consequences.
Human crime prevention is created by non-infallible beings and represents a clash of equally valid exercises of free will - the policeman's will to capture the criminal vs the criminal's will to commit the crime. Because the pendulum can swing both ways, both can win or lose - and suffer the consequences. This is critical to free will - do what you want and pay the consequences. How could you fulfill that mantra if God prevented you perfectly?
In any case, my initial understanding of your thought experiment was that the God in it would blast people to smithereens - so I apologize for the misunderstanding here. I've taken your rectification into account in the later points.
Zarathustra wrote:He would be perfectly successful in preventing 100% of crimes, and no would-be criminal - no matter how prepared or how astute - would be able to avoid getting caught.
Getting caught wouldn't change the fact that the criminal could still
choose to attempt the crime. Criminals ignore the consequences all the time. Death penalty doesn't stop murders. You're assuming a level of rationality with these people that I don't believe they exhibit.
That's your opinion. Many criminals have perfectly valid reasons (in their minds) for what they did, and these reasons may even be entirely rational, even if amoral.
But step back a bit and consider teenagers. We know teenagers often attempt dangerous stunts, sometimes attempting to steal things or do something similar for "the thrill". "The thrill" refers to danger - the danger of getting hurt, or the danger of getting caught. But do you think they would truly do anything that brash if they knew, with 100% certainty, that they WOULD get caught? Remember - in your thought experiment, people must necessarily know that God exists because, well, even if you implanted memories in the criminal that he performed the act and prevented him from truly performing it, after 3-4 centuries of memory discrepancies ("how comes this guy remembers raping you at the party, and neither you nor your friends have ever seen him?"), even the thickest-headed people would realize there's a powerful agency preventing crime and modifying memories. And that's not counting the possibility the God you describe actually came out into the open and stated what was going on!
Zarathustra wrote:Moreover, everyone would know there's no way to get away with a crime - because everyone would know for sure that (a) an omnipotent, omniscient God exists ("why, just yesterday a man tried to mug me and he was shot to death by lightning from the sky...") and that (b) He prevents all crimes from occurring.
I've already covered this possibility in my first post here by supposing that god could supply a memory of committing the act, so that no one would realize they hadn't succeeded in completing it.
Which is of course what I referred to in the earlier paragraph. If your thought experiment suggests that both the would-be criminal and the would-be victim would get false memories implanted, then where would be the difference between this and actually committing the act? And if it's only the criminal getting the false memories, how could people not realize what's going on after hundreds of thousands of situations in which one person remembers committing a crime and the supposed victim is objectively fine and clearly has no memory of the fact? Either you'd have half the population of the world in an asylum, or you'd have everyone convinced something is preventing all crimes with 100% accuracy.
Zarathustra wrote:Besides, if we're going to assume the Judeo-Christian system, then people should know that they'll get caught with 100% success in the afterlife. Even people who have this belief still sin.
True, but they rationalize it within their framework. Besides, scientific studies have demonstrated that humankind is unable to process the concept of long-term consequences years in the future: in other words, while you could hesitate to commit a crime if you knew a policeman was nearby and there was a high likelihood he'd arrest you and throw you into prison (an immediate consequence, i.e. being locked up would occur soon, even if it the sentence itself later stretches for years), you would not hesitate if you knew you would be arrested 40 years later. This is scientifically proved. The knowledge of an afterlife of punishment in the distant future is not enough to prevent crimes (or sin, in the case you describe) even among deeply religious people.
Zarathustra wrote:See above - it would be a restriction because even the instant you had a fleeting thought about coveting your neighbour's wife, you'd know without any room for misunderstanding that as soon as you did something in that regard, you'd be unable to complete the deed because God would stop you (maybe also punish you).
But according to the Bible, merely thinking this thought is enough to qualify for the sin. Not the act.
Sure, but I'm not talking about sinning here; I'm talking about committing to a physical course of action following your free will to do so.
Zarathustra wrote:Finally: if the Judeo-Christian God exists, then focusing your speculation on the world we see and touch is limiting. Divine perspective must perforce be different from ours, and if the Judeo-Christian God exists, then an afterlife must also exist, which means that those who suffer in the living world may well be rewarded with an eternity of blessings, for all we know - which incidentally would be a way to both not restrict free will in the living world, and at the same time to ensure that suffering is not in vain.
The point of this thread was to imagine a
different world if we were god. Not to be limited by the Judeo-Christian belief system. Rus responded to Rob (page 2?) that we couldn't have a world where people choose no evil. I think we could. My reasoning transcends the Judeo-Christian assumptions, and in fact shows
their limits. [(quote]
That's your opinion - I think your reasoning simply replaces Judeo-Christian assumptions with your own, but this is my opinion
Zarathustra wrote:That's not a valid argument, because you're still not explaining how you think this should be handled.
Yes I have: if I were god, I'd stop all victimization (from my point of view), and I'd substitute a memory that the deed was done. That would allow people to be free, and stop what I consider to be victimization. I'm god, so I get to decide what is or is not victimization.
See above.
Zarathustra wrote:I could just as easily counteract with "We're talking about a being with infinite powers. How can you judge His actions without knowing His mind - and therefore without having all the necessary elements to judge objectively?"
Another argument that depends upon ignorance. God of the gaps. Because I don't know, I can't judge? That's like saying you can't can't do science because we can't explain the reason for the mass ratio of protons vs electrons.
Apples and oranges again (I like this metaphor

): science cannot explain the reason but it's looking for it; but your mind is objectively finite and no matter what you do, will never be able to grasp infinity or eternity. And by the way: the entire judiciary system is based on the concept that if you can't prove someone's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, then you can't judge that person guilty. Just saying...
Zarathustra wrote:In this thought experiment, it's sufficient that I've given a noncontradictory version of reality. The burden of proof isn't on me to know the infinite mind of a hypothetical god and eliminate all his potential knowledge. The burden of proof is on anyone who objects to my imaginary world on the basis of it being inconsistent or impossible. You don't have to know the mind of god to do that, but you do have to show where my reality wouldn't work. There is nothing in principle that would make my hypothetical reality impossible, nor is there anything here that would invalidate freewill.
Again, that's your opinion. In my opinion your world is contradictory (for the reasons stated above re: memories), and it invalidates free will in that you are forcing people not to act according to their desires. Think on it: once the people in your world realize they cannot physically commit crimes, would that make them behave better? Or would it only add to their frustration (thereby stunting their potential growth and realization of the enormity of their deeds)? Maybe it would even degrade morality in your world: a person who "murdered" somebody might figure out that, hey, if there are no consequences and he can still "get the rush" so to speak (because he'd remember the murder and getting away with it), why not do it another time? And maybe another?
Zarathustra wrote:That statement of mine referred to your idea of God preventing crimes; and as I said before, that WOULD violate free will. Therefore, no instance of God preventing any kind of crime would not violate free will.
Well, then explain how the
hypothetical Exodus wouldn't violate the freewill of the Egyptians when God directly, miraculously intervened to save the Jews? Your argument is so strict, that you've not only eliminated my version of reality (apparently

), but also the Judeo-Christian one, too. I don't care, I'm an atheist. I have nothing investted in that myth. But you seem to be arguing against my version of reality on the basis of the hypothetical validity of the Judeo-Christian one (as you did above).
Why should I explain away the literal tale of Exodus if I already stated I don't believe in it as it is literally presented? BTW, most Christians outside the U.S. do not take the Bible literally either, so the "Judeo-Christian version of reality" you refer to has nothing to fear from my argument - unlike the "taking the Bible literally" version of reality
Zarathustra wrote:Which means of course that the fact God is not preventing crimes in the observable universe therefore doesn't demonstrate anything, least of all God's absence.
My point was never to demonstrate anything about the J-C god on the basis of him not preventing crimes. My point was to demonstrate the fallacies in the idea that preventing crimes would violate freewill, for the purpose of proposing a counter-reality that would be better than this purported one. It is merely a side-benefit that this thought experiment also shows the deficiencies in the hypothetical world of Christianity. Indeed, that's the point of this thread: I can do better than that myth. I don't need to demonstrate God's absence in order to show that I can construct a better myth. But the fact that I can easily construct a better myth certainly casts doubt of the myth of Christianity.
My opinion is that you didn't succeed, only replaced some assumptions with others... Then again, to each his own
