Determinism vs Free-Will; Mutually incompatable or not?

[wayfriend]

In the predetermined universe, you didn't pick the hot pocket by choice---you didn't make the determination to choose it, because you were always going to "choose" that pocket since before you or anybody else even existed.[/color]

Again: Who made the choice, if I did not? You can't just say I didn't without saying who did.

Again: if it was set at the beginning of time, how was it decided what it would be set to?

Again: why couldn't I have been the one to decide it at the beginning of time? If all the future was set in the beginning of time, then I, and my will, was set a the beginning of time. How come my will doesn't get to do things at the beginning of time and other things do? That's rigging the experiment to produce a foregone conclusion.

These are the holes in your premise.

[Vraith]

In the predetermined universe, you didn't pick the hot pocket by choice---you didn't make the determination to choose it, because you were always going to "choose" that pocket since before you or anybody else even existed.[/color]

Again: Who made the choice, if I did not? You can't just say I didn't without saying who did.

Again: if it was set at the beginning of time, how was it decided what it would be set to?

Again: why couldn't I have been the one to decide it at the beginning of time? If all the future was set in the beginning of time, then I, and my will, was set a the beginning of time. How come my will doesn't get to do things at the beginning of time and other things do? That's rigging the experiment to produce a foregone conclusion.

These are the holes in your premise.

No one made the choice. There was no choice to be made. It was the next absolutely unalterable effect in an unalterable chain of unalterable effects from unalterable causes all the way back.
[[or, if you want to make the situation worse, some god-being made the "rules" that determined it all.]]

It wasn't "decided," if by decided you mean a something with decision-making power. [a being with free will building our clockwork universe? Or a clockwork being building the only kind of universe it could?]
We don't know how things are set/congeal out of "nothing" and into the rules and something of the universe---but the instant those rules are in place, if the universe is determined, there will never be free will anywhere in that universe again [if there even was any before/during the rule-and-stuff creation/condensation].

Your will doesn't get to decide at the beginning of time because you are not there. It is "set" that you will come to be in the future, not that you already are.

Those aren't flaws in my premise---they are things that must be so, and preclude free will, if the universe is wholly determined.
There simply is no deciding---cannot be any deciding---inside a predetermined universe.
That's what determined/predetermined DOES: it excludes the possibility of choice, it executes chance, slays randomness in its sleep, aborts probability into impossibility, makes "will" a mindless spring, and "free" the delusion of a soft spongy machine.

In a determined universe, your mind/brain/you entire, are just a different kind of billiard ball, and have the same amount of choice [none], even if you think you are the player of the game.

Now, there are lots of peeps around, past and present, who think as you do, or things similar. Maybe y'all are right, but I don't see how.

But I prefer, by far, the Occam's Razor solution. We don't have to violate/contort determinism [or invent some magic or other super/extra/metanatural things] if we just say that we can have free will because the universe is not strictly determined.

[wayfriend]

No one made the choice. There was no choice to be made.

I could have had chinese food. But I had hot pockets instead. So something was decided.

You can't talk about the universe being "set" and then deny there was ever anything that needed to be set. You exactly and particularly mean that all choices have been made, and then deny that there are any choices to make. This is completely inconsistent as far as I can tell.

Your will doesn't get to decide at the beginning of time because you are not there. It is "set" that you will come to be in the future, not that you already are.

It is "set" that I will come to be, which includes every thing about me, including everything that I will choose. In order to that to be "set", information about me has to exist in some form. But you seem to be picking and choosing what about me is present at the dawn of time and what about me isn't.

There simply is no deciding---cannot be any deciding---inside a predetermined universe.

You do know that predetermination includes, by definition, determination. It dictates when determination happens, but not whether. If nothing is determined, then nothing can be pre-determined.

But I prefer, by far, the Occam's Razor solution. We don't have to violate/contort determinism [or invent some magic or other super/extra/metanatural things] if we just say that we can have free will because the universe is not strictly determined.

But to believe in free will, we have to give up religion, insofar as it acknowledges an omniscient being, and we have to give up science, insofar as it requires that the universe is deterministic. That seems rather harsh. I'd like to have all three, if possible. That's the whole POINT.

[Zarathustra]

No one made the choice. There was no choice to be made.

I could have had chinese food. But I had hot pockets instead. So something was decided.

If you're arguing that freewill is compatible with determinism, then you could not have had Chinese food. There was only one possible outcome to your "choice." I wouldn't really call that a choice, but if you're accepting predestination and/or determinism, then what choice do you have but to accept the single-outcome hypothesis? This is one of the criticisms of compatibilism.

But just because there were alternatives in a given situation doesn't mean there was a choice. When an electron's position is measured, it could show up "over here" or "over there." The fact that only one alternative is found doesn't mean the electron (or anything else) made a choice. Sure, people are different from electrons, but we also live in a deterministic level of the universe, whereas the electron does not.

You can't talk about the universe being "set" and then deny there was ever anything that needed to be set. You exactly and particularly mean that all choices have been made, and then deny that there are any choices to make. This is completely inconsistent as far as I can tell.

Initial conditions could be entirely random--like the universe exploding--and then all outcomes would be set from those initial conditions according to physical laws. Saying this isn't the same as saying all choices have been made, but instead that all outcomes have been determined. Saying they've been determined isn't the same as saying they've been chosen. Most of those outcomes (like where bits of matter fly) aren't choices.

But to believe in free will, we have to give up religion, insofar as it acknowledges an omniscient being, and we have to give up science, insofar as it requires that the universe is deterministic. That seems rather harsh. I'd like to have all three, if possible. That's the whole POINT.

Should we should decide the nature of reality based on what we want? I don't see what we want as having anything to do with these issues.

However, I don't believe we have to give up religion merely to have freewill (there are better reasons). It's a more difficult question when it comes to science, especially if we assume the brain and consciousness are explicable. If we can explain them, then this means we know how they work. Knowing how something works is even more damning to the case of freewill than God knowing what you'll do. Knowing how something works is more than knowing the future (e.g. through miraculous or magical knowledge, as a God would), but instead knowing how things are determined. And if they are determined, then they can ONLY have one possible outcome for any given situation. No Chinese soup for you!

What most philosophers do is narrow down what they mean by freewill to mean "autonomy" or self-causation. The lack of outside coercion. This doesn't mean you aren't determined ... you're self-determined. But that's still determinism. It just relocates the source of determination to the self.

[Hashi Lebwohl]

I am determined to have free will.

[Fist and Faith]

I haven't read the last several posts yet. Here's another way of expressing what I think wf means. Let's say there's free will. I know that my sister chose lasagna today. We had pizza, lasagna, eggplant parmesan, and spaghetti and meatballs. She took lasagna.

Let's say tomorrow I somehow go back in time to any point before my sister chose lasagna. I know what she's going to choose. If i don't alter anything that affects her decision, she will choose lasagna. And my knowledge of what she will choose does not take her free will away from her.

[Zarathustra]

Let's say tomorrow I somehow go back in time to any point before my sister chose lasagna. I know what she's going to choose. If i don't alter anything that affects her decision, she will choose lasagna. And my knowledge of what she will choose does not take her free will away from her.

Since going back in time might be impossible in principle, I'm calling this "magical or miraculous knowledge." You're right, that knowledge doesn't infringe upon freewill. However, if you know she's going to choose lasagna because science has progressed to the stage where we can completely know how the brain works, such that future brains states can be entirely determined from previous brain states, then freewill in the sense that most of us use it is an illusion. [That's assuming, of course, that the brain does not take advantage of quantum effects that introduce indeterminism.]

The distinction is between understanding and knowledge. Simply knowing what will happen is not the same as understanding the mechanisms that make a particular thing happen. Primitive people could predict that the sun was going to come up tomorrow, but that's not the same as knowing that the earth revolves around the sun and rotates on its axis, making only one outcome possible. That's why writers of the Bible could believe that the sun would stand still for three days, while we know all life on earth would be flung to their deaths if it suddenly stopped turning.

If you can know the causes and causal mechanisms of effects for any particular system--in other words, if a system is explicable and determinate--then there can be only one effect for any particular cause. Thus--assuming the brain is explicable and determinate like all other macro objects--completely knowing the causal mechanisms of the brain would mean that we know it can only have a single brain state based on previous states. So you could *only* choose the lasagna, given those particular conditions.

Is that free? Well, it depends on what you mean by 'free.' Most of us don't think that's freedom. But it's not the knowledge that takes away the freedom. It's simply acquiring the knowledge THAT you're not free.

[Fist and Faith]

Ýup. I agree with all that.

[Vraith]

. Thus--assuming the brain is explicable and determinate like all other macro objects--completely knowing the causal mechanisms of the brain would mean that we know it can only have a single brain state based on previous states. So you could *only* choose the lasagna, given those particular conditions.

I agree with almost every word you've said in this little series of exchanges.
This quote is where everything matters/changes---and where the only thing that I would consider to actually be "free will" comes from.
I think that assumption isn't so. [don't know it---but there are definitely macro phenomena that are unpredictable, and some space for things that are indeterminate on that scale]. That brains [and probably some other intricate/complex/complicated macro objects] are explicable but indeterminate. Fully explainable, but knowable only statistically.
I'd even say that indeterminancy is one necessary condition/property of any object that can make most of the claims we make about ourselves and the universe---to "knowing" to "intelligence," to "choice," to "consciousness," and many others.

[hierachy]

I find the determinism vs free will thing to be a very odd dichotomy to propose in the first place.

Surely it should be determinism vs uncertainty... a metaphysical dichotomy.

Neither really imply free will, which I see as more of a subject in the area of neurology.

[peter]

Probably a failure to truly grasp the meanings of one or both on my part, but I think the spirit of my question is fairly clear. Take your Thirteen Monkeys avatar; was it predetermined that you would make that choice, or was it uncertain (and if so did you exercise free-will in the making of it).

[Vraith]

Probably a failure to truly grasp the meanings of one or both on my part, but I think the spirit of my question is fairly clear. Take your Thirteen Monkeys avatar; was it predetermined that you would make that choice, or was it uncertain (and if so did you exercise free-will in the making of it).

Ummm...determined and uncertain are not necessarily mutually exclusive. [depending on how uncertainty is being used/applied---to mean "merely" the knowability is limited/restricted, or to mean it is not determined], so I think your original question form is the better one.
Because determined and free are mutually exclusive. Like a squarecircle, which can only be reconciled by changing things so a square isn't a square or a circle isn't a circle or both.

[hierachy]

Ummm...determined and uncertain are not necessarily mutually exclusive. [depending on how uncertainty is being used/applied---to mean "merely" the knowability is limited/restricted, or to mean it is not determined

The way I was using it could be defined as the antithesis of determinism; could have been otherwise; not predetermined.

Uncertainty, if true, does not imply free will.

I find the concept of free will itself to be very suspect, especially in a discussion at the level of metaphysics.

Take your Thirteen Monkeys avatar; was it predetermined that you would make that choice, or was it uncertain (and if so did you exercise free-will in the making of it).

What exactly do we even mean by free will? What is the entity that has freedom? The avatar choice... I mean, I'm fairly sure there was dopamine involved; without dopamine I probably wouldn't bother to do anything. Does that mean my choice wasn't free?

The more I dissect the concept of free will, the less meaning I find in it. From what I can tell it is just a line drawn in the sand, an imaginary separation between 'I' and the universe of which I am part... and when we ask whether free will exists, we are like the dog chasing its own tail.

When we talk about billiard balls, it is more meaningful to describe the interaction in terms of Newtonian physics than quantum physics. When we talk about war, it is more meaningful to describe it in terms of politics than the interaction of particles. And when we talk about free will, it is more meaningful to talk about it in terms of chemistry and neurology than in terms of metaphysics.

[Vraith]

Uncertainty, if true, does not imply free will.

Exactly my point. Uncertainty may well exist and yet free will not exist.
It is necessary, but not sufficient, for free will.

Metaphysics IS suspect. Which is why I keep insisting in various ways on the physics and that uncertainty by your definition/usage---"not predetermined"---must be a material/physical/existential/instantiated fact for the mere possibility of free will.
And even that isn't enough for free will in any/all conscious/self-conscious beings.
It would only provide the probability that some of those beings in some situations would have some capacity for some freedom of choices/options.

Meaningful free will depends on a very particular set of circumstances: that all the rules/things operate in such a way that intelligent/observing beings can know what those "rules" are, how "things" were, how things are, how things work...YET, the future does not exist. That it is not an already-flipped coin that we just don't know the result of.
It must be integral to the rules. Not illusion... and not some metaphysical/magical/divine gap or space or intervention. [or "container" like Lewis---I think it was Lewis---arguing roughly that we're points on a line and can be free there, but God is a sphere, so can know it all without violating our will. Malarkey. ]

If free will is real, we will eventually know exactly how it works. [[which is kinda scary---cuz then we can make critters that will do exactly what we want and think they know why, and think they're choosing it, and think they're saying something meaningful on KW about how "if free will is real, we will eventually know..." but really just following our Grand Design.
But, we're moral...we'll be nice to them afterwards. At least SOME of them. If there IS an 'afterwards' for them...

[Morning]

Why hasn't anyone edited the title of this thread yet? That's one against free will

[Avatar]

Willpower isn't free, it's damn costly.

--A

[peter]

Listen to this, it might be bollocks. If every event, both mental and physical is immutably fixed in a predetermined world, then uncertainty only exists as a function of lack of knowledge in the minds of entity's within the determined universe in question. (V. said this above didn't he). From outside the set of events of that universe the uncertainty has no existence - or at least it's not the same thing as it is inside the set. A paradox or just bollocks? I thought so - bollocks!

[Vraith]

Listen to this, it might be bollocks. If every event, both mental and physical is immutably fixed in a predetermined world, then uncertainty only exists as a function of lack of knowledge in the minds of entity's within the determined universe in question. (V. said this above didn't he). From outside the set of events of that universe the uncertainty has no existence - or at least it's not the same thing as it is inside the set. A paradox or just bollocks? I thought so - bollocks!

oh oh...be careful. Uncertainty can be just a lack of information, and/or restriction on knowing within the frame of the universe. But it can ALSO be a restriction on knowability at all, by anyone, in any frame. [[and it could be that it is literally so---that things are uncertain with no limit/restriction on knowability because they are, in fact, undetermined]]

[wayfriend]

Listen to this, it might be bollocks. If every event, both mental and physical is immutably fixed in a predetermined world, then uncertainty only exists as a function of lack of knowledge in the minds of entity's within the determined universe in question.

I prefer to believe that free will is more of a "causal collapse". It's when you trace a chain of cause and effect backwards and discover that the chain just arises out of nothing - an effect with no cause. This original effect, which is the exercise of our will, is, in essence, a miracle - an adam or eve of causality. In this way, we are like gods, in that we can cause things to be just by wishing it.

[Zarathustra]

. Thus--assuming the brain is explicable and determinate like all other macro objects--completely knowing the causal mechanisms of the brain would mean that we know it can only have a single brain state based on previous states. So you could *only* choose the lasagna, given those particular conditions.

I agree with almost every word you've said in this little series of exchanges.

...I think that assumption isn't so. [don't know it---but there are definitely macro phenomena that are unpredictable, and some space for things that are indeterminate on that scale]. That brains [and probably some other intricate/complex/complicated macro objects] are explicable but indeterminate. Fully explainable, but knowable only statistically.
I'd even say that indeterminancy is one necessary condition/property of any object that can make most of the claims we make about ourselves and the universe---to "knowing" to "intelligence," to "choice," to "consciousness," and many others.

I lean toward this. I don't necessarily assume what I (for the sake of argument) assumed above. I'm not sure the brain is explicable with current science, especially not on the algorithmic/computer model. As I've pointed out before, people like Roger Penrose speculate that the brain takes advantage of quantum effects and will need a new science to understand fully. Using Godel, he argues that whatever understanding we eventually achieve for consciousness, it cannot be algorithmic. I suppose that means it can't be strictly deterministic. Statistical is a good word for the understanding we'd achieve.

Once you introduce understanding/knowledge into a system, it can't be entirely described with billiard ball determinism. Understanding is ephemeral, ethereal, immaterial ... even as it dances on the hard floor of matter. It creates possibilities that are meaningless analyzed/reduced in terms of bits bumping together.